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Introduction 
1 What Is Philosophical about Philosophical 
Moral Psychology? 
 
Psychology is no more closely related to philosophy than any other 
natural science. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 4.1121 
Throughout the twentieth century, philosophical work in 
metaethics largely ignored the psychological literature on moral 
judgment. … Over the last twenty years, a tradition in moral 
psychology has developed that really does, I will maintain, help us 
understand the nature of moral judgment.  
Shaun Nichols, Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations 
of Moral Judgment, 4 
Thus, the student of politics must study the soul, but he must do so 
with his own aim in view, and only to the extent that the objects of 
his inquiry demand: to go into it in greater detail would perhaps be 
more laborious than his purposes require. 
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1102a 
 
This dissertation consists in four essays on the necessary 
psychological conditions of moral judgment and moral 
responsibility. In addition to examining these psychological 
conditions and their implications for normative theories, some of the 
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papers discuss the proper methodology of such investigation. The 
emphasis on methodology is surely warranted, for the nature of 
claims in this area is apt to be particularly confusing, as much recent 
work in empirical psychology unintentionally shows. Philosophical 
theses and arguments for them are easily mistaken for empirical 
claims, unless they are formulated with particular care. 
Unfortunately, philosophers have often not been careful enough. 
Take a recent attempt at formulating the subject matter of 
philosophical moral psychology by Jay Wallace: 
Moral psychology […] explores a variety of psychological 
phenomena through the unifying prism of a concern for 
normativity. It studies the psychological conditions for the 
possibility of binding norms of action; the ways in which moral and 
other such norms can be internalized and complied with in the lives 
of agents; and a range of psychological conditions and formations 
that have implications for the normative assessment of agents and 
their lives. (Wallace 2006, 87) 
 
Wallace is in effect saying that moral psychology studies what it 
takes to be a moral subject, someone who makes judgments about 
right and wrong, on the one hand, and to be an object of evaluative 
assessment, on the other. As we will see in the next sections, I believe 
this is along the right tracks, but talk of ‘exploring psychological 
phenomena’ or ‘studying psychological formations’ is dangerously 
ambiguous. It is very natural to read it as suggesting an empirical 
investigation into how human beings internalize norms, make moral 
judgments, or engage in moral reasoning, for example. And indeed, 
an increasing number of philosophers and psychologists are treating 
these questions as purely empirical ones. Discussing the role of 
emotion in moral judgment, Jesse Prinz formulates the view with 
exceptional clarity: 
Do our ordinary moral concepts (the ones we deploy in token 
thoughts most frequently) have an emotional component? This is 
essentially an empirical question. It’s a question about what goes on 
in our heads when we use moral terms like ‘good’ and ‘bad’ or 
‘right’ and ‘wrong’. (Prinz 2006, 30) 
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If Prinz is right about the nature of the questions in moral 
psychology, there are two ways to look for answers: we can either 
speculate from the armchair what people are like, relying on 
introspection and anecdotal observation, or we can perform or make 
use of controlled psychological, neuroscientific, and social 
psychological experiments. After all, how else do you ‘explore 
psychological phenomena’? Given these options, it is obvious which 
one to take. Empirical truths about the human mind, as well as 
anything else, are best discovered through the use of the scientific 
method and scientific evidence. Thus Prinz, for example, defends the 
importance of emotion to moral judgment by appeal to fMRI studies 
that show brain activity in areas associated with emotion while they 
make moral judgments or hear morally loaded stories, studies that 
indicate that emotions influence which subject matters people 
moralize about, and studies that claim that violent psychopathy is 
explained by a lacking capacity for negative emotions and 
consequently empathy and guilt.1 
Yet philosophers studying moral judgment and moral 
responsibility have not, by and large, made use of such evidence. As 
John Doris and Stephen Stich put it, 
Until recently, the moral psychology of philosophy departments has 
been largely speculative; prominent empirical claims — about the 
structure of character, say, or the nature of moral reasoning — have 
seldom been subject to systematic empirical scrutiny. (Doris and 
Stich 2006) 
 
Have philosophers simply been irresponsible in turning away from 
brain scanners, experimental microeconomics, psychology 
laboratories, and surveys? Or is it possible that the questions that 
philosophers have been asking are of a very different kind? As this 
dissertation makes clear, I believe the latter is correct. There are 
philosophical questions and philosophical methods that are in an 
                                                 
1 I discuss these data in section 2.3 below. 
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important way discontinuous with scientific ones, although the latter 
are not irrelevant to philosophy either. But what is the difference? 
To begin with a relatively clear case, when it comes to normative 
ethics, we have a pretty good idea about how to distinguish between 
philosophical and non-philosophical questions. Bracketing for the 
time being subjectivism and social relativism about ethics, it is one 
thing to ask what people think is good or right and another to ask 
what is good or right. Here, the distinction between the 
philosophical and the empirical coincides with that between the 
normative and the descriptive. (Correspondingly, it is blurred, if at all, 
to the extent that the distinction between the normative and the 
descriptive is blurred.) This is not to say that psychological data are 
irrelevant to normative ethics. First, insofar as normative theories are 
meant to describe an ideal that could actually guide us, we must be 
able to actually live up to that ideal, and that depends on what we 
are like. Typically, ethical theories are not meant for the benefit of 
angels, but ordinary human beings, and that gives rise to a kind of 
constraint by facts about our psychological capacities, as people like 
Bernard Williams (1981a) and Owen Flanagan (1991) have argued. 
Second, normative theories themselves involve various sorts of 
empirical commitments. Virtue ethics assumes the existence of 
character traits, consequentialists need to know what consequences 
actions have on people’s welfare before they can pronounce on their 
normative status, and liberals of all varieties need to know what 
kinds of social arrangements promote or threaten autonomy to 
derive concrete prescriptions from their principles. Psychological 
results are thus relevant to normative ethics in at least two different 
ways. In neither case, however, is there a danger of confusing the 
philosophical and the empirical aspect of the enterprise.2  
In metaethics, things are otherwise. Many of the questions it asks 
look on the surface very much like factual, empirical questions: What 
is the nature of moral reasoning? Do moral utterances express 
emotions? Can beliefs motivate us? What kind of dispositions are 
                                                 
2 For a more detailed discussion, see section 4 of this introduction. 
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virtues and vices? And so on.3 So what is the difference between the 
philosophical and the non-philosophical in this area? Even those 
who have defended the autonomy of normative ethics with respect 
to psychology and cognitive science have sometimes been willing to 
cede the fight when it comes to metaethics.4 I will begin with a 
simple sort of response that must soon be qualified: as philosophers 
we are interested in what is necessary and what is possible, not in what 
is actual. In metaethics we want to find out what kind of 
psychological structures must be in place for an agent to count as 
making a moral judgment or as fully morally responsible, or what 
the structure of a psychological process must be like for it to count as 
moral reasoning. This is an a priori investigation into the truth 
conditions of the relevant claims or, in other words, our concepts 
and the practices in which they are embedded. It usually proceeds 
by reflecting on intuitive judgments about particular cases and 
drawing general conclusions on that basis. When a philosopher 
claims that to think it is wrong to lie is to be in a state of accepting a 
norm that prescribes guilt for lying, he is not making an empirical 
psychological generalization on the basis of observing people who 
think it is wrong to lie. Rather, he is saying that someone who is not 
in such a psychological state does not really think that lying is wrong 
(whether or not she claims to think so); she does not fulfil the criteria 
for making that type of moral judgment. Thus, the philosopher 
provides a target, as it were, for empirical, a posteriori psychological 
investigation: if you want to find out what makes people think lying 
is wrong, for example, look at what makes people accept norms that 
prescribe guilt for lying. This is the sort of division of labour that 
would be acceptable to those subscribe to the view expressed in 
Tractatus 4.1121, quoted above. 
                                                 
3 For a clear example of someone who takes just this sort of questions to 
be empirical, see Johnson 1996, 50.  
4 See Held 1996, who is content to distinguish between causal 
explanations of moral judgments and normative questions about their 
correctness. This leaves no room for metaethics, which is concerned with 
neither. 
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However, as I noted, distinguishing the philosophical from the 
empirical in terms of the distinction between the a priori and the a 
posteriori is too blunt. Things are not quite so simple. First of all, the 
status of a priori knowledge is a very contentious matter these days. 
Quine’s rejection of the distinction between analytic and synthetic 
truths cast doubt on one natural grounding for a priori knowledge, 
and Kripke’s arguments for the existence of necessary a posteriori 
truths convinced many that conceptual analysis has at best a very 
limited scope in metaphysics.5 There exists a vast literature on the 
topic pro and con, and I cannot review it here.6 As Essay 1 shows, I 
do not despair of the possibility of something like a priori conceptual 
analysis even post-Quine and post-Kripke, so I do not find this 
worry from methodological naturalism compelling. It is not my concern 
to argue that there could not be, for example, a posteriori necessary 
knowledge in philosophy – if we can discover the essence of water 
by empirical research, we could surely, in principle, discover the 
essence of some philosophically relevant kind the same way. All I 
want and need to defend is methodological pluralism – as long as some 
of the important truths about necessities and possibilities are 
accessible to a priori conceptual investigation, there is room for 
traditional philosophical reflection.7 
Nevertheless, second, a posteriori considerations can have a 
legitimate role in philosophical investigation when revision is 
warranted. One desideratum in a philosophical account is making 
sense of our ordinary practices, for which the distinction between 
moral responsibility and the lack of it, for example, seems to be 
fundamental – we take it that some people deserve praise, others 
                                                 
5 Quine 1951, 1960; Kripke 1980. It should be noted that though the 
semantic issue of analyticity and the epistemological issue of apriority are 
connected, they are not identical. For one thing, there may be synthetic a 
priori truths, like, perhaps, the supervenience of moral properties on non-
moral properties (defended in Zangwill 1995). 
6 For some more detail, see the summary of Essay 1 below. 
7 The worry with pluralism is that different methods can lead to 
different conclusions on the same issue. I believe that these priority issues 
must be settled case by case. 
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blame. But what if it turns out that our ordinary concept of moral 
responsibility requires the sort of capacities for reflective self-control, 
for example, that empirical studies show human beings just do not 
have?8 Well, we could say that we should be sceptics about moral 
responsibility. But we could also make a revisionist move. Perhaps 
we cannot be responsible in quite the sense way we thought we 
were, but there is still a distinction to be made that makes sense of 
most of our pre-theoretical judgments in the area; some people do, as 
a matter of fact, have the capacities it takes to be schresponsible and 
others do not, and it is the schresponsible ones we think deserve 
praise and blame. If this were the case, the conclusion to draw could 
plausibly be revising our ordinary concept of responsibility in the 
light of a posteriori considerations. 
Third, there is a class of what we could term Moorean facts about 
human nature. Like the existence of G. E. Moore’s two hands, 
Moorean facts are contingent states of affairs of whose existence we 
are more certain than of any countervailing evidence.9 I would argue 
that there are such things about human nature as well. To begin 
with, I take it that that it is a priori that agents (beings who act and do 
not merely react) somehow represent goals, have some way of 
ranking and selecting among them, and somehow represent their 
environment and the consequences of taking various means to their 
goals. Now, here is a Moorean fact: at least adult, healthy human 
beings are agents. It is a posteriori and contingent, but no conceivable 
evidence from psychology, cognitive science, or biology could 
                                                 
8 This worry is nicely brought out by the recent work of Eddy Nahmias 
on ‘neurotic compatibilism’ (Nahmias forthcoming). It is very different from 
the sort of problem that Galen Strawson (1994, 2002) claims we have, namely 
that our concept of moral responsibility is simply incoherent, so that nobody 
could be free or ultimately morally responsible, whether determinism is true 
or not; if Strawson were right, empirical facts would not matter at all. See 
section 3.2 for more discussion. 
9 Moore’s argument is in Moore 1939. The term ‘Moorean fact’ was 
introduced by David Lewis, according whom they are “those things we 
know better than any philosophical argument to the contrary” (Lewis 1999, 
418). I see no reason to limit the counterarguments to philosophical ones. 
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convince us otherwise. A further Moorean fact about human nature: 
human beings have various emotions. They also daydream, play 
games, desire respect from others, make love and war. If someone 
claimed that they did not, we would be entitled to respond with an 
incredulous stare. So, there is a class of basic truths about human 
psychology that are accessible without scientific study and that 
scientific study could not overturn. Philosophers, too, are entitled to 
appeal to these truths, and have certainly not shied away from doing 
so. However, this should not be taken as a license for unchecked 
armchair speculation about human nature, which, unfortunately, has 
also been a favourite pastime for many philosophers – Hobbes, 
Rousseau, and Nietzsche spring immediately to mind. Caution and 
judgment are called for. It is not easy to draw the line around 
acceptable Moorean appeals, but the more specific and contentious 
the claims become, the more important systematic empirical 
confirmation becomes. For example, we cannot simply assume that 
psychological egoism is false (altruism is not a truism!) or that broad 
character traits like honesty exist – both either are or involve 
explanatory hypotheses about human behaviour.10 As a rule of 
thumb, the fewer empirically unsupported appeals to contingent a 
posteriori truths a philosophical account makes, the better. 
Finally, philosophers do not just analyze, but also systematize, 
explain and justify. The method of reflective equilibrium calls for 
balancing judgments about particular cases with general principles. 
It is surely central to philosophical work in many areas, but cannot 
be straightforwardly classified as a priori or a posteriori. Nor is it 
conceptual analysis. Relatedly, concepts can be vague and their 
application to novel situations uncertain. Perhaps it is indeterminate 
whether small children’s recognition of non-conventional status of 
some norm violations pre-theoretically counts as moral judgment – 
in some ways it does, in some ways it does not.11 In such a case, we 
are surely entitled to fix the borders of the concept guided by further 
                                                 
10 For details, see the discussion of empirical and philosophical work on 
these issues in section 4.1. 
11 I discuss studies on the development of the moral/conventional 
distinction below in section 2.3.  
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theoretical purposes. And finally, it is a desideratum for 
philosophical accounts that the explanations they offer are consistent 
with the results of natural and social science.12 For example, other 
things being equal, an account of how we can come to know moral 
truths that only appeals to naturalistically acceptable mechanisms 
that do other explanatory work as well is superior to an account that 
postulates a capacity not known to existing science. Rejecting 
methodological naturalism in favour of pluralism does not necessarily 
mean giving up on substantive naturalism, the ontological view that 
there are no supernatural properties.13 
The picture that emerges is that while there is an important 
discontinuity between philosophical and scientific questions and 
methods, a posteriori considerations can be relevant to philosophical 
inquiry in a number of distinct ways. Philosophers cannot simply 
dismiss what science says about their area of interest, even if it is 
unlikely that the empirical data as such will settle philosophical 
disputes. Methodologically, I thus reject both Wittgensteinian 
exceptionalism and naturalistic assimilationism. Aristotle’s view, as 
usual, seems the most wise. As to the subject matter, I take it that the 
questions of philosophical moral psychology fall under three main 
categories: 
 
1. What are the necessary psychological conditions for 
making moral judgments – that is, what is the nature of 
moral thinking? 
2. What are the necessary psychological conditions for 
being morally responsible and thus fit to be praised and 
blamed? 
3. What are the implications of facts about human 
psychology for normative ethical theory? 
                                                 
12 One way to cash this out is to say that a wide reflective equilibrium is 
preferable to a narrow one. See Rawls 1971 and Daniels 1979 for discussion. 
13 I formulate substantive naturalism in terms of rejection of the 
supernatural rather than in terms of affirming the existence of only natural 
properties, since it makes sense to classify non-naturalists in ethics as 
(potentially) substantive naturalists. But this is a terminological issue. 
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For reasons discussed in the next section, the first category has 
traditionally been central to metaethics, so I will call it narrowly 
metaethical. Questions in the second category can be termed broadly 
metaethical, since they concern the nature of key elements of our 
ethical practices, but are not themselves normative questions, at least 
not directly. The final category obviously falls under normative ethics, 
though the psychological claims involved are either simply empirical 
or belong to either of the two metaethical categories. As it turns out, 
there are a variety of links between these categories. It is very 
plausible that being morally responsible requires being able to make 
moral judgments, so the metaethical categories are, to a degree, 
interdependent. Second, the capacities required for moral 
responsibility are plausibly also necessary if not sufficient for 
autonomy. This means that they have implications for most 
normative ethical and political theories, and thus for questions of the 
third category. 
In the rest of this introduction, I will present some of the 
background of the essays comprising the dissertation and 
summarize their main arguments. Together, they touch on all of the 
central issues in philosophical moral psychology. Simplifying things 
somewhat (since none of the papers is limited to discussing 
questions of a single category), essay 1 discusses the distinctive a 
priori methodology of philosophical moral psychology, essay 2 
narrowly metaethical questions, essay 3 broadly metaethical issues, 
and finally essay 4 the normative implications of the metaethically 
relevant psychological facts. Though I do not claim to offer a 
comprehensive theory of philosophical moral psychology in this 
collection of articles, I hope that their joint effect is to demonstrate 
that the recent explosion of interest in the field is not altogether 
unjustified and that philosophy still has something distinctive to 
contribute. 
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Essay 1: The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy 
 
The traditional wisdom has it that philosophers are cheap: they do 
not need a laboratory, statistics programs, or a microscope, just a 
laptop and a subscription to JSTOR. This, of course, is because the 
knowledge they seek has been taken to be accessible a priori, in some 
sense independent of experience. An important part of this 
knowledge is conceptual in nature. (Hardly anybody would claim 
that all of it is; there seem to be (in Kantian terms) synthetic a priori 
truths, like the knowledge that nothing can be both blue and yellow 
all over.) Conceptual or analytic truths are such, it used to be said, by 
virtue of the meanings of the words involved. Some, like “Vixens are 
female foxes”, wear their status on their sleeve. Others, like the 
(alleged) conceptual truth that someone who could not have done 
otherwise that she in fact did, did not act freely, are unobvious and 
may not be recognized as such. However, the traditional view has it, 
if there are conceptual truths, they are knowable a priori, with no 
need for experience beyond what is needed to grasp the concepts 
involved. One need not go out and catch a lot of vixens and run 
them by a vixen-sexer to discover that they are all female. Nor does 
one need to go out and observe (per impossibile) that none of the 
people who could not have acted otherwise acted freely. Sufficient 
justification for the beliefs, if it exists, is available to reflection of 
competent concept-users, and unavailable on the basis of experience. 
Why do philosophers care about conceptual truths? A simple 
answer is suggested by the discussion in the previous section: 
because philosophers want to get at the essence of things, at what is 
necessary and what possible, and conceptual truths seem to offer at 
least part of the answer to such questions. It is not possible for a 
vixen not to be a female fox; in every possible world, if there are 
vixens, there are female foxes. (Though of course they may not be 
called ‘vixen’, and other things may.) To vary the example, if moral 
judgment internalism is true, it is not possible for a person to make a 
genuine first-personal moral judgment without being motivated to 
some degree to act accordingly. What happens in these cases is that 
we make the move, in Carnapian terms, from the formal mode to the 
material mode – from the observation that our concept of moral 
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judgment would not apply to a certain sort of psychological state to 
the conclusion that the state in question is not a moral judgment, or 
from the truth conditions of attributions of moral judgment to the 
shape of the fact that constitutes it. If internalism is true, motivation 
is part of the essence of moral judgment. 
So far, so good, but here problems arise. What if a vixen does not 
feel at home in the body of a foxy temptress and undergoes what we 
call a sex change operation? Is it still female? Is it still a vixen? And 
most importantly, do our answers to these two questions necessarily 
go together? Quineans think they do not.14 We could decide to call 
something a vixen even if we granted it was now a male. For Quine 
(1951), all truths are open to revision in light of new a posteriori 
beliefs, famously even mathematical and logical truths. There are no 
conceptual truths. He is no friend of essences. Kripke (1980), by 
contrast, is. His challenge to traditional conceptual analysis is 
drawing apart three distinctions that the logical positivists assumed 
to coincide, the analytic/synthetic, a priori/a posteriori, and 
necessary/contingent distinctions. Kripke is particularly concerned 
to show that there can be a posteriori necessary identities, such as the 
identity of Hesperus with Phosphorus or water with H20. His work 
has inspired most contemporary metaphysicians to talk about de re 
necessities and forget about conceptual truths (though Kripke 
himself does not deny their existence). In contrast to Quine’s heirs, 
however, the Kripkeans feel free to engage in a priori speculation 
about the nature of the world. 
Fortunately, I do not have to take a stand on this debate in ‘The 
Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’. It turns out that at some 
point in their argument, both defenders and critics of conceptual 
analysis appeal to conceptual intuitions about various scenarios – 
would we say that some animal is a vixen, or that some sample of 
liquid is water? These intuitions are taken to be shared with other 
speakers and thinkers who have the concept in question. Within the 
practice of conceptual analysis, too, intuitions serve as evidence one 
                                                 
14 But let us not forget the well-known Yiddish proverb: Az di bobe volt 
gehat beytsim volt zi geven mayn zeyde (if my grandmother had balls, she 
would be my grandfather). 
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way or another. Does moral responsibility require alternative 
possibilities? Well, if we can construct a scenario in which we would 
happily describe someone as morally responsible in spite of lacking 
alternative possibilities – this is what Harry Frankfurt (1969) tries to 
do – then it does not. If it turns out that the original scenario fails to 
rule out alternative possibilities (as some have claimed in Frankfurt’s 
case), it does not support compatibilism after all. This is how much 
debate within analytic philosophy is still conducted. But what kind 
of claim is it that an agent in a scenario is intuitively responsible? It 
seems to be a claim about ordinary people’s judgments concerning 
the case in question, a claim about how they would classify the case, 
or simply what they would say.15 But what is the source of 
entitlement for claims of this kind? That depends on how exactly we 
construe the claim. If it is an empirical hypothesis about the 
linguistic behaviour of the majority of speakers, we need a posteriori 
empirical evidence to decide on it. If it is a claim about competent 
users of a shared concept would say in suitable conditions, a priori 
entitlement comes for free with conceptual competence and being in 
suitable conditions. 
The cornerstone of a new school of philosophical methodology 
commonly called experimental philosophy is that claims about 
intuitions are empirical hypotheses about observable linguistic 
behaviour. Consequently, experimentalists have conducted a host of 
surveys measuring people’s responses to carefully constructed 
scenarios. They have discovered, for example, that most people say 
that a person can be morally responsible for robbing a bank even if 
the world is deterministic, and that most people say a psychopath 
can think that something is morally wrong and yet feel no 
compunction for doing it. In ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental 
Philosophy’, I challenge this understanding of philosophical appeals 
                                                 
15 The term ‘intuition’ has very many uses in philosophy, even in this 
area. George Bealer’s view is that intuitions are “sui generis propositional 
attitudes,” fallible intellectual seemings that serve as the source of a priori 
knowledge (e.g. Bealer 2003, 73–75). Bealer is clearly coming from the 
philosophy of logic and mathematics, where appeals to intuition may well 
play a different role. 
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to intuition. I argue that they are claims about what the rules 
constituting our public concepts require us to say in particular cases, 
which is to say that they are claims about what competent speakers 
in sufficiently ideal conditions would say if they ignored pragmatic 
considerations. I argue, further, that surveys do not and could not 
provide the sort of data that would settle the truth of this sort of 
claims. They cannot rule out insufficient grasp of the concept in 
question (which is all the more likely since the scenarios presented 
tend to be non-paradigmatic cases), mistakes in application due to 
inattention or emotional factors, or the influence of pragmatic 
considerations, such as wanting to avoid undesirable implicatures. 
This is why they can only get at what I call ‘surface intuitions’, which 
are not legitimate evidence in philosophical debates. 
Positively, I argue that there are two sources for knowledge 
about shared concepts. One is simply reflection. What one would say 
oneself can be a guide to what other users of the same concept would 
say, since we all have a history of interactions with other speakers. In 
those interactions, there is pressure for uniformity, since otherwise 
we would be speaking past each other all the time. There are also 
sanctions, which may consist in nothing more than 
misunderstanding. To be sure, reflection is not as easy as it looks, 
and conditions may be less than ideal for the very reason that one 
typically has an interest one way or the other. That is why there is a 
role for the second source of knowledge about shared concepts, good 
old-fashioned Socratic dialogue. This is a type of dialogue that aims 
at creating suitable conditions for the responder’s judgments to 
match her own rules. In dialogue, one can vary the scenario in 
question, compare and contrast it to others, and so draw the 
attention of the respondent to the presumably relevant features. 
Thus, someone who is first inclined to say that the psychopath can 
make genuine moral judgments may change her mind when she is 
brought to consider everyday cases in which lack of motivation and 
guilt defeats the attribution of moral judgment. Of course, one’s own 
initial sense of things may be wrong; if the respondent in a Socratic 
dialogue persists in a judgment that is contrary to one’s theoretical 
commitments, and especially if many do so, one should conclude 
that one’s own intuitions may be corrupted. For example, the folk 
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concept of moral judgment may indeed turn out to be externalist. An 
internalist about moral judgment, then, would be proposing a 
revisionist account on the basis of some other philosophical virtues, 
and in effect saying that we should change our practice. After all, 
there is much more to philosophy than conceptual analysis.16 
 
                                                 
16 Along with my paper, Philosophical Explorations will publish two 
responses. In ‘The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy’, Eddy 
Nahmias and Thomas Nadelhoffer accept that surface intuitions do not 
suffice, but defend the possibility of getting at robust intuitions by surveys 
that are better designed. In ‘Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical 
Significance’, Joshua Knobe seems to make a U-turn and reject the 
importance of conceptual analysis to philosophy. The sort of experimental 
philosophy he now defends uses ‘intuitions’ to discover how the mind 
actually works rather than what our concepts are. 
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2 The Role of Moral Psychology in Metaethics  
 
Metaethics, narrowly conceived, is the study of the nature and 
presuppositions of ethical thought and its linguistic expressions. As 
it is often put, metaethics asks second-order questions about ethics, 
not first-order ones. It does not ask whether, for example, bombing 
civilians is morally wrong but whether it can be objectively true that 
bombing civilians is morally wrong and what kind of facts, if any, 
would make it the case that it is so (moral metaphysics), whether the 
linguistic expressions of the moral judgment in question are in the 
business of stating facts or (perhaps in addition) conveying attitudes 
about bombing civilians (moral semantics), how is it that we come to 
know that bombing civilians is morally wrong (moral epistemology), 
and finally, what it is to think that bombing civilians is morally 
wrong and what is distinctive of the psychological processes that 
lead to such thoughts (moral psychology).  
Answers to these questions are obviously not independent of 
each other. If, as non-cognitivists in moral psychology say, to think 
that bombing civilians is wrong is to have some kind of negative 
attitude toward it, then it is natural to suppose that linguistic 
expressions of moral judgments convey this attitude, and there is 
little point in looking for facts that would make the judgment true. 
This makes non-cognitivism metaphysically and epistemologically 
very undemanding, but raises well-known questions about the 
apparent objectivity of moral judgments and the apparent logical 
relationships between moral judgments, for example. If, on the other 
hand, cognitivists are right and thinking that bombing civilians is 
wrong is having a belief about its properties, we can 
straightforwardly ask when such beliefs are justified and what, if 
anything, makes them true. This puts moral judgments and 
 
 
 
 
26 
discourse on par with other domains in which questions have correct 
answers, but raises notorious problems about either explaining how 
sui generis moral properties fit in a physical world or how moral 
properties can be identical with natural ones, as well as issues about 
the apparent motivational and emotional importance of moral 
judgments. The history of metaethics is the story of a balancing act of 
trying to fit all the apparent features of moral thought and reality in 
one coherent account starting either from cognitive or non-cognitive 
side. 
2.1 Why Moral Psychology Matters to Metaethics 
Both cognitivism and non-cognitivism are in the first instance 
doctrines in philosophical moral psychology, though the terms 
‘cognitivism’ and ‘non-cognitivism’ are all too often applied to views 
in moral metaphysics as if they were interchangeable with ‘realism’ 
and ‘irrealism’ (or ‘anti-realism’). (This is highly misleading, not least 
because there are forms of irrealist cognitivism, namely error theory 
and many varieties of fictionalism.) Why have these moral 
psychological terms come to designate the main options in 
metaethics as a whole? It seems that while metaethical problems in 
different areas can be approached piecemeal, there is a natural order 
of dependence between them. Insofar as moral semantics studies 
what moral utterances convey and how, it seems obvious that an 
answer to this question depends on the answer that we give to the 
question of what moral judgments consist in – that is, what it is to 
think something is right or wrong – since it is those very judgments 
that sincere moral utterances give expression to. In other words, the 
following Expressive Identity Thesis (EIT) holds: 
 
(EIT) What moral judgments consist in = what moral utterances 
express 
 
As it is sometimes put, moral judgments provide the sincerity 
conditions for moral utterances – an utterance of ‘Bombing civilians is 
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wrong’ is sincere only if the speaker really thinks bombing civilians 
is wrong, whatever having that thought consists in. (It may be the 
case that moral utterances convey more about the speaker’s 
psychological states than just their sincerity conditions, perhaps by 
way of pragmatic implicatures. The study of moral language, 
therefore, does not reduce to moral psychology, though the latter is 
essential to it.) Further, insofar as moral metaphysics studies what 
ontological commitments moral utterances involve and whether the 
world meets them or not, the answers it gives seem to depend in part 
(but essentially) on answers given by moral semantics. So, the 
following Metaphysical Identity Thesis (MIT) holds: 
 
(MIT) What moral utterances commit us to = what kind of facts 
(if any) would make moral utterances true 
 
Given EIT, what moral utterances commit us to is inherited from 
moral judgments, so given MIT, psychological study of moral 
judgment is central to the answers of moral metaphysics. For 
example, if to think that bombing civilians is wrong is to ascribe a 
non-natural property to bombing civilians, what would (or does) 
make bombing civilians wrong would be its having such a property. 
(Of course, there is the further metaphysical question of whether the 
sort of facts moral judgments ascribe exist and what their nature is. 
While moral psychology is essential to moral metaphysics, the latter 
does not by any means reduce to moral psychology.17) Similarly, 
moral epistemology could hardly get off the ground before we have 
an understanding of whether there is moral knowledge in the first 
place and what it consists in. Thus, epistemology again points back 
to questions about the nature of moral judgment. In this way, moral 
psychology has a certain limited explanatory priority in metaethics, 
and it often makes sense to classify comprehensive metaethical 
positions as cognitivist or non-cognitivist.  
                                                 
17 Error theory makes this point vivid: according to Mackie (1977), for 
example, non-naturalist cognitivism is the correct view in moral psychology, 
but there simply are no facts that would make the moral beliefs true. 
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However, it is still possible that methodologically, some other 
branch of metaethics provides a more fruitful entry point to the 
interlinked questions. Traditionally, and for a good reason, it is 
moral semantics that has enjoyed this sort of methodological 
priority. The question about what moral utterances express is, 
arguably, a question about public linguistic norms that are accessible 
to philosophical reflection and so offer the prospect of intersubjective 
agreement. In such reflection, we can exploit EIT in the other 
direction: since moral judgments are what moral utterances express, 
knowing what moral utterances express is knowing what moral 
judgments are. This is why knowing whether moral utterances are 
disguised imperatives, for example, has direct implications for moral 
judgment, and someone like Hare can be unhesitatingly classified as 
a non-cognitivist, in spite his focus on moral language rather than 
moral psychology. However, we can also ask more directly what 
counts as taking a moral stance while still exploiting the publicly 
available character of conceptual norms by asking what makes 
attributions of moral judgments true. That is, we can inquire into the 
truth conditions of the following sorts of claims: 
 
Jordan thinks that she morally ought to go home. 
Paul thinks giving money to charity is morally good. 
James thinks Paul is generous. 
Michael thinks it would be dishonest to take the money. 
Anne thinks she owes gratitude to Michael. 
 
In each case, what makes the attribution true is something about 
the psychological condition of the person involved – his or her 
beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, and so on.18 For a long time, 
metaethicists have focused on the first two kinds of judgments, 
assuming that other sorts of moral judgments can be reduced to 
some combination of them and factual judgments. This non-
accidentally parallels the focus in normative ethics on duties and 
obligations, right and wrong, or good and bad. As normative 
                                                 
18 This is, perhaps, not a truth universally acknowledged; see Knobe and 
Roedder 2006 and my response in Kauppinen 2006. 
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ethicists have come to have a richer picture of the ethical landscape, 
emphasizing the notions of virtue and vice and the plurality of 
deontic concepts, metaethicists are slowly beginning to follow.19  
2.2 Perspectives on Practical Reasoning and Moral 
Motivation 
 
Any reflection on moral phenomenology reveals that moral 
considerations strike us – most of us, anyway – as having a 
particular kind of authority over us in deliberation. We experience 
them as demanding or compelling, as independent of our will or 
whims. This phenomenology provides one entry point into further 
questions in metaethical moral psychology: What kind of 
motivational and cognitive structures must be in place for this kind 
of experience to be possible? Do moral considerations really have the 
sort of authority we experience them to have, or is the experience in 
that respect an illusion? If they do, what is the source of the 
authority? These are questions about the appearance and reality of 
the demands of morality, and virtually every classic of Western 
philosophy has tried to answer them. As I will try to show, this 
inquiry, though it draws on some Moorean facts about human 
nature, has certain distinctively philosophical characteristics. First, it 
is concerned with possibility and necessity, not just actuality. 
Second, and most importantly, it always has in view the veracity of 
the phenomenology, so to speak: the explanation of moral 
motivation will be either vindicating, if it is compatible with the felt 
authority being warranted, or undermining, if the psychological 
                                                 
19 I defend a cognitivist view of moral judgments involving ‘thick’ 
concepts like generosity and gracefulness in my ‘Kind Words and Cruel 
Facts’ (in preparation). 
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mechanisms it appeals to make it implausible that moral 
considerations have the sort of standing we take them to have. 
To chart the available options in this area, I will organize them in 
a tree structure. The basic division I make is between those who 
argue that the authority of morality is also the authority of reason 
and those who deny that the demands of morality are rationally 
compelling. The most radical form of this denial is skepticism about 
the authority of morality. According to these skeptics, the explanation 
of how we come to have the sense of moral obligation undermines it. 
Thus, on most readings, Nietzsche and Freud each offer debunking 
accounts of how we come to feel that we ought to do something – in 
broadest terms, we come to punish ourselves for the things that 
others punish us for. But denial of the rational authority of morality 
need not lead to skepticism, as sentimentalists like Hume and Smith 
show. For them, the fact that the felt authority of morality has its 
source in the social sentiments of the human animal does not mean it 
is any less normatively compelling, given the sentimentalist 
conception of normativity. It would be begging the question against 
sentimentalists to insist that vindicating the demands of morality 
requires showing they are rational or at least backed up with 
reasons. 
On the rationalist side, the first division is between those who 
share Hume’s skepticism about the power of reason to evaluate final 
ends and those who have confidence in the practicality of reason. 
Prudentialists like Hobbes take it as given that the pursuit of self-
interest is rational and try to show that moral behaviour is in 
everyone’s enlightened self-interest. If that were the case, the 
authority of moral demands would be underwritten by the authority 
of our own future good. This story is only partially rationalist, 
however, since the ends to which morality is a means remain beyond 
rational assessment. There are two ways in which practical reason 
could extend beyond an instrumental role. Formalists like Kant argue 
that the very nature of rational agency is a source of normative 
demands for everyone regardless of their existing desires. The 
faculty of reason in its practical use allows us to recognize these 
demands and can give itself rise to motivation. Substantivists like 
Aristotle refrain from making the assumption that all rational agents 
would find moral demands compelling. But they do believe that 
there are reasons for doing the right thing and that being a virtuous 
agent is a matter of being able to recognize these reasons and being 
appropriately motivated by this recognition. 
The philosophical options in making sense of the appearance and 
reality of moral demands can be summed up in the following tree: 
Is the felt authority of morality the authority of reason? 
noyes
Are there practical reasons   Can something other than reason
that are not grounded in desires?   be a source of genuine authority?
noyesnoyes
Are there reasons that Prudentialism Sentimentalism Scepticism
derive from the nature of  (Hobbes) (Hume, Smith)   (Nietzsche)
agency as such?
yes no
Formalism Substantivism
(Kant)  (Aristotle)
Choosing between these positions requires answering a number of 
questions that have been at the center of recent metaethical debates:
What are the roles of belief, desire, and emotion in motivation? Is the
source of desires expected pleasure, expected good, or something
else? Must normative reasons be grounded in existing motives?
What makes a psychological transition an instance of practical
reasoning? Can practical reason be the source of moral motivation?
31
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What role do principles play in moral deliberation? What is virtue? 
All of these can be seen as questions about moral judgment, 
provided that judgment is understood in its process sense rather 
than the product sense, as an activity rather than a state. A full 
theory of moral judgment would integrate theories of the process 
and the product of judging into a coherent whole. 
In this section, I will give an overview of how different traditions 
in philosophical moral psychology answer questions about the 
process of moral judgment. However, I will  discuss sceptical views 
only to the extent that some empirical theories count as such. A 
thorough discussion of the views of Nietzsche and Freud would lead 
too far away from mainstream debates. Since the purpose of this 
introduction is simply to provide a broader background for the 
articles comprising the dissertation, I will not try to adjudicate 
between the competing accounts either. 
2.2.1 The Sentimentalist Tradition 
The distinctive feature of sentimentalism is that the authority of 
morality is grounded in sentiments rather than reason. It thus 
combines pessimism about the powers of practical reason with 
optimism about human nature. I will begin with the conception of 
practical reason that the sentimentalist and prudentialist traditions 
share in its essentials. 
Reasoning in general is a process of arriving at new 
psychological states (or retaining old ones) by way of drawing out 
the implications of old ones. It is thus something one does, 
consciously or unconsciously. For a psychological process to count as 
reasoning, the transitions from old to new states must somehow be 
underwritten, and perhaps also guided, by broadly speaking logical 
relations among their contents.20 In the simplest case, a person who 
begins with the beliefs that it will rain tomorrow if the barometer 
                                                 
20 This sketch draws on the work of Gilbert Harman (1999a) and John 
Broome (1999). See also Wallace 2003. 
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falls below 980 and that the barometer reads 979, and infers that it 
will rain tomorrow counts as engaging in (good) reasoning, since the 
content of the new belief deductively follows from the contents of 
the old ones. The causal transition between psychological states 
mirrors the abstract logical relationship among the contents, insofar 
as the agent is rational. This simple case is surely an exception: much 
reasoning is based on relations that are looser than the deductive, 
and all too often people engage in bad reasoning that only remotely 
resembles drawing out logical consequences. 
Practical reasoning differs from theoretical reasoning in at least 
two main respects: its subject matter is not establishing how things 
are but what one is to do, in virtue of which is it essentially first-
personal, and its conclusion is correspondingly a psychological state 
with practical relevance, either a belief about what one ought to do 
or an intention to act. The simplest kind of practical reasoning is 
instrumental reasoning, which is (roughly) reasoning from intentions 
(or desires) and beliefs about the most efficient means to new 
intentions to take the most efficient means. On the Humean picture of 
practical reason, this is the only sort of practical psychological 
transition that merits the title of reasoning.21 Relying on what is 
called the ‘Humean Theory of Motivation’22, according to which only 
psychological states with a world-to-mind direction of fit, 
paradigmatically desires, can motivate us to act, Humeans argue that 
if practical reasoning is to lead to action, its conclusion must be a 
desire-like state. Relying on what has been termed the ‘desire-in, 
desire-out principle’23, according to which practical reasoning can 
                                                 
21 To talk about a ‘Humean’ view is not necessarily to talk about Hume’s 
own view, and the same goes for other classics. The relationship between 
Hume and Humeans is some sort of family resemblance, the most distinctive 
feature of which is Hume’s assertion that “Reason is, and ought only to be 
the slave of the passions.” (Hume 1739-1740/1978, 415). 
22 For a well-known defense of the view, see Smith 1987. For the notion 
of direction of fit, see also Anscombe 1958a, Searle 1983. Smith’s version of 
the Humean theory is criticized and rejected by Schueler 1995, Dancy 2000, 
and Tenenbaum (forthcoming).  
23 Wallace 1990, 370. 
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give rise to new motivation only if there has been some antecedent 
“motivation for the agent to deliberate from”, as Bernard Williams 
puts it24, Humeans argue also that the starting point of practical 
reasoning must ultimately be a desire that is itself beyond rational 
assessment. Consequently, desires can be rationally criticized only 
insofar as they are based on false factual beliefs or conflict with 
other, more fundamental non-rational desires.25 It is a short step 
from here to the familiar maximizing conception of rationality, 
according to which what it is rational for us to do is what would 
maximize our expected utility, where utility is understood as 
satisfaction of existing desires. If what we have reason to do is what 
we would do if we were fully rational, this has implications for what 
reasons we have as well. Based on the connection between 
rationality and reasons, Williams has argued that what an agent has 
reason to do is constrained by her existing motivations, however 
those have come about. In his terms, we can have only internal 
reasons, considerations that would motivate us after sound practical 
deliberation proceeding from our existing motivational set.26 
Negatively, the claim is that there are no external reasons, 
                                                 
24 Williams 1981b, 109. It should be noted that Williams himself goes 
beyond the narrowly Humean picture by including among an agent’s 
“motivational set” not just desires but also “dispositions of evaluation, 
patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and various projects, as 
they may be called, embodying commitments of the agent” (ibid., 105), and 
among ways of practical deliberation not just means-end reasoning but also 
finding constitutive means, harmonizing and ranking ends, and imagining 
what the realization of ends comes to (ibid., 104). Compare Hume, Treatise 
3.1.1, 296–298. 
25 What ‘more fundamental’ means in this context is not a simple 
question. It is cannot be just ‘causally stronger’, since that would leave no 
room for normativity – the causally strongest desire is by definition the one I 
actually act on. Several alternatives are open: perhaps fundamental desires 
are those on which others depend for their point (for example, desire to 
borrow a book probably lacks a point in the absence of a desire to read the 
book) or those that feature centrally in the agent’s self-conception (for 
example, Ronald Reagan’s desire that Communism fail). 
26 Williams 1981b, Williams 1995, 39. See also Smith 1995.  
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considerations that would be normative for an agent regardless of 
her existing motivational states. It would be “bluff” or “bullying” 
someone to insist that they have a reason to do something that does 
not serve their desires or projects.27 
The Humean view has clear implications for the relationship 
between morality and rationality. If our reasons depend on our 
contingent desires, it may well be the case that a dictator has no 
reason to refrain from torturing his opponents. If, as seems plausible, 
what we ought to do is what we have most reason to do, it may thus 
be the case that the dictator positively ought to torture his 
opponents.28 Morality and reason come apart. This raises a worry 
about the authority of morality. There are two basic reactions to this 
threatening fact within the instrumental or maximizing conception 
of rationality: denying it or giving an alternative explanation for why 
morality is important. Hobbes and his followers like Gauthier take 
the first route and try to show that at the end of the day, it pays off to 
be moral, so it is rational in this sense after all. Since the pursuit of 
one’s enlightened self-interest does not look very much like moral 
behaviour even on those occasions in which the two coincide, I will 
                                                 
27 Williams 1981b, 111, Williams 1995. 
28 This conclusion is embraced by Gilbert Harman, according to whom it 
is not the case that Hitler ought not have ordered the extermination of Jews, 
given his values, even if we can say, deploying our own values, that Hitler 
was evil (Harman and Thomson 1996, 60–62; Harman 1975). Other Humeans 
like Simon Blackburn avoid this conclusion by rejecting the connection 
between reasons and oughts, on the one hand, and rationality, on the other; 
consequently, they can say that though it was not irrational for Hitler to 
order the genocide, he had no reason to do so and ought not to have done so 
(Blackburn 1998, ch. 9). 
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leave this prudentialist option aside here.29 At best, it vindicates the 
authority of morality in an ersatz sense.30 
The second alternative is more promising. Hume and Adam 
Smith begin with a strict division of labour between reason and 
sentiment: the former tells us what the probable consequences of our 
actions are and the latter independently makes us choose those that 
benefit general happiness. The central question thus becomes how 
we can and do come to have a desire, or more precisely a sentiment 
of approbation toward actions that benefit others, even when it runs 
contrary to our own perceived interests. On their story, we start our 
approving actions that give us pleasure and disapproving those that 
cause us pain. However, it is a natural fact about us that we 
sympathize with the pleasure and pain of others as well, and thus to 
an extent share them. (It is important that this is not a prescription 
but a descriptive claim: we cannot help sympathizing with others.31) 
This kind of first-order sympathy already disposes us to disapprove 
of actions that cause pain to others – unless we take them to deserve 
it, or, perhaps, if our own interests are at stake. For such cases, at 
least, a further source of motivation is needed. Here sympathy enters 
the story a second time: we also come to feel the approval and 
disapproval of others toward our own actions. This process of 
internalizing the attitudes of others is the source of the sentiments of 
shame and guilt, which can be motivationally very effective.32 Of 
                                                 
29 As Kant points out, “[t]he maxim of self-love (prudence) only advises; 
the law of morality commands” (Kant 1788/1996, 169). In his example, if you 
win a game by cheating, prudence congratulates you, while the moral law 
tells you to despise yourself. Nor do we think people deserve to be punished 
if they act against their self-interest, unlike in the case of moral violations. 
30 In fairness to Hobbes in particular, he is not concerned with moral 
obligation or our sense of it, but with the justification of political obligation. 
31 “These sentiments are so rooted in our constitution and temper, that 
without entirely confounding the human mind by disease or madness, ‘tis 
impossible to extirpate and destroy them.” (Treatise 3.1.2, 305) 
32 Both Hume and Smith provide very persuasive examples of the 
motivational role of shame, in particular. Hume mentions the mortification 
that a man feels when another complains of his bad breath, though it clearly 
 
 
 
 
37 
course, we are aware of the fact that particular others may approve 
or disapprove of us without our meriting it, perhaps because their 
interests conflict with ours. But we can also imagine how an impartial 
spectator would react to our action, and thus come to feel that the 
approval or disapproval is warranted. As Smith puts it,  
we either approve or disapprove of our own conduct, according as 
we feel that, when we place ourselves in the situation of another 
man, and view it, as it were, with his eyes and from his station, we 
either can or cannot entirely enter into and sympathise with the 
sentiments and motives which influenced it. […] We endeavour to 
examine our own conduct as we imagine any other fair and 
impartial spectator would examine it. (Smith 1759/1976, Part III, 
chap. 1.) 
 
Along the same lines, Hume notes that if we call someone an 
‘enemy’ or a ‘rival’, it is understood that we are expressing our 
particular sentiments, but if we call him ‘vicious’ or ‘depraved’, we 
are expressing sentiments with which we expect our audience to 
concur, sentiments that would be endorsed from a ‘common point of 
view’.33 When moralizing, we distance ourselves from our 
immediate sentiments of praise and blame, since we are aware that 
morally irrelevant facts about our situation, such as mood, 
spatiotemporal position and self-interest, can distort them, and 
reflectively correct for such factors to arrive at more impartial 
judgments. As Hume puts it, “We make allowance for a certain 
degree of selfishness in men; because we know it to be inseparable 
from human nature, and inherent in our frame and constitution. By 
this reflection we correct those sentiments of blame, which so 
naturally arise upon any opposition.”34 This is how we may even 
                                                                                                       
it is as such no inconvenience to himself (Treatise 3.3.1) and Smith that of a 
man who looks around and finds he is the only one laughing at his joke 
(Smith 1759/1976, 1.1.2). 
33 Enquiry IX, 252. 
34 Treatise 3.3.1, 372. Hume also notes that this impartial correction is an 
aspiration in which we often fail: “Sympathy, we shall allow, is much fainter 
than our concern for ourselves, and sympathy with persons remote from us 
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admire our enemies.35 This is no different in principle to what we do 
with our sense perceptions when we correct for the effects of 
distance or lighting conditions. In both cases, as Geoffrey Sayre-
McCord puts the Humean position, we are able to distinguish 
between reality and appearance by defining “a set of standard 
conditions occupied by a standard observer and [taking] her 
reactions (her sense perceptions or sentiments) as setting the 
standard for ours”36. If we did not take those steps, morality could 
not perform its function of social coordination of attitudes and 
actions.37 Specifically moral language would lose its point. Thus, in 
short, our natural, non-rational dispositions to sympathize, 
internalize, and imagine together give rise to recognizably moral 
preferences, which we then tend to project as features of the world 
itself. 
As Simon Blackburn has emphasized, the Humean story is not a 
sceptical one, even though it denies that the demands of morality are 
those of rationality and denies the explanatory reality of moral 
properties. The fact that the felt authority of morality derives from 
internalizing the disapproval of an impartial spectator does not 
undermine that authority. It does not make the moral demand 
                                                                                                       
much fainter than that with persons near and contiguous; but for this very 
reason it is necessary for us, in our calm judgments and discourse 
concerning the characters of men, to neglect all these differences and render 
our sentiments more public and social.” (Enquiry V, 220) 
35 Treatise, 303. 
36 Sayre-McCord 1994. Sayre-McCord argues that for the purposes of 
social coordination of moral judgments, we are better off referring to a 
standard rather than ideal (omniscient, perfectly impartial, limitlessly 
sympathetic etc.) observer, whose reactions we could not possibly anticipate, 
given that we as a matter of fact always lack her knowledge and 
psychological capacities. 
37 In Hume’s words, “When we form our judgments of persons, merely 
from the tendency of their characters to our own benefit, or to that of our 
friends, we find so many contradictions to our sentiments in society and 
conversation, that we seek some other standard of merit and demerit, which 
may not admit of so great variation.” (Treatise 3.3.1, 373; cf. Enquiry V, 219–
220) For a contemporary version, see especially Gibbard 1990. 
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arbitrary or unwarranted – that is the point of idealizing the 
disapproval. To be sure, it does not vindicate morality by showing 
that its demands are rational, but the sentimentalists reject such 
restriction on the notion of vindication. To think that morality is 
vindicated is itself to have a positive sentiment toward it, and Hume 
argues at the very end of the Treatise on Human Nature that this is 
precisely what should happen when we come to see that moral 
thought has its source in our natural social sentiments: 
All lovers of virtue (and such we all are in speculation, however we 
may degenerate in practice) must certainly be pleas'd to see moral 
distinctions deriv'd from so noble a source, which gives us a just 
notion both of the generosity and capacity of human nature. It 
requires but very little knowledge of human affairs to perceive, that 
a sense of morals is a principle inherent in the soul, and one of the 
most powerful that enters into the composition. But this sense must 
certainly acquire new force, when reflecting on itself, it approves of 
those principles, from whence it is deriv'd, and finds nothing but 
what is great and good in its rise and origin. (Treatise 3.3.6, 394) 
2.2.2 The Kantian Perspective 
For the sentimentalists, those of us who treat moral demands as 
authoritative do so only because of contingent facts about human 
nature – most of us happen to be attuned to the sentiments of others. 
Kant found this an intolerably shaky foundation for morality, as well 
as one that does not sit well with our commonsense conviction that 
the demands of morality obligate everyone. For him, if the will is 
determined with respect to a contingent goal of an agent, it always 
aims at some expected pleasure.38 To be sure, the source of that 
                                                 
38 Kant is thus a psychological hedonist when it comes to motives not 
derived from pure reason. To this extent he is in accord with Hume, 
according to whom “’Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that aversion 
or propensity arises towards any object” (Treatise 2.3.3, 266), and a long line 
of others. In the Metaphysics of Morals he emphasizes that pleasure can be 
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pleasure may be the well-being of others, but insofar as it is just a 
pleasure among others, what he will do is unbearably contingent 
from a moral perspective. If some other pleasure appears greater or 
easier or longer-lasting, a benefactor “can even repulse a poor man 
whom at other times it is a joy for him to benefit because he now has 
only enough money in his pocket to pay for his admission to the 
theater”39. In Kantian terms, the Humean view has room only for 
hypothetical reasons to be moral. Kant himself famously held that as 
we ordinarily understand it, the demands of morality are both 
rational and categorical, imperative for anyone regardless of their 
desires. To vindicate the authority of morality, we must be able to 
show that even Hume’s ‘sensible knave’ who, lacking sympathy or 
imagination, desires to take advantage of his fellow-men when able 
to do so with impunity, has reason to honour the moral law.  
Establishing that the knave has reason to act morally will 
naturally take a lot of argument. Perhaps the cleverest arguments 
against the Humean view aim to show that instrumental reasoning is 
only normative or reason-providing if there are categorical reasons 
to have the desires that serve as its premises. Otherwise it is not the 
case that one ought to take the means, or has reason to do so. Thus, 
John Broome has argued that Humeans commit the fallacy of 
detachment parallel to a similar mistake in modal reasoning: just as it 
would be a mistake to infer “Necessarily q” from “Necessarily, if p 
then q” and p, it is a mistake to infer “I ought to φ” from the 
instrumental principle “I ought to make it the case that if I desire to 
ψ, I take the best means φ” and desiring to ψ.40 In the modal case, 
for it to be necessarily the case that q, it must also be necessarily, not 
                                                                                                       
associated with desire in two ways, either as cause or effect (Kant 1797/1996, 
373–374). In the latter case, the pleasure cannot determine the desire, which 
must instead be directed by pure practical reason itself. This sort of pleasure 
is not pathological but moral: “[P]leasure that must be preceded by the law in 
order to be felt is in the moral order.” (Kant 1797/1996, 511; emphasis in the 
original) 
39 Kant 1788/1996, 157. 
40 What I present here is a simplified and modified version of the 
argument in Broome 1999. 
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merely contingently, the case that p, even if q necessarily follows 
from p. Similarly, in the case of oughts, for it to be the case that I 
ought to φ, it must also be the case that I ought to desire to ψ, even if 
rationality requires φ-ing if one desires to ψ.41 If there is a sound 
argument of this type, reasons cannot bottom out in non-rational 
desires.42  
Even if the Humean view of practical reasoning is inadequate, it 
does not yet follow that a Kantian view must be correct. The 
distinctively Kantian approach is to argue that categorical reasons 
derive from the very structure of practical reasoning itself. Like 
Humeans, Kantians thus understand reasons for action in terms of 
what it would be rational for an agent to do. For Kant, practical 
reasoning is a matter of deciding which maxim of action to adopt; a 
maxim is a subjective principle of action of the type “In 
circumstances C, I will perform action A in order to achieve end 
E”43. A maxim is like a policy or law that one gives to oneself. Many 
contemporary Kantians argue that having such policies, as opposed 
to merely doing what one most desires, is constitutive of being a 
person as such. The argument is that being a person is not being at 
the mercy of passing desires (like Harry Frankfurt’s ‘wantons’) but 
having a vantage point that transcends particular moments.44 
Persons are capable of taking a stand on things on the basis of 
                                                 
41 The fallacy can be formulated in terms of the scope of the relevant 
operator. In the case of necessity, it is a matter of reading □ (p→q) as p→□q, 
which are clearly not equivalent. Using ‘O’ for ‘ought to’, the practical 
reasoning case can be formulated as mistaking O (ψ→φ) for ψ→Oφ. The 
latter principle would obviously allow for detaching the consequent.  
42 Christine Korsgaard presents a different argument in the same vein in 
Korsgaard 1997. It is criticized in Hubin 2001. 
43 It is an indication of the contested nature of Kant interpretation that 
there is no consensus on such a fundamental issue as what a maxim is for 
him. The formulation I use captures all the elements in at least one of Kant’s 
own examples, namely “[E] From self-love [A] I make it my principle to 
shorten my life [C] when its longer duration threatens more troubles that it 
promises agreeableness.” (Groundwork II, 74) 
44 See Korsgaard 1996 and Velleman 2006 for this line of argument. 
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reflection, and taking a stand consists in adopting policies and 
principles. 
Famously, Kant argues that adopting a maxim is rational only if 
it could at the same time be willed by all as a universal law. What this 
amounts to and exactly how it is meant to work is the subject of 
much controversy. A few things should be relatively clear, however. 
First, this formulation of the Categorical Imperative45 is meant to be 
a formal criterion, a filter through which any maxim must pass to be 
rational. The criterion must be formal, because reasons are 
essentially the sort of considerations that have authority for any 
rational agent. Rationality cannot depend on the material of the 
maxims, contingent desires and goals, since people have, or at any 
rate could have, all sorts of desires or goals.46 By the same token, the 
maxim must be universalizable – if it is binding on me qua rational 
agent, it is binding on everyone qua rational agent. As many have 
recently argued, for a policy to be rational, it must be justifiable to 
any rational agent, suitably qualified – for Habermas, to any agent 
willing and able to enter into an uncoerced discourse47, for Scanlon, 
to any agent who is motivated “to find principles for the general 
regulation of behavior that others, similarly motivated, could not 
reasonably reject”48.  
Second, here as elsewhere, the fundamental formal principle of 
rationality is that of avoiding contradiction. Kant offers two different 
tests for this. The contradiction in conception test asks whether the 
                                                 
45 I follow the current convention and capitalize the Categorical 
Imperative when talking about the test that maxims must pass in order to 
determine which are “categorical imperatives” in the plural, i.e. 
prescriptions that obligate unconditionally. I will here discuss only the 
Formula of Universal Law version and leave aside the issue of whether the 
other formulations are equivalent, as Kant claims. 
46 “And how should laws of the determination of our will be taken as 
laws of the determination of the will of rational beings as such, and for ours 
only as rational beings, if they were merely empirical and did not have their 
origin completely a priori in pure but practical reason?” (Groundwork II, 63) 
47 See Habermas 1983, Habermas 1996. 
48 Scanlon 1998, 6. 
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maxim is even conceivable as a universal law; if not, it will not be 
justifiable to any rational agent. Kant’s most famous and persuasive 
example of this is the case of deceitful promises. Suppose I am 
considering the possible maxim “I will make a deceitful promise in 
order to advance my interests”. If it were a universal law, it would 
be something like “Everyone will make a deceitful promise in order 
to advance his interests.” But if everyone made deceitful promises 
when it suited them, the whole institution of promising would 
collapse: no one would take anyone’s word for anything.49 Thus, the 
maxim cannot be coherently universalized. A maxim whose contrary 
fails the contradiction in conception test identifies a perfect duty or 
unconditional obligation. Since failing to keep promises fails the test, 
keeping promises is such a duty – for Kant, it is never acceptable to 
break a promise. The other test Kant offers for identifying rational 
maxims is contradiction in will. According to him, there are maxims 
that can be conceived as universal laws but cannot be coherently 
willed as such. One of his examples is failing to develop one’s talents. 
The idea seems to be that given some basic facts about human 
beings, they cannot achieve any goals without either themselves or 
others having the skills they require. If nobody had any skills, no 
goals would be reached. Assuming that as agents we are always 
seeking one goal or another, we cannot coherently will a world in 
which no goals are reached.50 If this sort of admittedly contrived 
reasoning holds water, we have an imperfect duty to develop our 
talents. Imperfect duties obligate only sometimes and to some extent 
– we need not spend all our time developing our talents. 
Suppose that we do, in fact, get determinate content for the 
moral law by way of the categorical imperative test, and so as a 
result of pure reasoning. (Since I am not here concerned with 
                                                 
49 As Kant puts it, “the universality of a law that everyone, when he 
believes himself to be in need, could promise whatever he pleases with the 
intention of not keeping it would make the promise and the end one might 
have in it itself impossible, since no one would believe what was promised 
him but would laugh at all such expressions as vain pretenses.” (Groundwork 
II, 74) 
50 Compare Kant 1797/1996, 522–523. 
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arguing for any particular position, I will adopt an agnostic stance on 
whether or not Kant’s tests yield determinate results.) Why should 
anyone care about this – that is, why should we adopt only rationally 
acceptable policies? Well, if, as it seems, the question about why one 
should care about something is a question about what reasons we 
have to care about something, it is already answered. In David 
Velleman’s words, there is “something self-defeating about asking 
for a reason to act for reasons”51. Similarly, when we ask if 
something really has authority, we seem to be asking for reasons to 
obey its commands, and we already know that reason commands us 
to obey the commands of reason. So while we can, as a matter of fact, 
act contrary to morality, as we all too often do, its normative 
authority over us is inescapable and the demands it makes upon us 
genuine. When we experience something as having this sort of 
authority, we have the subjective feeling of respect (Achtung) for it: 
“What I cognize immediately as a law for me, I cognize with respect, 
which signifies merely consciousness of the subordination of my will 
to a law without the mediation of other influences on my sense.”52 
Kant hastens to add that respect is not a cause of the moral law (that 
is, the will is not presented with a hypothetical imperative “If you 
respect the moral law, do x”) but an effect of the law. Kant does not 
present this as an empirical hypothesis; rather, consciousness of a 
law one has given oneself is what respect is.53 Thus, insofar as moral 
                                                 
51 Velleman 2006, 19. 
52 Groundwork I, 56n. This kind of respect combines elements of fear and 
inclination: the law gives rise to something like fear insofar as it may 
command us to act against our own happiness, and something like 
inclination, since it is something that we ourselves will as rational agents, 
not something external. 
53 Thus, to say that one acts out of respect for the law, as Kant sometimes 
does, is just to say one’s action is determined by consciousness of the law, 
and since the latter results from an exercise of pure reason, reason itself can 
be practical. I emphasize this, because otherwise there is a temptation to 
read Kant as going back on his claim that reason itself can be practical when 
he says things like “neither fear nor inclination, but solely respect for the 
law, is the incentive which can give an action moral worth” (Groundwork II). 
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demands are reason’s own laws, both their experienced and 
normative authority is explained. 
2.2.3 The Aristotelian Alternative 
It takes some violence to fit Aristotle into the framework of moral 
motivation I have been working with. The Greeks, as is well known, 
were not terribly keen on moral obligation and guilt. Nor were they, 
like Kant, haunted by the possibility that morality might not be 
authoritative for everyone. But Aristotle does contrast acting ‘for the 
sake of the fine’ with other motives and links it with avoiding shame, 
and believes that the demands of virtue are those of reason. This is 
clear both in his general metaethical remarks and the discussion of 
particular virtues. For example, he says of the brave person that 
“though he will fear even the sorts of things that are not irresistible, 
he will stand firm against them, in the right way, as reason prescribes, 
for the sake of the fine, for this is the end aimed at by virtue”54 (all 
emphases in the paragraph are mine). Standing firm in the face of 
danger requires that “the brave person’s actions and feelings accord 
with what something is worth, and follow what reason prescribes”55. 
Moreover, when a virtuous person does what reason prescribes, “he 
will do this with pleasure, or at any rate without pain; for action in 
accord with virtue is pleasant or at any rate painless, and least of all 
                                                                                                       
Such passages could suggest that an incentive (Triebfeder) in addition to 
reason is needed for moral action in Kant’s moral psychology. Along the 
same lines, Philip Stratton-Lake analyzes respect as “reverential awareness 
of the moral law” (Stratton-Lake 2000, 36) and defends the view that this sort 
of awareness constitutes being morally motivated rather than usurping the 
practical role of the moral law itself. 
54 NE 1115b, 41. I will be referring to Irwin’s translation of Nicomachean 
Ethics using both the Bekker and Irwin page numbers. Since I am not 
working from a Greek edition, I will not use line numbers. 
55 NE 1115b, 41. 
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is it painful.”56 Practical reason, emotions, desires, and pleasure are 
thus all involved in the process of moral judgment, but Aristotle’s 
understanding of each is very different from his early modern 
counterparts. I will focus on the puzzles of his understanding of 
practical reason and its relationship to virtue and emotion. 
Aristotle has a kind of Humean theory of action – for animals. 
Animals experience pleasure and pain, and expectation of pleasure 
or pain gives rise to desire, which gives rise to action.57 But in 
human beings, desire or wish (boulesis), in contrast to mere animal 
urge, is essentially oriented to what the agent takes to be good. Of 
course, if the agent thought that pleasure was the only good, this 
would almost coincide with the Humean account of desire.58 But 
since for Aristotle there is more to well-being or eudaimonia than 
pleasure, the virtuous, who have a correct conception of the good, 
have a different motivational structure.59 They desire in accordance 
with reason, and deliberate about the best means (which may be 
constitutive) to bring about the desired end. The structure of 
deliberation, for Aristotle, can be represented by means of a practical 
syllogism. The first or major premise is the ‘premise of the good’, 
which is the content of a desiderative (orectic) state, and the second 
                                                 
56 NE 1120a, 50. This is in the context of a discussion of generosity. 
57 See Irwin 1980, 42. Desire in animals is “appetite (epithumia), 
nonrational desire for the pleasant” (Irwin 1980, 44). 
58 I say it would ‘almost’ coincide, since for Aristotle, pleasure is not a 
single phenomenal state. Instead, there are many kinds of pleasure arising 
from the exercise of our various capacities, in short, activities. As Aristotle 
often says, the sort of pleasure that is characteristic of an activity, like the joy 
of solving a mathematical problem, completes it, while an alien pleasure 
disrupts it. See NE 1174a–1176a, 157–161. 
59 It follows from the nature of pleasure (see previous footnote) that it 
does not make sense to aim at happiness by way of finding the best means 
for maximizing pleasure. This is just not a meaningful goal, since the 
‘means’ and the ‘end’ are not independent of each other in the way that such 
deliberation would require. The best life is the most pleasant, too, but that is 
just a consequence of the fact that it involves the exercise of characteristic 
human capacities with respect to their proper objects. Compare NE 1099a, 
11. 
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or minor premise is the ‘premise of the possible’, which is the 
content of a cognitive state, and the conclusion an action or a 
decision to act. For deliberation to be good, both of these premises 
must be correct. In good deliberation, “virtue makes the goal correct, 
and prudence makes the things promoting the goal [correct].”60 (This 
statement creates a number of puzzles, which I will return to in a 
moment.) Decision (prohairesis), in turn, is just a “deliberative desire 
to do an action that is up to us” (NE 1113a, 36). This deliberative 
desire, then is the “principle of the action – the source of the motion” 
(NE 1139a, 87), unless weakness of the will intervenes.  
                                                
Given that Aristotle sometimes suggests that the scope of 
prudence or practical wisdom (phronesis)61 is limited to “things open 
to deliberation”62, there is some temptation to read him as having a 
Humean conception of practical reason as an ability to go from one 
desire to another.63 But this cannot be true. Aristotle also 
unambiguously says that prudence is “a state of grasping the truth, 
involving reason”64. Practical wisdom is distinct from mere 
cleverness, which is “such as to be able to do the actions that tend to 
promote whatever goal is assumed and to attain them” (NE 1144a, 
97). The phronimos, the practically wise person, has the right aim as 
well as the right means to it. That is why it cannot be had without 
the virtues of character.65 At the same time, full virtue cannot be 
acquired without phronesis; virtues of character do not merely accord 
with right reason, but involve it.66 There is thus a puzzle at the heart 
 
60 NE 1144a, 97. Gloss by Irwin. 
61 ‘Prudence’ is the term used in Irwin’s standard translation of NE. 
‘Practical wisdom’ seems often more appropriate. I will use both terms here. 
Prudence is the virtue of the part of the rational part of the soul that is 
concerned with things that can be otherwise. 
62 NE 1141b, 91. Cf. also NE 1139a, 86, according to which prudence is 
the virtue of the rationally calculating part of the soul, and “deliberating is 
the same as rationally calculating”.  
63 For this kind of reading, see Audi 1989. 
64 NE 1140b, 89, 90. 
65 NE 1144b, 98-99; NE 1178a, 165. 
66 NE 1144b, 98. 
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of book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics and Aristotle’s theory of 
practical reason: how can we reconcile the claim that we do not 
deliberate about the ends with the claim that virtues, which set the 
ends, cannot be had without phronesis? One way to understand these 
remarks is to understand prudence functioning in two stages: first 
specifying what would best promote eudaimonia in the present 
situation (providing the premise of the good), and then deliberating 
about the best means to that end. This sort of two-part conception of 
the process seems to accord well with NE 1142b: “If, then, having 
deliberated well is proper to a prudent person, good deliberation 
will be the type of correctness that accords with what is expedient 
for promoting the end about which prudence is the true supposition” 
(my emphasis). This is the line taken by Terence Irwin, who believes 
that when we deliberate about what promotes happiness, “we 
discover its constituents, and so we have a more precise conception 
of happiness”, which can then be “the basis for further deliberation 
about what to do”67. But how can this be reconciled with the claim 
that “we deliberate about things that promote the end, not about the 
end” 68? 
Some interpreters believe that the only way to make Aristotle 
coherent is to take the correct end that prudence requires to be 
provided by some other capacity. We know that what makes an end 
correct is that it contributes to eudaimonia or happiness or living well, 
which everyone can agree in the abstract is the one thing that we do 
not pursue for the sake of anything else and for the sake of which (at 
least in part) we pursue all other things. But this is not to say 
anything until we have a concrete view of what eudaimonia consists 
in.69 How do we reach that? David Reeve argues that ethical 
principles, generalizations that hold for the most part about what 
constitutes eudaimonia or promotes it, are not a matter of 
deliberation, though they are arrived at by a rational process: “We 
do not deliberate about what eudaimonia really is. We discover what 
it is, as we discover what a crab is, by experience, empirical 
                                                 
67 Irwin 1999, 249. 
68 NE 1113a, 36. 
69 Cf. NE 1095a, 3. 
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investigation, and dialectic.”70 Practical wisdom gets its major 
premise “second-hand from the scientific part”71. How does the 
scientific part, then, get at the principles of ethics? Reeve’s leading 
idea is that ethics is much more like science for Aristotle than many 
think. Like science, ethics has first principles that cannot be derived 
from other principles. Instead, their source is in the first instance 
induction (epagoge) from experience. 
 In ethics, induction works to begin with by way of experiences 
of pleasure and pain, which inform us whether our existing ends are 
such that they contribute to a satisfactory life – whether what we 
happen to desire actually is desirable.72 We learn, for example, 
which foods it is good to eat and how much. This process does not 
begin with a blank slate, since we start out with natural tendencies 
that are roughly in the right direction – children do not find crude oil 
appetizing, for example.73 Nor does it take place in a social vacuum: 
we already have generations of ‘experiments in living’ (Reeve 
borrows Mill’s term) behind us, and so culturally transmitted 
knowledge of what is good for being like us, such as recipes for Thai 
red curry. (Some people get lucky in this respect and get better 
brought up than others in the ways of human happiness; more on 
this below.) These experiences give rise to candidate conceptions, 
which can then be tested in dialectic argumentation against the endoxa 
on the area, the views held by “everyone or by the majority or by the 
wise, either by all of them or by most or by the most notable and 
                                                 
70 Reeve 1992, 82. Compare Reeve 2006, 205: “that happiness is our end 
is not up to us, since, as something determined by our function or essence … 
it does not admit of being otherwise”. 
71 Reeve 2006, 208. 
72 Reeve 2006, 204, 214. He points out that these experiences also inform 
us of what the best means to satisfy our desires are. Compare NE 1172a, 153: 
“[W]hen we educate children, we steer them by pleasure and pain.” 
73 In line with his general teleological worldview, Aristotle talks about 
“natural virtue” in NE VI, 13. As Reeve puts it, “without natural virtue we 
will not have the kind of experience from which the truth about eudaimonia 
can be reached by induction or habituation.” (Reeve 1992, 89) 
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reputable”74. Dialectic in general, not just in ethics but all the 
sciences, is a matter of trying to solve the aporiai or apparent 
contradictions among the endoxa by removing ambiguities, 
identifying false assumptions, explaining how people could have 
come to make mistakes, and showing that the principles arrived at 
can account for the remaining endoxa.75 Aristotle’s summarizes some 
of these features at the beginning of his discussion of weakness of 
will: 
As in other cases, we must set out the appearances, and first of all 
go through the puzzles. In this way we must prove the common 
beliefs about these ways of being affected – ideally, all the common 
beliefs, but if not all, most of them, and the most important. For if 
the objections are solved, and the common beliefs are left, it will be 
an adequate proof. (NE 1145b, 100) 
 
Aristotle’s argument against the widely held belief (and thus 
endoxon) that happiness is bodily pleasure is an example of this sort 
of dialectic at play – basically, he argues that people who have 
limited experience of the good life take one constituent of it, bodily 
pleasure, for the whole thing.76 This makes intelligible why the many 
make a mistake, and allows Aristotle to delete the view with good 
conscience from the list of those that the best theory must 
accommodate. 
Dialectic, certainly, is a rational process of justification, but it is 
not practical reasoning – it aims to discover how things really are, to 
give us theoretical knowledge or nous of eudaimonia. Of course, not 
everyone engages in dialectic, but in any case, once we have a 
conception of what happiness is and what promotes it, whether 
derived from personal experience, education, or dialectic, in Reeve’s 
picture, “phronesis or practical wisdom uses perception to apply a 
universal … supplied by nous to guide a particular action.”77 On this 
                                                 
74 Topics I.1.100b21-23, I.11.104b32-34 (quoted in Reeve 2006, 200). 
75 See Kraut 2006; also Reeve 1992, ch. 1.  
76 See NE 1153b-1154a. 
77 Reeve 1992, 59. 
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kind of view, the universal, which functions as the major premise of 
the practical syllogism, is something like “Giving to the needy is part 
of the good life”, and the minor premise, supplied by a kind of 
perception, is something like “My signing this check is giving to the 
needy”.78 It is important that the ‘middle term’ of the syllogism 
(“giving to the needy”) is itself cast in terms of ethically neutral 
properties whose instantiation can consequently be grasped by 
anyone, including those not having had a good ethical upbringing. 
The ethical weight, so to speak, is then carried by the major premise; 
it is what one must get right in order to be a virtuous person.79 
                                                 
78 The minor premise must involve indexical and demonstrative 
elements, since it is meant to lead to immediate action or at least decision 
concerning action. See also Gottlieb 2006.  
79 Aquinas’s theory of practical reason seems to work along these lines. 
He clearly subscribes to the division of labour model: prudentia (his Latin 
version of phronesis) “applies universal principles to the particular 
conclusions of practical matters” (Summa II/II/Q47.6). These principles are 
known to the understanding by a “special natural habit, which we call 
‘synderesis’.” (Summa I/Q79.12), a notion related to conscience. There is a 
twist to the story, however: for Aquinas, understanding is in a sense a part of 
prudentia: “Now every deduction of reason proceeds from certain statements 
which are taken as primary: wherefore every process of reasoning must 
needs proceed from some understanding. Therefore since prudence is right 
reason applied to action, the whole process of prudence must needs have its 
source in understanding. Hence it is that understanding is reckoned a part of 
prudence.” (Summa II/II/Q47.7) The sense in which understanding is a part 
of prudence seems to be that it is one of the abilities needed for practical 
wisdom. According to Aquinas, prudentia has eight such ‘quasi-integral’ 
parts: memory (since it is needed to learn from experience), understanding 
(nous, right estimate of a principle, which is needed to get the major premise 
right), docility or deference (since we must learn from others), shrewdness 
(since we must be quick in seeing similarities to find the right minor 
premise), inference (since we move from premises to conclusion), foresight 
(since we must anticipate consequences), circumspection (since we must fit 
the means to our circumstances) and caution (since appearances of the good 
are often deceptive). (Summa, II/II/Q.48-49) 
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There is, however, a different reading of Aristotle that gives the 
perceptual nature of phronesis more emphasis than Reeve allows. It 
highlights Aristotle’s remark that practical wisdom “is about the last 
thing, an object of perception, not scientific knowledge”80. On this 
view, defended by John McDowell, virtue does not consist in having 
the right principles, for there are no such things to be had – the 
moral world is too complex to be captured in finitely graspable rules, 
as Aristotle suggests several times in the Ethics81 – nor does practical 
wisdom, correspondingly, consist in selecting the action that best 
promotes the end specified by the principles. Instead, as Myles 
Burnyeat puts it, when Aristotle talks about moral learning, he is 
pointing to “our ability to internalize from a scattered range of 
particular cases a general evaluative attitude which is not reducible 
to rules or precepts.”82 A virtue of character, Aristotle says, is a state 
or disposition (hexis) to feel pleasure, pain, anger, pity, and other 
emotions “at the right times, about the right things, toward the right 
people, for the right end, and in the right way”83. If this is the case, 
                                                 
80 NE 1142a, 93. 
81 NE 1094b, 2; NE 1098a, 9. See also NE 1137b, 83-84, where Aristotle is 
discussing why laws, which are inherently universal, will sometimes lead to 
error in individual cases but are not the worse for that: “And the law is no 
less correct on this account; for the source of the error is not the law or the 
legislator, but the nature of the object itself, since this is what the subject matter 
of actions is bound to be like.” (my emphasis) 
82 Burnyeat 1980, 72. Martha Nussbaum has defended a similar view, 
arguing that moral principles are “summaries or rules of thumb, highly 
useful for a variety of purposes, but valid only to the extent to which they 
correctly describe good concrete judgments, and to be assessed, ultimately, 
against these.” (Nussbaum 1990, 68) 
83 NE 1106b. Aristotle does famously characterize the right end, right 
way, and so on, as a mean between extremes, but this is a singularly 
unhelpful characterization. I find Sarah Broadie’s reading of this ‘doctrine of 
the mean’ persuasive. Though she is too reverent to come straight out and 
say that it is useless (she thinks that virtues are dispositions that protect 
from “excesses and deficiencies of feeling and impulse” (Broadie 1991, 101) 
that lead astray), she notes that some passages in Aristotle suggest that “one 
could discover independently that such and such a possible response would 
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McDowell argues, there is really not much substance to the so-called 
major premise or premise of the good: 
Having the right end is not a mere aggregate of concerns; it requires 
the capacity to know which should be acted on when. If that 
capacity cannot be identified with acceptance of a set of rules, there 
is really nothing for it to be except the capacity to get things right 
occasion by occasion: that is, the perceptual capacity that 
determines which feature of the situation should engage a standing 
concern. So the premise of the good, and the selection of the right 
feature of the situation to serve as premise of the possible, 
correspond to a single fact about the agent, which we can view 
indifferently as an orectic state or as a cognitive capacity. 
(McDowell 1998b, 30) 
 
McDowell’s reading emphasizes that virtue and phronesis really do 
go hand in hand, as NE 1144b says. This has a number of 
consequences. First, when it comes to moral learning, “the moulding 
of character is (in part) the shaping of reason”84 When we learn to be 
virtuous, we are learning what reasons there are for doing things 
and what is really worthwhile. When we fail to become virtuous, we 
are also blind to (some) reasons there are. Thus, though moral 
education is not a rational process, it can be necessary for opening 
one’s eyes to reasons. For Aristotle, you cannot convince everyone 
by rational argument that they should be virtuous. If they cannot see 
a reason for doing something that, say, decreases their pleasure 
though it would crucially benefit others, their failure is not one of 
rationality. There is no incoherence or contradiction involved. The 
strongest support for this kind of reading comes from passages like 
the following: 
                                                                                                       
be intermediate independently of knowing that it would be right, and from 
this deduce that it would be right” and goes on to point out, rightly, that 
“there seems to be no independent sense of ‘intermediate’ such that every 
response is right to which that sense applies.” (ibid., 100) 
84 McDowell 1996/1998, 184n33. Cf. McDowell 1998b, 40. 
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What argument, then, could reform people like these? For it is 
impossible, or not easy, to alter by argument what has long been 
absorbed as a result of one’s habits. … Arguments and teaching 
surely do not prevail on everyone, but the soul of the student needs 
to have been prepared by habits for enjoying and hating finely, like 
ground that is to nourish seed. (NE 1179b, 168) 
 
It may thus take good luck to be able to appreciate what one has 
reason to do. Aristotle self-consciously addresses his treatise to the 
lucky: only those who already have a decent grasp of ‘the that’ (what 
is good) will benefit from an examination of ‘the because’ (why it is 
good), both because only they have the necessary cognitive grasp 
and because only they have the necessary motivation for the 
reflection to make a practical difference to their lives.85 It should be 
emphasized that this in no way contradicts the view that the 
demands of virtue are the demands of reason.86 All it means is that 
reasons and rationality can come apart, so that we can have reason to 
do something even if we could be perfectly rational while failing to 
recognize it. This is a decisive departure from the tradition of Hume 
and Kant, which is reaffirmed in our day by Bernard Williams, as 
discussed above. As McDowell sees it, one can come to be sensitive 
to reasons, including reasons one always had, by means of non-
rational processes like being influenced by moving rhetoric, 
inspiration, and conversion.87 For him, the point of the contrast that 
Aristotle draws between virtue and practical wisdom is that though 
one cannot have practical wisdom without having the right goal 
(and so recognizing genuine reasons), it is not exercise of practical 
wisdom that makes it the case that one’s goal is right, but the 
shaping of one’s character in good upbringing.88 
                                                 
85 Compare NE 1095b, 4 and Irwin 1999, 176–177. 
86 It does mean, though, that insofar as moral responsibility requires 
being able to respond to reasons, bad luck in upbringing can lead to reduced 
responsibility. See also the discussion in section 3.2. 
87 McDowell 1995/1998, 100. 
88 McDowell 1998b, 31–32. 
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Secondly, if the ability to see reasons and being virtuous go 
together, Aristotle’s so-called ‘function argument’ must be seen in a 
new light. In Book I of the Ethics, Aristotle argues that the good for 
anything that has a function (ergon) depends on what the function is 
– what it is to do well as a carpenter is determined by the function or 
characteristic activity of a carpenter as such. It also provides a 
criterion for which qualities of an individual qua a member of a 
functional class are true excellences or virtues (aretai) – precision is a 
virtue of the carpenter because it is required to build well, while wit 
is not his virtue as a carpenter, since it is not required for that. So if 
there is a function or characteristic activity of a human being, 
something “it is the business of a human being to do”89 as McDowell 
has it, it will tell us what is good for human beings and what the true 
virtues are. Aristotle thinks there is such a thing. After ruling out 
merely staying alive (which is shared with plants and so could not be 
specifically human) and sense perception and movement (which are 
shared with animals), he concludes that “the human function is 
activity of the soul with reason or requiring reason”90. Doing well as 
a human being, then, is engaging in activities that involve the use of 
reason over the course of an entire lifetime.91 The qualities that are 
truly human excellences or virtues are those that serve or constitute 
this kind of life. This, Aristotle admits, is just a sketch to be filled in 
later; sadly, he never explicitly does so in the works preserved to us. 
So it is unsurprising that the function argument has been taken to be 
many different things.  
One understanding of it is as providing a metaphysical 
grounding for ethics in human nature – if the best life for human 
beings can be specified in advance of taking an ethical stance, and 
the traditional virtues best promote it, it can be shown to be in 
everyone’s interest to be traditionally virtuous. Someone who cheats 
                                                 
89 Ibid. 
90 NE 1098a, 9. 
91 As Nussbaum emphasizes, this should not be taken to exclude 
physical activities; rather, it means that in a good life rational activity “is the 
distinctive and guiding feature that gives life its characteristic overall shape” 
(Nussbaum 1995, 113–114). 
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in a business deal, for example, harms herself in a way that can be 
specified in non-ethical terms. McDowell rejects this reading. For 
him, Aristotle’s talk of human nature should be seen as a “rhetorical 
flourish”92, a way of framing the issue about what kind of life is best 
in a way that connects it to the question of which character traits 
really are virtues. When Aristotle says that the human ergon is 
engaging in rational activity, all this does is exclude a brutish or 
solitary life from being the good life.93 The argument does not 
provide an Archimedean point outside the fray of moral argument 
for choosing between various kinds of activities involving 
rationality, like selfish pursuit of riches and fame or devotion to 
finding a cure for cancer. There is no external validation for ethics, 
and no need for it. The fact that it is in one’s self-interest to be ethical 
is not visible, so to speak, from outside an ethical perspective – it is 
good for you to be honest, but that is not to say that honesty best 
satisfies the desires of any human being or guarantees the most 
pleasure to her, regardless of her upbringing. Instead, in reflecting 
on what the true virtues are or what it is the business of human 
beings to do, we may and must draw on our substantial ethical 
convictions. McDowell likes to borrow Neurath’s famous coherentist 
image of repairing a ship while still at sea – one can remove and 
replace a particular plank only while relying on other planks, which 
may in turn be removed and replaced later.94 Just so, we can 
vindicate the status of honesty as a genuine human excellence only 
within a scheme of values that determines, among other things, what 
are characteristically human activities. That is why those who lack 
the grasp of ‘the that’ cannot grasp ‘the because’, the kind of 
justificatory story that shows the point of having a particular virtue 
by placing it in a larger scheme of things, either. By contrast, 
“[s]omeone who is well brought up has the beginnings [needed for 
ethical inquiry – AK], or can easily acquire them.”95  
                                                 
92 McDowell 1980/1998, 19. 
93 McDowell 1980/1998, 13. Compare McDowell 1998b, 35. 
94 McDowell 1996/1998, 191–195; McDowell 1998b, 36–40.  
95 NE 1095b, 4. 
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The third consequence of linking virtue and practical wisdom 
closely is a distinctive picture of what moral judgment amounts to. 
On McDowell’s view, virtue and practical wisdom manifest 
themselves first in the correct morally loaded perception of the 
situation; certain features of it appear to the agent as calling for a 
response, as contributing to the moral shape of the situation. Moral 
reasoning is a matter of coming to recognize these demands and 
balancing them without the aid of principles, and its aim is to arrive 
at the correct conception of the situation. But how can a correct 
conception of the situation, a kind of belief, be motivationally 
efficacious? McDowell’s influential reading has it that for the 
virtuous person, the thing to do in the situation stands out as 
practically salient, and that is both a cognitive and motivational state 
– nothing else seems appealing to her, as we might say. So, for 
example, someone who lacks the concern that goes with (is one with) 
the virtue of temperance, and to whom, say, a tryst with an intern 
thus seems appealing, is not in the same cognitive state (does not 
perceive the world in the same way as) the truly temperate person.96 
Lacking the proper concern (motivational state), he has at best a 
limited grasp of what virtue calls for in this situation, since the 
knowledge in question is not knowledge of principles but a 
situation-specific sense of what really matters.  
As McDowell puts it, the competing concerns are “silenced” by 
the virtue.97 In the Aristotelian tradition, there is thus a fundamental 
difference between the virtuous person and the continent (enkratic 
or strong-willed) person who is tempted by vice but succeeds in 
resisting it. The virtuous are not tempted by vice. The idea of an 
extramarital relationship, for example, does not seem appealing to 
him. The continent person, in contrast, feels the pull, and so 
perceives the world differently, but has enough of a hold of virtue to 
stay on the straight and narrow. The incontinent (akratic or weak-
willed) person, then, gives in, though he knows better – on 
Aristotle’s explanation, he does not attend to his knowledge because 
of an unruly desire, and has it only in the way a drunk knows how 
                                                 
96 See, for example, McDowell 1998b, 47. 
97 McDowell 1979/1998, 56. 
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to walk straight.98 His perception could be the same as the continent 
person’s one, but virtue is not as deeply ingrained in his habits.99 
Finally, of course, there is the vicious person who lacks not only the 
situation-specific sense of what matters but also the shallower 
understanding of principles that the continent and incontinent have. 
Actions that are in fact bad appear as good to the vicious person, and 
if not weak-willed100, he will decide to pursue them.  
Let us now return to the original question about the authority of 
morality. It should be clear by now that Aristotle indeed sees the 
demands of virtue as the demands of reason, though not of 
rationality itself. But how about their felt authority? The virtuous 
                                                 
98 NE 1146b-1147a, 103. More precisely, the incontinent person’s general 
knowledge of the good (such as “fatty foods are bad for you”) does not get 
activated, because as a result of expected pleasure or pain, he does not focus 
on the fattiness of the pizza in question and so lacks the minor premise (“this 
pizza is fatty”) needed to draw the inference: “Since the last premise is a 
belief about something perceptible, and controls action, this is what the 
incontinent person does not have when he is being affected.” (NE 1147b, 
104) The problem is thus one of perception of the particular case. That is 
why the incontinent person is “like a city that votes for all the right decrees 
and has excellent laws, but does not apply them” (NE 1152a, 113). This way 
Aristotle tries in a dialectical spirit to save the Socratic view that no one 
knowingly does what is bad – in one sense, the incontinent person knows 
what is good (so he is not vicious), but in another he does not. 
99 It could also be that the weak-willed person is lacking in what Philip 
Pettit and Michael Smith call ‘executive virtues’, virtues that are not about 
having the right end but about being motivated to pursue it in the right way 
(Pettit and Smith 1993, 76–77). Their examples of such virtues are 
temperance, courage, fortitude, and impartiality across times and persons (a 
kind of justice).  
100 Huckleberry Finn, who believed that black people were below whites 
(and thus was to that extent vicious) but could not help helping his friend 
Jim, is a now-classic example of ‘inverse akrasia’, weakness of will in pursuit 
of a bad goal. See especially Arpaly 2003. Aristotle himself brings up inverse 
akrasia in NE 1146a, 101, though he thinks that acting against one’s best 
judgment is not incontinent if the pleasure that causes it is not shameful but 
fine (NE 1151b, 112). 
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person, or even the imperfectly virtuous person, which is what most 
of us are, does not just choose the right action, the action that 
contributes best to her well-being over the course of a lifetime and to 
that of her city. She also chooses it ‘for the sake of the fine’, as we 
saw above. The ‘fine’ is kalon, also beautiful and noble. Gabriel 
Richardson Lear argues that things are kalon in the Aristotelian sense 
when they visibly manifest order, symmetry, and boundedness 
(being limited to the right amount, not too much or too little) in 
effectively serving an end, which is naturally eudaimonia in the case 
of activity.101 Contemplation of fine things gives pleasure, which is 
pride if the object is one’s own action. Now, virtuous actions, 
especially those that benefit others, are fine in the Aristotelian sense 
– think of the admirable skill and the resulting pleasure of 
contemplating the actions of someone giving just the right kind of 
gift or holding a forward position under enemy fire for just the right 
time or saying just the right words in apologizing. Since virtuous 
actions are fine, doing them ‘for the sake of the fine’ does not stand 
opposed to doing them for their own sake. It certainly does not 
involve virtuous agent thinking “X would be fine, so I will do X”. 
Rather, it seems, ‘for the sake of” indicates that the virtuous actions 
get their point from contributing to a well-ordered, happy life, rather 
than contributing to pleasure or status. Actions that depart far 
enough from this goal are ugly or shameful; the brave person 
“stands firm against what is and appears frightening to a human 
being; he does this because it is fine to stand firm and shameful to 
fail”102. Again, it is tempting to read passages like this as presenting 
the virtuous person as being motivated by the fear of shame. Perhaps 
this is occasionally the case for the less virtuous, but in the case of 
the practically wise, we should rather say that virtuousness shows 
itself in the fact that one feels ashamed after doing something that 
falls obviously short of an ideal, just as one takes pride and pleasure 
in actions that meet it. On the Aristotelian picture, then, the felt 
authority of morality is explained by the fact that the virtuous have 
been brought up to feel pride in doing the right thing in the right 
                                                 
101 Richardson Lear 2006.  
102 NE 1117a, 44. 
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way and shame for falling short of it because of expectation of pain 
or pleasure. 
2.3 Empirical Study of Moral Thinking and Its Philosophical 
Implications 
 
As I have emphasized, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish 
metaethical questions from empirical ones. In recent years, interest in 
empirical moral psychology has burgeoned, and claims of 
philosophical significance have not been wanting. Classic 
philosophical views are often dismissed as outmoded speculation on 
matters that are now at long last brought within scientific scrutiny. 
In the following, I will take a brief look at some empirical claims 
concerning the nature and causes of moral judgment, and discuss 
their potential philosophical relevance. My aim is to clarify the areas 
of overlap and difference in the explanatory questions that 
philosophers and psychologists are asking and articulate some 
desiderata that can help us decide between the answers. 
2.3.1 The Moral/Conventional Distinction 
It would appear fairly obvious that the question about the nature or 
essence of moral judgment in the product sense cannot be answered 
a posteriori. However, there is a research tradition in developmental 
psychology that sometimes, in addition to very legitimate questions, 
tries to do just that. Inspired by Lawrence Kohlberg’s notion of 
stages of moral development103, Elliot Turiel and his followers have 
                                                 
103 See e.g. Kohlberg 1981. For a devastating review and critique see e.g. 
Shweder, Mahapatra, and Miller (1987, 11), who conclude that “[w]hat 
Kohlberg has firmly established empirically is that, with his interview 
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studied the emergence of the distinction between judgments about 
moral and conventional violations in children. Kohlberg, whose 
main interest was in the justifications that children of different ages 
offered for their verdicts on various moral dilemmas (most 
famously, should Heinz steal the drug necessary to save his wife or 
not?), found that small children explained their answers by reference 
to a punishing authority or self-interested reciprocity (stages 1 and 2) 
and teenagers by reference to functioning of the society (stages 3 and 
4, or ‘conventional morality’). Only later in the teens did people start 
to refer to rights and universal principles of justice (stages 5 and 6, or 
‘post-conventional morality’), adopting a critical perspective on 
parental authority and existing social structures.104  
Turiel and colleagues challenged Kohlberg’s reliance on explicit 
justifications and wanted to show that the distinction between 
conventional and moral rules emerges much earlier than Kohlberg’s 
view allows. In broadest terms, their method is as follows: Children 
of different ages and ethnicities are presented with scenarios (in the 
form of stories or drawings) in which a rule that they are presumably 
familiar with, such as not hitting another child, not stealing an apple, 
sitting on a rug during story time, or putting a toy in its designated 
place, is violated, and they reliably judge these transgressive 
behaviours to be “not OK”. Further questions are then asked: would 
the behaviour be OK if an authority figure, such as a teacher or 
parent, said it was? Would the behaviour be OK in another time and 
place? How serious is the violation in question? It turns out that in a 
variety of different cultures and communities, the children’s answers 
form a distinctive pattern. According to children as young as 3 ½ 
years old (Smetana 1981), behaviour that involves hurting others, 
                                                                                                       
methodology and scheme of concepts, children are more likely than adults 
to justify action verbally by reference to the subjective feelings of the self, 
and that adults make more reference to social and political institutions … in 
discussing their obligations.” But that is it – children and adults (and adults 
in different socioeconomic groups) offer different kinds of verbal 
justifications, and even those cluster on Kohlberg’s stages 2 and 3 (for 
children) and 3 and 4 (for adults). 
104 See Kohlberg 1981 for detailed discussion of these studies. 
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such as throwing sand on another child’s face, is judged to be wrong 
regardless of what the authority figure says – even if the authority 
figure is God and the community in question is very religious.105 It is 
also judged to be wrong in other places (such as other schools), and a 
serious violation. Justifications that are offered refer to others’ 
welfare, fairness, and rights (the latter two kinds of justifications are 
increasingly offered as children get older). By contrast, behaviour 
that involves violating a social convention, such as wearing pyjamas 
to school, is considered by children to be okay if an authority figure, 
such as a teacher or parent, says so. It is also judged to be acceptable 
in other places, and engaging in it is not taken to be a serious 
violation. Justifications offered for these judgments appeal to 
obeying authority, avoiding punishment, or need for social 
coordination.106 According to a recent overview by Turiel, there exist 
at least a hundred studies, conducted not only in the United States 
but also non-Western countries like India, Korea, Nigeria, and 
Zambia, confirming these results.107 
This body of research, then, suggests that children distinguish 
between (at least) two different kinds of rules and violations.108 I will 
call the first type of normative judgments involving authority-
independence, generalizability, seriousness, and characteristic 
justifications in terms of harm Type 1 normative judgments, and the 
second Type 2 judgments. The social psychologists doing this 
research have not hesitated to label Type 1 judgments as moral. From 
a philosophical perspective, the first question this raises concerns the 
                                                 
105 Nucci (1986) studied Amish children and found that though all of 
them believed that it would be all right to work on Sunday if God had not 
forbidden it, 80% believed that it would still be wrong to hit another person. 
This suggests that regardless of upbringing, children go with Socrates rather 
than Euthyphro. 
106 Smetana 1993, 115. 
107 Turiel 2002, 110–111. 
108 A third type of rule is prudential, concerning the agent’s own 
welfare. Prudential rule violations are not taken to be as serious as moral 
violations, even when harm to others is small and harm to self is large (Tisak 
and Turiel 1984). 
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distinction between the form or functional role of moral judgment 
and its content. Are all functionally Type 1 norms – norms that are 
taken to be authority-independent, general, and serious – norms that 
have to do with harm, justice, and rights? What follows for the 
nature of moral judgment if they are? One answer, suggested by the 
work of Stich and colleagues109, is that if all or most functionally 
Type 1 judgments concern harm and related considerations, these 
judgments form a psychological natural kind that is plausibly 
identified with moral judgment. For them, this would settle a long-
standing philosophical debate about whether functional role or 
content defines what makes a judgment moral. Natural kinds here 
are understood as ‘homeostatic cluster properties’ in Richard Boyd’s 
sense.110 
This suggestion, not really defended by anyone (except perhaps 
Nichols 2004), does not work, for reasons familiar from earlier 
metaphysical disputes. To cut a long story short, if a particular 
content such as harm was part of the essence of moral judgment, it 
would follow that it would be impossible for something that does not 
have that content to count as a moral judgment. The truth of the 
claim would have modal consequences, indeed consequences for 
every possible world. So let us imagine a Twin Earth that is 
otherwise much like ours, except that people there make judgments 
with Type 1 functional role about giving gifts, which they take to be 
seriously wrong everywhere, regardless of what any authority says. 
They do not believe, let us assume, that giving gifts causes any 
physical or psychological harm to anyone; it’s just wrong as a type of 
action, like callously breaking a promise is for us. The question is: is 
it possible that they take gift-giving to be morally wrong? It seems 
obvious that it is, and that they are indeed making moral judgments 
concerning it. If they were not doing so, we could not morally 
disagree with them, as Hare pointed out a long ago with respect to a 
similar scenario.111 But then it cannot be the part of the essence of 
moral judgment that it concerns (what is taken to be) harm. Thus, 
                                                 
109 Nado, Stich, and Kelly (forthcoming). 
110 Boyd 1988. 
111 Hare 1952. 
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even if Turiel and his colleagues are right and people actually only 
moralize what they take to be harmful behaviours, it does not follow 
that harm or any other content is part of the essence of moral 
judgment. 
In fact, we do not have to go to Twin Earth to find that people 
moralize things that do not involve harm, justice, or rights. If that is 
so, moral judgment is not a psychological natural kind either, even 
given Boyd’s liberal conception of natural kinds. Lockhart, 
Abrahams, and Osherson (1977) found that children considered 
certain social conventions, such as meanings of words, rules of hide-
and-seek, eating with one’s hands, or even driving on the right side 
of the road as functionally Type 1 norms, in spite of their evident 
arbitrariness and lack of basis in harm. Similarly, children in 
traditional Arab Israeli villages studied by Nisan (1987) treated 
violations like coed bathing and calling a teacher by the first name as 
Type 1 violations. Perhaps most extensive research in this vein has 
been carried out by Shweder and his colleagues in India and 
America. In the orthodox Hindu town of Bhubaneswar, Shweder, 
Mahapatra, and Miller (1987) asked both Brahman (high caste) and 
‘untouchable’ (casteless) children and adults a series of questions 
about 39 different violations, including a widow eating fish, a 
woman sleeping in the same bed with her husband during her 
menstrual period, a son addressing his father by his first name, and 
eating beef.112 All of these mentioned violations were treated by both 
children and adults as authority-independent and serious, though 
adults were more likely to be contextualist about the status of some 
violations (for example, although son using his father’s first name is 
non-conventionally wrong, it is acceptable in the American context 
where the circumstances are different). Indeed, few violations were 
thought to be conventional. As Shweder and colleagues interpret the 
results, the Hindus moralize violations that do not have to do with 
harm, justice, or rights. To be sure, it is possible to see many of the 
violations as harmful in the Hindu belief context113, but this is to 
                                                 
112 Shweder, Mahapatra, and Miller 1987, 40. 
113 For example, Turiel points out in response that “it is believed that if a 
widow eats fish regularly it will cause offense to her husband’s spirit. … 
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stretch the notion of ‘harm’ to triviality – in this sense, anything at all 
can be ‘harmful’, as long as it runs counter to some cultural belief or 
norm. 
So, there is plenty of evidence against identifying Type 1 norms 
with harm norms. But are all violations of harm norms, at least, 
considered Type 1 violations? Recent research by Stich and his 
associates suggests that this is not the case. In an Internet survey of 
mostly American subjects, Kelly, Stich et al. (forthcoming) asked 
people to rate the wrongness of behaviours like whipping a sailor 
and keeping slaves while varying the time and place. As one might 
expect, most participants judged the behaviours were wrong when 
they were described as taking place in our day, but more than half 
rated whipping a sailor 300 years ago as okay. (Interestingly, only 
11% found ancient slavery acceptable.) To test for authority-
independence, they also asked about the wrongness of physically 
abusing military trainees to prepare them for interrogation in two 
conditions, when it was permitted by superiors and when it was 
forbidden by them. Around 60% of participants thought physical 
abuse in this context was acceptable if permitted by authorities, 
while only fewer than 10% thought so if it was forbidden. Kelly, 
Stich, and al. conclude that a significant number of people do not 
take harm-related violations to be authority-independent or 
generalizable. Thus, even if we adopted a homeostatic property 
cluster model of natural kinds, type 1 norms with harm content 
would not form a natural kind.114 
In a broadside against the Turiel school, Howard Gabennesch 
argues that results like the preceding show that moral norms do not, 
                                                                                                       
Adherence to these practices among Indians is connected to harm and its 
prevention – in these cases to nonearthly and nonobserved entities.” (Turiel 
2002, 172) 
114 It must be said that the Kelly, Stich, et al. (forthcoming) results are 
not particularly robust. Participants might well read additional morally 
relevant features into the scenarios they present – centrally, both sailors 300 
years ago and contemporary military recruits might well be taken to have 
consented to harsh physical discipline when enlisting, and in both cases the 
rationale for such treatment is ready to hand. 
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after all, have a special status. Instead, all norms are deep down 
conventional and so basically arbitrary and changeable, but the 
conventional origin of some is simply masked by their age, 
applicability to everyone, unfamiliarity of function, complexity, lack 
of obvious utility, unvarying application in different contexts, 
relative stability over time, support from agencies of socialization 
like parents, teachers, and the legal system, lack of public deviance, 
and ideological support.115 Consequently, the more ‘transparent’ the 
origin of norms becomes, the more likely it is that they are perceived 
as conventional, Gabennesch argues.116 However, while 
Gabennesch’s view has some explanatory force – highly educated 
people tend to think of more norms as conventional – its problems 
are all too obvious: not all norms lose their moral status when their 
origin becomes more transparent, and as philosophical moral realists 
like to note, it is no accident that some norms apply to everyone, are 
stable over time, and receive support from parents, the law, and 
ideology. Sociological facts about attitudes to norms support moral 
scepticism no more than they do moral realism. 
Nevertheless, Gabennesch’s critique of social psychological 
cognitivists segues into the second philosophically relevant question 
I want to discuss: why do children pick out certain norms as non-
conventional and others as conventional? There is a variety of 
possible explanations relevant to moral epistemology and 
psychology. It could be that children have an innate moral sense that 
allows them to pick out norms that prohibit harm to others as having 
a special status.117 It could also be that they get different feedback – 
                                                 
115 Gabennesch 1990, 2054–2057. This is an argument against what is 
misleadingly called ‘moral realism’, the view that children (and adults) take 
harm norms to be Type 1. 
116 In his response to Gabennesch, Shweder argues that “the very idea 
that the social order is a conventional order is an expression of a culture-
specific worldview”, namely that of a subculture of academic liberalism 
(Shweder 1990, 2064). If so, it is hardly to be expected that everyone would, 
as an empirical matter of fact, converge on total conventionalism were the 
origin of moral norms transparent to them. 
117 This accords well with moral grammarian accounts, discussed below. 
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different sort of punishment or praise – for the norms they regard as 
non-conventional.118 Turiel’s own suggestion is that it is the 
children’s own experience of pain and observation of the pain-
behaviour of others that leads them to think that actions causing 
harm are wrong, while conventional violations are recognized as 
such because of adult reactions to breaches.119 Perhaps the most 
straightforward account, however, is that norms that are regarded as 
non-conventional are those whose violation gives rise to affective 
reactions. This view is defended by Shaun Nichols, who calls his 
view the Sentimental Rules account. The idea is simple. Causing 
harm to other people gives rise to a strong affective response in most 
human beings. As a result, those social norms that happen to forbid 
causing harm to others get picked out as particularly important – 
they are “affect-backed norms”, in Nichols’s terms.120 An advantage 
of this view is that it explains why people in many cultures moralize 
also actions that do not involve harm to others, but instead give rise 
to the affect of disgust. In Nichols’s study, subjects regarded actions 
like spitting into a glass before drinking from it as both disgusting 
and non-conventionally wrong.121 Further evidence for this view 
comes from the fact that psychopaths, who lack normal affective 
reactions to the suffering of others, fail to make the 
moral/conventional distinction – that is, they see nothing special 
about moral norms. Nichols quotes the psychopathic killer Ted 
Bundy, whose list of wrongs is entirely indifferent to the moral or 
conventional status of actions:  
It is wrong for me to jaywalk. It is wrong to rob a bank. It is wrong 
to break into other people’s houses. It is wrong for me to drive 
                                                 
118 This sort of view is defended by Prinz (forthcoming). 
119 See Turiel 1983. A basic problem with this account is that children’s 
moral judgments are not limited to actions causing physical harm even in 
our culture, not to mention the Indian subculture studied by Shweder and 
colleagues. 
120 Nichols 2004, 21. 
121 Nichols 2004, 20–25. Compare also the research by Haidt and 
colleagues, discussed below. 
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without a driver’s license. It is wrong not to pay your parking 
tickets. It is wrong not to vote in elections. It is wrong to 
intentionally embarrass people.122 
 
An alternative explanation for the deficit in psychopaths is offered 
by James Blair, who postulates a violence inhibition mechanism 
(VIM) that gets activated in normal humans in response to distress 
cues.123 Blair also comes up with an adaptive rationale for VIM. It is 
as plausible as any just-so story in evolutionary psychology: surely 
people who refrained from beating crying babies to death left more 
offspring. On Blair’s account, VIM is what underlies the 
moral/conventional distinctions – the rules whose violations activate 
VIM get designated as having a special status, and normal subjects 
often explain the wrongness of the violation by reference to the 
distress of others. While this explanation works for psychopaths124, it 
fails to explain the non-conventional status of disgust-backed norms, 
for example, so Nichols’s account must be regarded as superior to 
the extent that these norms really are taken to be moral by the 
subjects – the other alternative is to say that not all functionally Type 
1 norms are moral. 
On Nichols’s view, the norms and the affects that back them are 
distinct from each other. This explains why affect does not need to be 
“online” every time someone makes a moral judgment – the norm is 
                                                 
122 Nichols 2004, 112. Nichols is quoting from Michaud and Aynesworth, 
Ted Bundy: Conversations with a Killer. New American Library, New York, 
1989, 116. 
123 Blair 1995, Blair 2006. 
124 To be sure, in Blair’s study, the psychopaths did not, as expected, 
treat all norms as conventional, but as moral. He tries to explain this away by 
appeal to ulterior motives that the subjects may have had: “These subjects 
were all incarcerated and presumably motivated to be released. All wished 
to demonstrate that the treatments they were receiving were effective. They 
therefore would be motivated to show how they had learned the rules of the 
society.” (Blair 1995, 23) The hypothesis is thus that faced with these 
incentives and unable to distinguish moral from conventional violations, the 
psychopaths erred on the side of caution and said that all violations were 
wrong in an authority-independent manner. 
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still marked as special due to its past association with affect. Nichols 
does not, however, want to subscribe to a purely developmental 
account, according to which affect only needs to be present during a 
period of moral learning; his hypothesis is that if the relevant 
emotions were to be eradicated, “over time, the tendency to treat 
harm norms as distinctive would wane.”125 At the same time, the 
dissociation between the affect and the norms raises the issue of why 
they seem to go together as a rule. Here Nichols’s hypothesis is that 
the relationship to affect serves to explain the persistence of certain 
norms, including moral and etiquette norms – prohibitions that 
happen to coincide with independently specified emotional reactions 
like disgust get remembered and propagated over time, while others 
fall into the mists of time.126 Were this kind of story correct, it would 
call into question the moral realist alternative, according to which 
change in moral norms concerning slavery and the treatment of 
women, for example, is a result of growing awareness of moral 
facts.127 
As attractive as Nichols’s simple story is, it has some obvious 
weaknesses as well. First, are affects and norms really independent 
from each other in the way that his account requires? If what we find 
distressing or even disgusting depends on what we regard as 
prohibited, the direction of explanation runs in the opposite 
direction: what is considered wrong is regarded as distressing or 
disgusting. This seems to be the best explanation of some empirical 
data: surely if people find cleaning a toilet with a flag disgusting128, 
it is not because the action is inherently such, but because it is 
regarded as inappropriate given the norms requiring respect for 
what the flag symbolizes. Similarly, physical harm that is regarded 
as just punishment surely does not give rise to the same emotional 
reaction as the same harm would if it was regarded as unjust. 
Second, philosophical discussions of rule-following throw into 
                                                 
125 Nichols 2004, 99. 
126 Nichols 2004, chs. 6 and 7. 
127 For the realist explanation of moral change, see Brink 1989 and 
Sturgeon 1988. 
128 As shown in Haidt, Koller, and Dias 1993. 
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question the Platonistic model of norms that Nichols’s account seems 
to presuppose – that is, it may not be the case that once we latch onto 
rails that are out there, we can go on the same way without having 
appropriate emotional propensities.129 This has some empirical 
support, too: while psychopaths and those suffering from acquired 
sociopathy are able to classify correctly paradigmatic norm 
violations, they get lost when a more-fine grained response is called 
for, suggesting reduced moral competence. A more complex story is 
thus needed. Perhaps recent theories of the causes of moral 
judgment will help, though they are not focused on the 
moral/conventional distinction. 
2.3.2 The Process of Moral Judgment 
Why is it that people respond to particular cases as they do, say by 
judging the behaviour in question to be wrong? That is, what kind of 
psychological process is moral judgment in the process sense? One 
explanation would be that people consciously hold certain general 
moral principles that have to do with welfare, harm, and justice, 
recognize the case in question as falling under one (or more), and 
come to a verdict as a result. This seems to be the assumption in the 
tradition deriving from Piaget and Kohlberg. However, various 
different experiments have called this simple rationalist model into 
question. I will next discuss the best-known new alternative models, 
which all draw heavily on experimental results. 
 
Affectivist Accounts of Moral Judgment 
 
The first sort of evidence comes from various ‘dumbfounding’ 
studies conducted by Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues. Here is 
perhaps their most famous case: 
                                                 
129 The locus classicus for this kind of criticism is McDowell 1981. 
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Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are traveling together in 
France on summer vacation from college. One night they are staying 
alone in a cabin near the beach. They decide it would be interesting 
and fun if they tried making love. At the very least it would be a 
new experience for each of them. Julie was already taking birth 
control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe. They both 
enjoy making love, but they decide not to do it again. They keep 
that night as a special secret, which makes them feel even closer to 
each other. What do you think about that? Was it OK for them to 
make love? (Haidt, Björklund, and Murphy 2000; Haidt 2001, 814) 
 
Most people say that Julie and Mark’s incestuous night is wrong. But 
when they are asked for reasons why, their answers are confused. A 
typical subject mentions the dangers of inbreeding, even though Julie 
and Mark use multiple forms of birth control. When the researcher 
points this out, the typical subject comes up with a different reason, 
such as the emotional problems associated with incest. When the 
researcher reminds the subject that in the story there are no such 
problems, she either gropes for yet another reason or says something 
like “I just know it’s wrong”. In Haidt’s terms, they are 
‘dumbfounded’: they cannot explain why they make the judgment 
they do, but they hold on to it nonetheless, and come up with bad 
reasons if they are asked to explain. Haidt and his colleagues have 
found the same pattern in a number of studies featuring cases like 
masturbating with a dead chicken or cleaning the toilet bowl with a 
flag, in which, according to their hypotheses, no harm is caused by 
the actions.130 What best explains this?  
                                                 
130 For these cases, see Haidt, Koller, and Dias (1993). The assumption 
that the cases involve ‘no harm’ is problematic, however. It requires 
restricting ‘harm’ to concrete physical or psychological damage, which is fair 
enough insofar as the target of criticism is the Turiel school. However, for 
the subjects studied, desecrating the flag may well involve symbolic harm, 
and masturbating with a chicken may well be taken to indicate a damaged 
sexual psychology, whatever the researchers say. They may thus well have a 
kind of harm-based rationale for their moral judgments, contrary to what the 
studies assume. 
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Drawing on a large body of work in social psychology, Haidt 
argues that there are two kinds of cognition issuing from what he 
calls the ‘intuitive’ and ‘reasoning’ systems, often also known as 
‘system 1’ and ‘system 2’.131 The intuitive system is fast, effortless, 
automatic and unintentional, and only its products but not processes 
are accessible to consciousness. Many of its elements are probably 
evolutionary adaptations. The reasoning system, by contrast, is slow, 
requires effort and attention, and involves at least some consciously 
accessible and controllable steps and verbalization. Haidt’s thesis, 
crudely put, is that moral judgments issue from the intuitive system 
rather than the reasoning system. In particular, the intuitive process 
involved in moral judgments works by way of affect. Haidt endorses 
Antonio Damasio’s ‘somatic marker hypothesis’, according to which 
prudential and moral decision-making proceeds in normal subjects 
on the basis of associations of experiential stimuli with bodily 
feelings.132 The evidence for this comes mainly from subjects with 
damage to their ventromedial prefrontal cortex, whose function 
appears to be integrating the feelings in question to decision-making. 
After injury, these subjects make erratic judgments in spite of having 
their abstract reasoning capacities intact. Further, the studies by 
Haidt and his colleagues – as well as Nichols’s work discussed above 
– suggest that the affect of disgust drives many non-harm-based 
judgments (for example in the case of masturbating with a chicken). 
What is more, the affective state of the subject need not have 
anything to do with the object of evaluation. Wheatley and Haidt 
(2005) found that hypnotizing susceptible participants to experience 
disgust at the sight of random words resulted in a difference to their 
moral judgments about written scenarios.133 Valdesolo and DeSteno 
                                                 
131 Haidt 2001, 818–819. For the general picture of two very different 
cognitive systems see also Zajonc 1980, Bargh 1994, Bargh and Chartrand 
1999, Bargh and Ferguson 2000, and Wilson 2002. 
132 See Damasio 1994. 
133 It is important that the hypnotized disgust was entirely rationally 
irrelevant to the moral status of the events of the story; for example, in one 
case, it was aroused by reading the word ‘often’. The actions themselves 
were innocent, like fostering good discussions.  
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(2006) had people watch five minutes of comedy (Saturday Night 
Live) to put them in a good mood, and found that it made people 
more likely to judge that it is morally appropriate to push a fat man 
in front of a trolley to save five others (see below for the trolley 
dilemmas).  
In short, on this sort of view, moral judgments are caused by 
automatic, non-rational affective reactions. The reasoning system is 
activated as a rule only in interpersonal contexts of attitude 
modification, in which people are called to ‘rationalize’ their 
intuitive judgments post-hoc, by appeal to reasons and principles 
that have little or nothing to do with their original judgments but 
have currency in their social environment. As Haidt puts it, “moral 
reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is 
usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been 
reached”134. Though in rare cases, particularly in the ones in which 
gut reactions conflict, conscious reflection may make a difference to 
moral judgments, the chief causal effect of explicit moral reasoning is 
on the judgments of other people.135 Since these theories claim that 
moral judgments are arrived at in virtue of primitive affective 
reactions rather than any rational process and that reasoning has at 
best a secondary role in moral thinking, I will call these theories 
affectivist.136 Somewhat more modest versions of this type of theory, 
such as the of Joshua Greene and colleagues, allow for conscious 
reasoning to be effective with respect to impersonal judgments, but 
still maintain that emotional reactions drive personal moral 
judgments; I will call this kind of view semi-affectivist.137 The simplest 
versions of affectivist theory concern moral judgments made about 
other people’s actions, but it is easy enough to extend the model to 
arriving at first-person moral ought-judgments. Presumably, 
                                                 
134 Haidt 2001, 814. 
135 See especially Haidt and Björklund (forthcoming). 
136 Haidt labels his view ’social intuitionist’, but this since this is apt to 
be very misleading, given that the view has little to do with the 
philosophical views called intuitionism. I will use a more descriptive term 
instead. 
137 For the personal/impersonal distinction, see below. 
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deliberation must proceed in something like the following manner. 
First, we imagine the outcomes of various possible actions.138 
Second, we have different affective reactions to these imagined 
outcomes. Third, we pick the one that generates the most positive (or 
least negative, as it may be) affective reaction. And finally, if asked, 
we come up with a story that purports to justify (show that there is 
most reason for) the alternative we have chosen.139 
                                                
 
Is There a Universal Moral Grammar? 
 
A rival experimentalist school argues that there exists an innate, 
universal moral ‘grammar’ that operates automatically and 
unconsciously in a moral faculty, producing ‘ethicality’ judgments, 
just like the Chomskian innate language faculty is meant to come up 
with grammaticality judgments. Chomsky famously argued that 
whatever feedback children get from their environment, no amount 
of behaviourist learning can possibly be sufficient to give rise to our 
knowledge of the grammaticality of a potentially infinite number of 
novel sentences (the poverty of the stimulus argument). Language 
learning is fast compared to learning in general and has age-specific 
stages or critical periods that seem to universal. Moreover, if we look 
at all the languages across the world, we find that they employ only 
a small portion of the theoretically possible grammatical structures. 
To explain these phenomena, Chomsky postulated an innate 
language faculty with built-in abstract principles whose parameters 
are set by the child’s linguistic environment, giving rise to the 
variety of languages we have.140 To put it crudely, in some sense, the 
 
138 Presumably this will rely on some heuristic about which alternatives 
are relevant – for the model to have any plausibility, it cannot require that 
we go through any very large number of the physically possible alternative 
outcomes. 
139 This description of affectivist deliberation is intended to capture 
general features of the view, not to paraphrase any particular theory. At 
least Haidt (2003, 198) comes close to explicitly endorsing this sort of picture. 
140 This ‘principles and parameters’ view, first articulated in Chomsky 
(1981), is the just one incarnation of Chomsky’s theory. 
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child already knows, for example, that all complete sentences must 
have a subject (even if it is not always explicitly mentioned, it comes 
out in transformations of the sentence); the linguistic environment 
tells where in the sentence to put the subject relative to predicate 
expressions. 
The original inspiration for moral grammarians comes from 
Rawls, who drew an analogy in A Theory of Justice between the work 
that linguists do with linguistic intuitions and moral philosophers do 
with moral intuitions. Rawls suggested that normative ethics could 
be seen as in part articulating the tacit principles that guide everyday 
moral judgments.141 John Mikhail, as well as Marc Hauser and his 
colleagues, take the linguistic analogy much farther. Armed with a 
Chomskian model, they claim that moral competence is partly 
innate, a product of a module that contains universal principles as 
well as parameters that are set by the child’s moral environment. The 
basic argument is simple. Various empirical studies, including those 
in the moral/conventional paradigm, suggest that even young 
children are able to make complex moral distinctions about the sorts 
of cases they have never before encountered (even if their moral 
performance does not always match these judgments, given 
underdeveloped capacities for self-control and mind-reading, for 
example142). However, when people, children or adults, are called 
upon to justify the moral choices they make, they are stumped, often 
pointing to features that could not possibly explain their decisions. 
As Hauser puts it, “When people give explanations for their moral 
behaviour, they may have little or nothing to do with the underlying 
principles. Their sense of conscious reasoning from specific 
principles is illusory.”143 The best explanation for why they 
                                                 
141 Rawls 1971, 46–47. 
142 For the competence/performance distinction in ethics, see Hauser 
2006, ch. 5. 
143 Hauser 2006, 67. Cushman, Young, and Hauser (2006) found that 
subjects’ ability to articulate the principle guiding their responses depended 
on the principle in question – most people were able to say that action is 
worse than omission, but few could explain that they judged a case more 
severely when a bad consequence was intended rather than a side effect. 
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nonetheless make sophisticated distinctions, according to Mikhail 
and Hauser, is that (normal) individuals possess a moral grammar, a 
system of tacitly known rules, concepts, and principles that enables 
them “to determine the deontic status of an infinite variety of acts 
and omissions”144. Just as linguistic grammar makes possible quick, 
automatic judgments of grammaticality of novel linguistic 
expressions (what Chomsky calls “language perception”), moral 
grammar makes possible quick, automatic judgments of moral status 
(“moral perception”). Mikhail, who follows the linguistic model 
most closely, goes so far as to break down moral perception to three 
parts analogous to the linguistic case: deontic rules (“intentionally 
causing bodily harm is prima facie wrong”, “causing bad 
consequences that are known but not intended is more acceptable 
than intending harm”), structural descriptions of actions in the 
abstract terms in which the deontic rules are defined (“action x is a 
case of intentionally causing bodily harm”), and conversion rules 
that get from perceptual stimulus to the morally loaded structural 
descriptions (“Joe pushed Jack off the bridge” to “Joe intentionally 
caused bodily harm to Jack”).145 
If, indeed, our moral judgments result from a complex, 
automatic computational process of the sort grammarians describe, 
the next question is how we could possibly acquire such a mental 
system. The moral grammarians argue that, just like in the linguistic 
case, there is a poverty of moral stimulus – children are not taught to 
make all the fine distinctions they do make, and indeed could not 
learn to make them on their slim experiential basis. Thus, they 
postulate an innate moral module that is specialized in the sort of 
analysis and computation that the moral grammar requires. It works 
independently of both general reasoning capacities and emotional 
reactions, though it does require input from other subsystems (like 
mindreading) and its output may give rise to emotional reactions. 
                                                 
144 Mikhail (forthcoming). Cushman, Young, and Hauser (2006) endorse 
a multiple systems model, in which the moral grammar module is only a 
part of the story. 
145 For a detailed description of these various rules and principles, see 
Mikhail 2000, Mikhail (forthcoming). 
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Trolleyology: Deciding Between Empirical Accounts 
 
How can we decide between rationalist (Kohlberg, Turiel), affectivist 
(Haidt, Greene), and computational (Mikhail, Hauser) accounts of 
the processes that give rise to particular moral judgments? One way 
is to look at patterns in the judgments that people make in response 
to carefully constructed cases, and in particular how changing the 
cases gives rise to variations in intuitive judgments. For this purpose, 
Greene, Mikhail, and Hauser, together with their colleagues, have 
collected a large amount of data of people’s intuitive responses to the 
so-called trolley problems. (A lot of this data is generated through 
the Moral Sense Test on the Internet: 
http://moral.wjh.harvard.edu/.) Trolley problems are moral 
dilemmas that were originally introduced by Philippa Foot and 
Judith Jarvis Thomson to get at intuitions about the moral status of 
actions and omissions, intentions and side effects, agents and 
bystanders, and so on. Canonical variations include the following: 
 
(Switch) A trolley is about to run over five people on the 
tracks146 and kill them. John happens to be walking by and 
notices that he could save the five people by hitting a switch 
that turns the trolley on another track. However, there is 
someone on the other track as well, so saving the five would 
mean bringing about the death of the one. Should John hit 
the switch? 
 
(Fat Man) A trolley is about to run over five people on the 
tracks and kill them. John happens to be crossing a 
footbridge where a fat man is standing over the tracks. If 
John were to push him over the edge, his heft would suffice 
to stop the trolley before it reached the five people. 
                                                 
146 In fact, trolleys do not run on tracks but on wheels, but I will follow 
the philosophical tradition and pretend that they do! 
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However, this would mean the death of the fat man. Should 
John hit the switch? 
 
Foot and Thomson used these cases to provide intuitive support for 
the doctrine of double effect, the claim that a knowingly bringing 
about a bad outcome (killing a person) as a side effect of bringing 
about a good outcome (saving five) can be morally permissible, 
while bringing about a bad outcome as a means to a good end is not. 
The experimentalists, in contrast, are not directly interested in 
normative theory, but in the processes that underlie intuitive 
judgments and variation in them.  
To begin with, why do people give different responses to Switch 
and Fat Man? The rationalist views, especially Kohlberg, would 
appeal to consciously held justificatory principles, but the existing 
empirical data provides little support for this view – virtually 
nobody cites anything like the doctrine of double effect to justify 
their differential responses. Affectivists like Haidt have not (to my 
knowledge) tried to explain trolley intuitions, but the semi-affectivist 
or dual process model of Joshua Greene and his colleagues is 
developed partly to deal with them. Greene et al. suggest that the 
difference between the cases lies in the personal/impersonal 
dimension: while Switch involves deflecting an existing threat 
toward the one from the five, Fat Man involves creating a threat of 1) 
physical harm 2) through one’s own agency 3) to a particular 
person.147 They hypothesize that violations that are personal in the 
sense of meeting these three conditions give rise to evolutionarily 
basic and early emotions that inhibit harming actions (compare 
Blair’s VIM). This explains why people think it is wrong to push the 
Fat Man down.148 Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
                                                 
147 Greene et al 2001, Greene and Haidt 2002.  
148 On Greene’s view, this amounts to emotions interfering with 
rationality, since the rational thing to do in both situations would be to 
sacrifice the one to save the five. He even goes so far as to claim that 
empirical evidence shows that deontological theories are attempts to 
rationalize gut reactions post hoc, while consequentialist theories involve 
genuine reasoning, a rational and cognitive process! Here is a representative 
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studies conducted by Greene and his colleagues appear to support 
this. Briefly, when people make the more abstract and utilitarian 
choice in Switch, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, an area of the 
brain associated with conscious problem-solving, is particularly 
active, and when they are faced with Fat Man, areas associated with 
emotion (the posterior cingulate cortex, the medial prefrontal cortex, 
and the amygdala) are more active.149 Also, the reactions of people 
who say it is all right to push down Fat Man are slower than the 
reactions of those who say it is not, which Greene and colleagues 
hypothesize to result from it taking time for reasoning to overcome 
an initial emotional verdict.150 
Moral grammarians disagree. According to them, the essential 
difference is the one uncovered by philosophers: in Switch, the death 
of the innocent bystander is a known side-effect, but in Fat Man, it is 
a necessary means. Of course, few people explicitly entertain the 
doctrine of double effect, but it is alleged to form a part of the 
universal moral grammar that can be constructed on the basis of 
people’s reactions to these artificially constructed cases. To remove 
possible confounders, Mikhail and his colleagues added a different 
variation on the Moral Sense Test, a ‘loop’ case in which a large 
person, heavy enough to stop the trolley, is walking on a side track 
                                                                                                       
passage: “Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share 
are natural attempts to explain, in “cognitive” terms, what we feel when we 
find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the 
cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are 
inevitably incomplete, there seems to be “something deeply right” about 
them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions.” (Greene 
(forthcoming a)) 
149 Greene et al. 2001, Green et al. 2004. 
150 Greene et al. 2004, 393. Further evidence for this is that according to 
some preliminary results, burdening subjects with a cognitive workload 
slows down their utilitarian judgments, but not deontological ones, which is 
to be expected if the latter are automatic and affective (Greene (forthcoming 
b)). This is not to say that other explanations could not be found – it is 
hardly surprising that it is quicker to discover what rules that forbid certain 
types of actions require than what rules that tell you to calculate and 
compare outcomes require. 
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that loops back to the track on which the five are. Here it is a matter 
of deflecting an existing threat, not creating a new one, but at the 
same time, killing the large person is a necessary means for saving 
the five. Since the case is impersonal, semi-affectivist views like 
Greene’s predict that people would judge killing the one to be 
permissible, while if people’s judgments are subconsciously guided 
by the doctrine of double effect, they should find it impermissible. 
The results are mixed: 55% say it is permissible, in contrast to 89% in 
Switch and only 11% in Fat Man.151 
If variations in cases do not yield a verdict on the psychological 
mechanisms leading to moral judgment, another possibility is to 
vary the capacities of the subjects and see if that makes a difference. 
Particularly interesting here are psychopaths and acquired 
sociopathy patients, whose emotional reactions are known to be 
abnormal. If their reasoning capacity and moral module (assuming 
one exists) are intact, but moral judgments differ, we may conclude 
that the presence of emotions at least partially explains the 
judgments of normal subjects. It turns out that these people do think 
it is okay to push the Fat Man. Koenigs, Young, et al (2007) presented 
six patients whose social emotions (particularly guilt, shame, and 
empathy) were seriously impaired due to damaged ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (VMPC) with both personal and impersonal moral 
scenarios. In impersonal and low conflict scenarios, their judgments 
matched with normal control subjects. But in personal high conflict 
scenarios, like the choice between suffocating a crying baby or 
revealing the location of five people to a death squad, VMPC 
patients were significantly (4.7 times) more likely to choose the 
utilitarian option. Koenigs, Young, et al. conclude that “[i]n the 
                                                 
151 For these data, see Hauser, Young, and Cushman (forthcoming). The 
doctrine of double effect –story does receive some additional support from a 
fourth variant, in which a heavy weight on the side track behind the one 
person is added to the otherwise identical picture. In that case, the existence 
of the weight is a necessary means for saving the five, while the death of the 
one person is merely a foreseen side-effect. When killing the one is no longer 
a means but a side effect, 72% instead of 55% of people judge the action to be 
permissible. 
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absence of an emotional reaction to harm of others in personal moral 
dilemmas, VMPC patients may rely on explicit norms endorsing the 
maximization of aggregate welfare and prohibiting the harming of 
others”152. Conversely, the results suggest that social emotions play a 
significant role in normal people’s judgments in cases that involve 
personal engagement, though not in impersonal scenarios. Should 
we then conclude that a dual process model like Greene’s is 
superior? This would be too quick. It could be that also moral 
reasoning capacities or the hypothesized moral module are affected 
by the condition, though general reasoning abilities and intelligence 
are apparently intact. By trolleyological standards, the empirical 
debate remains open. 
2.3.3 Philosophical Implications 
What implications does all this recent social psychological and 
cognitive science research on moral judgment have for metaethics? 
Let us begin with a crucial distinction I mentioned in passing above, 
namely the distinction between the process and product senses of 
moral judgment. The psychological research has focused almost 
exclusively on the process of moral judgment, while contemporary 
metaethicists have focused almost exclusively on the product. As the 
discussion in section 2.2 showed, this was not the case for the classics 
of moral philosophy: they were interested both in the nature of the 
process and the nature of the product. What is more, they were not 
just interested in the process and product separately, but, as one 
might say, in their interdependence. On the one hand, it is the nature 
of the process of judging that explains the motivational and 
representational properties of the product it gives rise to. On the 
other hand, since we also have an independent grasp of what 
constitutes a moral stance, not just any way of arriving at it counts as 
a process of moral judging, especially as moral deliberation (which I 
                                                 
152 Koenigs, Young et al. 2007. 
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will understand simply as the process of arriving at a first-personal 
moral ought-judgment, whether or not it is a process of reasoning). 
For example, a distinctively moral process of judging might involve 
some kind of reflective correction of known bias, while taking a pill 
that changed your moral views would not count as a process of 
moral judgment in this sense, in spite of its causal outcome. If we 
always formed judgments about good and bad by taking some sort 
of pill or on the basis of simple affective reactions like disgust, it 
would be utterly baffling why we invest those judgments with a 
special authority and, for example, feel guilt if we act against them, 
or think that they can be justified to others.  
To say that not just any way of arriving at a moral judgment is a 
process of moral judging is not to use the term in an honorific or 
success sense – for example, a racist may engage in reasoning that 
counts as moral in this sense and yet arrive at the wrong answer. But 
neither should philosophical claims about what constitutes moral 
judgment in the process sense be understood as merely descriptive 
or statistical. Rather, they describe the necessary conditions of the 
sort of process that makes the essential properties of the product 
intelligible. It need not be the case, nor does any philosopher claim it 
to be the case, that we engage in that sort of process of reasoning or 
emotional correction or moral perception every time or even most of 
the time we moralize. Rather, there is a relationship of asymmetric 
logical dependence: a person who never engaged in the sort of judging 
the account describes would not count as making moral judgments, 
having utterly failed to grasp the point of making them, whether we 
understand the point as arriving at correct judgments about 
practically relevant features of the world, as realists take it, or as 
contributing to social coordination, as many expressivists see it.153 
Snap judgments made on the basis of simple affect or mood are thus 
parasitic on judgments made in the favoured way. Think of people 
who rant and rave about whatever makes them feel bad and fail to 
see any need for their reaction to be justifiable to others. Sometimes 
we think of these people as just bad moralizers, but at some point we 
                                                 
153 I owe the idea of this sort of dependence to Evan Simpson (1999).  
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just have to say that in spite of speaking the words, they are just not 
engaged in the practice of moralizing – the ‘disagreement’ between 
us and them is not about what to do, morally speaking, since they do 
not really hold moral views, but just a difference in what we actually 
do. 
The interdependence of the process and the product gives rise to 
a number of desiderata for theories of the process, whether 
psychological or philosophical. The description of the process should 
 
- make intelligible the motivational role of moral judgments 
- make intelligible the felt authority of moral demands 
- make intelligible either how the judgments it gives rise to 
have genuine normative authority or how people have come to 
make the mistake that they do 
- be compatible with Moorean facts about the difference 
between first-personal deliberation and moral evaluations of 
others 
- make intelligible the ubiquity and variety of moral argument 
and the related belief that our moral judgments, unlike mere 
likings, are at least in principle justifiable to others 
- be compatible with well-grounded theories of the nature of 
desire, belief, emotion, reasoning, and perception 
- be compatible with ecologically valid experimental results 
 
With these desiderata in mind, I will next quickly review the 
strengths and weaknesses of some recent empirical accounts and 
discuss the challenges the experimental results may present to 
philosophical theories. I will use diagrams of the various models to 
focus on their distinctive features. As a rule, solid arrows represent 
causal connections, dashed arrows optional connections, and shaded 
boxes exercises of psychological capacities (rather than simple 
mental states). 
 
Haidt’s ‘social intuitionist’ or affectivist model can be captured 
as follows154:
may influence 
causes
Emotion 
(affect) 
Judgment Reasoning
(rationalization)
creates a 
need for
may influence
In short, the claim is that as a rule, non-rational affects like disgust
give rise to moral judgments, which are subsequently rationalized if 
the social context calls for it. (The rationalizations themselves may
serve as input to other people’s judgments, a step not diagrammed
here.) It does not matter what gives rise to the affect (hypnosis will
do), so I have not diagrammed its antecedent. The dashed lines
represent the possibility that on a rare occasion, conscious reasoning
processes may make a difference to judgment or emotion; usually,
though, they are mere “confabulation”.
The affectivist model does not fare well with the desiderata. It 
does not even begin to make intelligible the felt authority of moral
demands nor their distinctive motivational role. Neither much 
resembles the motivational push of the affect that is hypothesized to 
give rise to moral judgment – why would doing something 
disgusting give rise to guilt, when our judgments of what is 
disgusting do not involve a commitment to justifiability to others?
The affectivist view thus leaves the nature of moral judgment in the
product sense entirely mysterious. The issue of normative authority
is not in view, and the picture of moral deliberation as consideration
of potential affective consequences of actions is implausible and
without empirical support. Terms like ‘emotion’ are carelessly 
thrown around without attention to the relationships among
154 Cf. Haidt 2001, 815.
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cognitive, affective, and motivational components of emotional 
states. Finally, while Haidt talks about the role moral argument, it is 
unclear why on his picture “moral reasons passed between people 
have causal force”155. If moral judgments are not influenced by 
reasons, why construct reasoned arguments when trying to persuade 
others? And indeed, on closer look, Haidt is not really talking about 
argumentation at all: “The reasons that people give to each other are 
best seen as attempts to trigger the right intuitions [i.e. affective 
reactions – AK] in others.”156 Philosophers will be reminded of 
Stevenson’s early emotivism, which similarly elided the distinction 
between rational and non-rational persuasion.157 Of course, there is 
no denying that persuasion is often non-rational and strategic, but 
surprisingly often arguments for moral positions are at least valid, if 
not so often sound. Nor is rhetorical flourish simply antithetical to 
argument. On the desiderata I outlined, then, the affectivist model 
seems like a failure. 
                                                 
155 Haidt and Björklund (forthcoming). 
156 Ibid. 
157 For Stevenson, “[a]ny statement about any matter of fact which any 
speaker considers likely to alter attitudes may be adduced as a reason for or 
against an ethical judgment. Whether this reason will in fact support or 
oppose the judgment will depend on whether the hearer believes it, and 
upon whether, if he does, it will actually make a difference to his attitudes” 
(Stevenson 1945, 114–115). 
Does Greene’s ‘dual process’ or semi-affectivist model fare any 
better? It can be summed up in the following diagram (all arrows 
indicate causation or possible causation): 
Emotion 
Consequentalist
reasoning
Perception of 
personal
situation
Perception of 
impersonal
situation
Judgement
On this picture, affect drives mainly judgments triggered by
personal situations, while mainly cool utilitarian reasoning is
employed to settle impersonal issues. The basic problems of the
affectivist model remain here: there is no explanation, and no
attempt to explain, the phenomenology and functional role of moral
judgment, either in personal and impersonal cases. Nor is the model 
of first-personal deliberation any more plausible. However, dual
process models could in principle do better at explaining or
undermining the normative authority of moral demands. For
Greene, in brief, the intuitive judgments arising from emotional
processes are irrational and unjustified, though there is an
evolutionary story to be told why we enjoy punishing, for example.
He argues that deontologists like Kant are therefore unwittingly in
the business of rationalizing their gut reactions, and that realizing
this should shift the balance of debate in normative ethics to a
consequentialist direction.158 Greene thus has the normative
implications of his account of moral judging in view, and concludes
that they are undermining in the case of affect-based judgments. But
how about impersonal judgments made on the basis of conscious
158 Greene (forthcoming a). 
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cost-benefit reasoning – is their felt authority warranted? This is a 
difficult question to answer, since Greene’s account does not explain 
why these judgments – in contrast to other cost-benefit calculations – 
are experienced as being grounded in desire-independent demands 
in the first place.  
The final theory I will review is Mikhail and Hauser’s moral 
grammarian or computational model159:
Judgement
Reasoning
(rationalization)
Emotion
Computational
analysis = 
subconscious
application of
principles
The basic problems with the account are by now familiar: knowing 
that designation of something as morally wrong, say, results from a
complex subconscious computational process does not give us any
insight into why thinking that something is morally wrong has the 
sort of phenomenological, motivational, and deliberative role it does.
This model simply has to assume that there is some other story to be
told of why we feel guilt, for example, for doing something we think
is wrong, a story that explains the properties of the judgment
without making them intelligible. But in addition, the grammarian
model raises questions the affectivist ones do not. There is no doubt
that we have emotions and that they often make a difference to our
judgments. But do we really have a ‘moral module’ analogous to the
language faculty many linguists postulate? If the analogy fails to
hold, what is left of the model? Let us begin with Steven Pinker’s
simple characterization of the Chomskian view of language:
159 Cf. Hauser 2006, 45.
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Language is a complex, specialized skill, which develops in the 
child spontaneously, without conscious effort or formal instruction, 
is deployed without awareness of its underlying logic, is 
qualitatively the same in every individual, and is distinct from more 
general abilities to process information or behave intelligently. For 
these reasons some cognitive scientists have described language as a 
psychological faculty, a mental organ, a neural system, and a 
computational module. (Pinker 1994, 4–5)160 
 
Can we substitute ‘morality’ for ‘language’ in such a story? There are 
a number of reasons to believe we cannot. First, to be sure, moral 
judgment is a complex skill, but does it really have to be the case that 
there are principles, conscious or subconscious, underlying every 
complex, intelligent performance? Take a game of chess. Surely it is 
possible that given a set of chess problems, a skilful player will be 
able to come up with effective solutions without being able to 
articulate any principles guiding his choices. It may also be possible 
for a researcher to come up with principles that match the choices at 
hand. But does it follow that the same principles, or any principles, 
must have guided the chess player’s original choices? As it happens, 
this is hotly disputed in the literature on skills. In classic work on 
skill acquisition, Hubert Dreyfus has long maintained that rules and 
principles play a role primarily at the first, ‘novice’ level, when one 
has to rely on cues accessible to non-experts.161 As one’s expertise 
develops, there is less and less reliance on rules, whose place is taken 
by refined perception and emotional and even bodily reactions. One 
could object that there must still be rules at an unconscious level, 
perhaps a computational one. Dreyfus can point to the failures and 
limitations of rule-based artificial intelligence as evidence against 
this.162 Connectionists in the philosophy of mind have independent 
reasons for the same conclusion. For connectionists, the mind is a 
complex network of neural networks whose inputs are not connected 
                                                 
160 Compare Cosmides and Tooby 2006, 186. 
161 See, for example, Dreyfus 1990 and Dreyfus 1992. For application of 
this kind of views to ethics, see also Dancy 1999. 
162 See Dreyfus 1992. 
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to outputs by way of any sort of computational rules. From this 
perspective, Paul Churchland argues that the alternative to a rule-
based account of moral capacity is “a hierarchy of learned 
prototypes, for both moral perception and moral behavior, 
prototypes embodied in the well-tuned configuration of a neural 
network’s synaptic weights.”163 The principlist assumption is thus 
very much open to question, and hangs in part on the debate 
between computationalist and connectionist theories of the mind.164 
Second, does moral judgment really develop spontaneously, 
without conscious instruction by parents and other authorities, that 
is, is there a poverty of moral stimulus?165 This is important for the 
innateness assumption of the grammarians. There seems to be a clear 
difference between the sorts of instruction involved in teaching 
language and teaching ethics. For example, children are punished for 
moral violations, but only occasionally admonished for linguistic 
errors.166 Moreover, the punishment seems to be qualitatively 
different from punishment for conventional violations, which 
potentially allows the child to come to make the moral/conventional 
distinction on the basis of experience.167 And of course, for both 
language and morality, imitation accounts for much of the learning. 
It thus seems like an empirically open question whether and what 
sort of moral capacities would have to be innate. A moral grammar, 
even if there was one, could perhaps be learned. Third, and related, 
                                                 
163 Churchland 1996, 101. Compare Clark 1996. 
164 In addition, some of the complex principles and transformations that 
the grammarians postulate as the operations of the moral module, like 
perception of certain movements as actions and analyzing the consequences 
of action into intended results and side effects, also serve other needs like 
social coordination and planning. They are thus not specifically moral skills, 
and could have developed or been learned independently. 
165 Much of the following is based on unpublished and forthcoming 
work by Jesse Prinz. 
166 (According to Prinz) Hoffman 2000 estimates that the behaviour of 
children between the ages of 2 and 10 is corrected every 6 to 9 minutes by 
caregivers. 
167 See Smetana 1989, Nucci and Weber 1995, and Prinz (forthcoming). 
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in the face of moral diversity, the idea that there would be a universal 
moral grammar requires putting a lot of weight on the distinction 
between principles and parameters: just like some languages indicate 
location with a suffix and some with a preposition, some moralities 
set the ‘killing permitted’ switch to ‘any out-group members’ and 
others to ‘convicted murderers’.168 This is a possible way of thinking 
of moral differences, to be sure. But it easily trivializes the ‘principle’ 
involved. In the example, all it amounts to is that there needs to be 
some regulation of whose killing is permissible. That indeed seems 
like a universal truth, but it hardly takes an innate module to figure 
that much out. And in areas in which there is cross-cultural 
convergence, there are also competing explanations, for example in 
terms of common needs, emotions, and problem situations. 
Finally, we are conscious of our moral principles (that is, “aware 
of their underlying logic”) to a much larger extent than of our 
grammatical principles.169 This opens up the possibility of using 
general (‘system 1’) reasoning capacities to make moral decisions, 
and also calls into question the modular nature of the process. Two 
well-known tests for modularity are the effects of ‘cognitive load’ 
and the existence of selective deficits.170 Adding cognitive load by 
making test subjects engage in some pointless but resource-
demanding activity slows down tasks that require conscious 
reasoning but does not interfere with automatic, modular processes 
like face recognition. Joshua Greene (forthcoming a) reports that 
some preliminary studies suggest that while moral judgments in 
                                                 
168 See Hauser 2006, 71–75. 
169 Hauser does assert that “having conscious access to some of the 
principles underlying our moral perception may have as little impact on our 
moral behavior as knowing the principles of language has on our speaking” 
(Hauser 2006, 67), but provides no evidence. This is trivially true if access to 
principles does not lead to reflective adjustment, like the adjustment that 
people make when they decide to become vegetarian for moral reasons. If 
people do come to reject principles they tacitly held, the claim that 
consciously adopting new principles has no impact becomes far less trivial 
indeed; witness the vegetarians around us. 
170 See Prinz 2006b. 
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personal scenarios are not slowed down by adding cognitive load, 
impersonal judgments are. This is bad news for moral modularists. It 
suggests that general rather than modular reasoning goes on in 
impersonal cases, and in personal scenarios, the judgments are 
plausibly triggered by affective reactions rather than modular 
analysis. However, it is important to bear in mind that this does not 
yet mean a victory for affectivists. Automatic processes (the sort of 
processes that are relatively undisturbed by cognitive load) can be 
learned and intelligent, rather than the sort of evolutionarily primitive 
affective reactions that Greene takes them to be. Dreyfus’s work on 
skills provides a clear example:  
We recently performed an experiment in which an international 
[chess] master, Julio Kaplan, was required rapidly to add numbers 
presented to him audibly at the rate of about one number per 
second, while at the same time playing five-second-a-move chess 
against a slightly weaker, but master level, player. Even with his 
analytical mind completely occupied by adding numbers, Kaplan 
more than held his own against the master in a series of games. 
(Dreyfus 1990) 
 
Chess skills, surely, are not primitive or affective or modular, though 
they evidently withstand cognitive load. As to selective deficits, they 
do exist for modular processes like face recognition, but that does 
not seem to be the case for morality – psychopaths, for example, 
suffer from a variety of problems, centrally with respect to social 
emotions, as we have seen, not deficits just in moral judgment.171 
In brief, then, the analogy between moral and linguistic 
judgment does not seem very close, and hardly warrants postulating 
a specialized moral module, as long as there are alternative and 
cheaper explanations of the data. 
 
                                                 
171 Prinz 2006b points out that selective deficits are closely related to 
another indication of modularity, anatomical localization, since the deficits 
are caused by damage to certain areas of the brain. Brain-imaging studies 
such a Greene et al. 2001 have not found a specific moral region of the brain. 
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Philosophical Explanations and Empirical Data 
 
It appears that the leading contemporary psychological models do 
not fare well on reasonable desiderata for an account of moral 
judgment in the process sense. What, then of philosophical views? 
As the discussion in section 2.2 should have shown, each of them 
passes most of the desiderata with flying colours. However, some of 
the experimental results present a challenge. The data points that 
must be accommodated include the following: 
 
- people are not, as a rule, able to articulate principles that 
would explain their judgments in complex dilemma cases 
- people do, however, come up with confabulations when 
asked to explain their judgments 
- emotional reactions and mood influence moral judgments, at 
least third-personal judgments about hypothetical cases 
- people lacking in affect, such as psychopaths, make 
abnormal moral judgments 
- even small children distinguish between moral and 
conventional rules 
- there is considerable cross-cultural variety in the content of 
moral judgments 
 
The data for these claims have been collected in surveys and 
structured interviews, both familiar social scientific methods. As in 
similar studies on other issues, there are concerns of ecological 
validity, that is, of how well the data correspond to people’s thought 
and behaviour in everyday contexts. What seems especially pressing 
in the case of moral judgment is the difference between important 
first-personal moral decisions and quick evaluations of hypothetical 
cases. The studies measure the latter, while the philosophical interest 
– quite naturally, given the practical purport of ethical theory – has 
focused on the former. It seems very likely that conscious reasoning 
and argument play a more important role in first-personal 
judgments and in evaluations of others that potentially call for action 
(such as punishment or voting) on one’s own part. The existing data 
should thus be taken with a grain of salt. 
It may in any case be worth it taking a quick look at how the 
philosophical accounts handle the data. With some inevitable 
simplification, they can also be summed up with diagrams. Let us 
begin with a Humean account of a simple case in which one person 
is morally disapproved for hurting another:  
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The Humean story, as I am construing it here, begins with beliefs
about other people’s mental states (what is sometimes called mind-
reading or cognitive sympathy), which give rise to a sympathetic
affective reaction. This affective reaction gives rise to a sentiment of 
moral disapprobation either directly or after being corrected for 
various perspectival errors like the effects of self-interest, mood, and
distance. Having internalized the reactions of others provides at least
part of the motivation for this corrective move. It is this second 
alternative that makes intelligible the functional and
phenomenological role that moral disapprobation has, including its
role in social coordination and feelings like disapproval of those who
fail to disapprove of the wrongdoer. Being fallible and imperfectly
sympathetic, we often fail to take the general point of view, and rush 
into judgment – “the passions do not always follow our corrections”,
Hume notes.172 But we can understand the role that even those
172 Treatise 3.3.1.
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rushed judgments play by reference to the ones that result from 
corrected sentiments – the uncorrected judgments are parasitic on the 
corrected ones in this sense. 
How does the Humean view square with the empirical data 
generated by recent studies? To begin with, it can easily 
accommodate all the data that support affectivist views – he 
explicitly cites similar observations in support of his own view. His 
view also predicts that various sorts of reflective correction are less 
likely in cases where nothing much is at stake for the agent, such as 
the ones the studies probe. It is also harder when immediate affective 
reactions are more vivid. Something like this might be at play in the 
trolley studies. In Fat Man, Hume, as a proto-utilitarian, might say 
that reflective correction is not successful – sympathy for the man 
one would have to push is more vivid than sympathy for the five 
who will die, which is why many choose not to push. The minority 
who allocate sympathy more impartially are willing to sacrifice the 
one. Secondly, as to the data concerning the inaccessibility of 
principles, while Hume talks about “the durable principles of the 
mind”173, he clearly does not conceive of them as discursive, but 
rather as steady dispositions to respond to situation-types with 
sentiments of approbation or disapprobation.174 It is thus predictable 
that people would sometimes fail to be able to articulate their 
content, and might confabulate if asked to state them. Finally, with 
respect to the moral/conventional distinction and its cultural 
variability, Hume’s empiricism about learning is tempered by his 
assumption of universal human capacities and dispositions. Given 
our psychological make-up and need for social coordination, it is 
predictable that we would come to moralize certain things, 
particularly those that give rise to sympathetic reactions in normal 
human beings. At the same time, the importance of habit and the 
influence of the opinions of close associates serve to explain why 
different cultures end up moralizing different things, within the 
limits of our natural tendencies. After all, for him some virtues are 
natural and others artificial. 
                                                 
173 Treatise 3.3.1. 
174 Compare Blackburn 1998, chap. 1. 
As to Kant, his focus is explicitly on first-personal moral 
decision-making. Here is a simple picture of how he seems to 
conceive the process of moral judgment in a case in which what is 
desired fails to pass the Categorical Imperative test: 
Desire for 
E
Belief that ?-
ing is the 
best means 
to achieve E
Potential 
maxim: ? in 
order to 
achieve E
Instrumental
reasoning
Testing
maxim for
universaliza-
bility
Judgement:
?-ing
is forbidden
Rational will 
to refrain
from ?-ing
Feeling of 
respect for
the law
On this construal, the process of practical reasoning begins with a 
desire for an end, say increasing profits. When this is combined with 
a means-end belief in instrumental reasoning, the result is a potential
maxim for action, for example cheating a customer when possible to
do so without getting caught in order to increase profits.175 If the 
agent is rational she will test the maxim for whether it could be a 
universal law, and if it is not, arrives at the judgment that the
proposed action is morally proscribed. This gives rise to a feeling of
175 This may be a controversial reading of the role of instrumental
reasoning in formulating maxims of action.
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respect for the majesty of the law – “[W]hat in our own judgment 
infringes upon our self-conceit humiliates. Hence the moral law 
inevitably humbles every human being when he compares with it 
the sensible propensity of his nature”176 – and sets the will against 
the course of action in question, here cheating a customer. It is not 
entirely clear what Kant takes the role of respect for the law to be in 
moral motivation, so I leave room for both direct determination of 
the will by the conclusion of practical reason and indirect 
determination via respect.177  
Of all the historical philosophical views discussed here, Kant’s 
has been the hardest hit by many of the empirical studies, given the 
extraordinary importance he seems to place on explicit impartial 
reasoning in arriving at moral judgments. How could he possibly 
account for the fact that, to put it mildly, we do not always engage in 
the sort of testing involved in Categorical Imperative when we make 
moral judgments? In fact, most of us never do so! Perhaps 
surprisingly, Kantians have a number of alternative strategies 
available. The considerations I mentioned earlier regarding the 
difference between first-personal and third-personal judgments can 
function as softening up arguments in favour of a plausibly larger 
role of explicit reasoning in the case of the former. Kant certainly 
does not deny that pleasures and affects make a difference to our 
likings, quite the contrary.  
But in fact, Kant may not need to defend the role of explicit 
reasoning in the first place. After first formulating the Categorical 
Imperative in the Groundwork, he says that common sense “agrees 
completely with this in its practical appraisals and always has this 
principle before its eyes”178. Common sense (gemeine 
                                                 
176 Kant 1788/1996, 200. 
177 In some places, Kant’s suggestion seems to be that it merely reduces 
the influence of competing desires; it “lessens the obstacle to pure practical 
reason and produces the conception of the superiority of its objective law to 
the impulses of the sensibility; and thus, by removing the counterpoise, it 
gives relatively greater weight to the law in the judgement of reason (in the 
case of a will affected by the aforesaid impulses)” (Kant 1788/1898, 168). 
178 Groundwork I, 57. 
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Menschenvernunft) does not need to be taught anything new to 
distinguish good and evil – the philosopher merely needs, “as did 
Socrates, make it attentive to its own principle”179. Kant’s 
explanatory strategy is thus closer to the moral grammarians – deep, 
underlying moral principles can be reconstructed from our particular 
judgments. (This is not to say that the moral law is at the mercy of 
whatever judgments we happen to make – Kant believes that the 
laws derived a priori from the concept of duty itself coincide with 
those implicit in our judgments, if not in our behaviour.) In fact, he is 
explicit that we can never know for certain what the principles of our 
actions are: “[N]o certain example can be cited of the disposition to 
act from pure duty; that, though much may be done in conformity 
with what duty commands, still it is always doubtful whether it was 
really done from duty and therefore has moral worth.”180 Since the 
moral worth of our actions depends on “those inner principles of 
actions that one does not see”181, our judgments about ourselves and 
others must remain uncertain. Kant acknowledges our tendency to 
rationalize judgments that are in fact driven by pleasure and affect – 
“we like to flatter ourselves by falsely attributing to ourselves a 
nobler motive”182. That is just why moral philosophy and explicit 
reflection are needed – “[i]nnocence is indeed a glorious thing, but it 
is very sad that it doesn’t take care of itself, and is easily led 
astray.”183 
There is no basis, therefore, for the claim that Kant denies the 
frequent influence of affects on our moral judgments or thinks that 
we must always be conscious of the process of reasoning that leads 
to judgment, even in the lucky cases in which the reasoning 
conforms to the moral law. To show that he is mistaken one would 
need to make the case that it is impossible for us to reason consciously 
in the way he recommends, or that it is not necessary to do so to 
understand and perhaps vindicate the authority of morality. (The 
                                                 
179 Groundwork I, 58. 
180 Groundwork II, 61. 
181 Groundwork II, 62. 
182 Groundwork II, 61. 
183 Kant 1785/1898. 
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latter, obviously, is the project of competing philosophical accounts, 
like those of Hume and Aristotle.) One could perhaps try to argue 
for this indirectly by observing the anthropological variety of moral 
systems – if people did reason, consciously or not, according to the 
Categorical Imperative, we would not expect to see such a variety. 
But the problem for this kind of arguments is to show that there 
indeed exists such variety among rational agents who make genuine 
(even if sometimes mistaken) moral judgments after we have 
eliminated both differences in factual background beliefs (such as 
beliefs about the afterlife) and derived moral judgments that make 
sense only in light of a particular cultural context (such as the 
judgment that it is wrong to show up drunk at a funeral, which is 
derived from a more general and putatively universal pro tanto norm 
of not insulting people’s feelings). Here Kant could turn the rarity 
and relative abstractness of the duties derivable by using the 
Categorical Imperative test to his advantage. Suppose that the list of 
duties pure practical reason generates looks much like W. D. Ross’s 
list of seven prima facie duties – fidelity, reparation, gratitude, 
beneficence, non-maleficence, justice, and self-improvement.184 It is 
far from obvious that results like those of Shweder and associates 
show that there is disagreement at this level, even though what 
constitutes fidelity or how gratitude is manifested varies from 
culture to culture. If so, the observed cultural variation in concrete 
moral judgments is compatible with the judgments resulting from 
implicit or explicit use of pure practical reason. 
                                                 
184 Ross 1930, 21–22. Robert Audi (2004) argues that a Rossian list of 
duties can indeed be inferred from the intrinsic-end formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative (“always treat another person as an end in itself, 
never as a mere means”).  
For Aristotle, finally, much of the work of moral judgment has 
already been done when there is a need to react to a particular case. 
Nevertheless, we could probably sketch a diagram something like 
the following for decent but not perfectly virtuous agents: 
to 
deliberation 
Moral
perception or 
conception
Judgment 
that x is the 
thing to do 
Re-examination
with a view to
judgment of the
practically wise
Educated
emotional
reaction
On the Aristotelian picture, we perceive (or conceive, if 
contemplating a possible action) the world in thick value terms –
actions strike us as courageous, silly, bold, cheap, noble, and so on.
These qualities provide pro tanto reasons toward an overall verdict
about the action and the agent. Corresponding to this perception
there is an emotional reaction, informed by our experience and
education, and shaped by our moral views. For Aristotle, emotions 
make a reference to the external world not just by way of having a
target (such as the thing that one is afraid of) but also having what is
now called a formal object (such as being dangerous), so they are
subject to assessment in terms of appropriateness.185 As I picture it
here, the perception or emotional reaction may thus need to be re-
examined, if there is reason to doubt it, if there appear to be 
conflicting reasons, or if there is disagreement. This may be
unnecessary for the perfectly virtuous person, who directly sees
what the right thing to do is, and rashly bypassed in the case of a
person lacking in virtue. But for the ordinary, imperfectly virtuous
but decent people, this seems the place where the goal of a mean
185 See Helm 2001 for this distinction and its importance.
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between excess and deficiency and the related reference to the 
practically wise agent can play a role. Aristotle, like Hume and Kant, 
recognizes that it is “hard work to be excellent”186. Everyone is 
biased in the direction of their own pleasure, and each person has 
her own natural tendencies toward one excess or another. Almost as 
if anticipating Kant’s metaphor of the ‘crooked timber of humanity’ 
(out of which, according to Kant, no straight thing has ever been 
made), Aristotle suggests that faced with a distorting bias, “[w]e 
must drag ourselves off in the contrary direction; for if we pull far 
away from error, as they do in straightening bent wood, we shall 
reach the intermediate condition.”187 The correct reaction is “defined 
by reference to reason, that is to say, to the reason by reference to 
which the prudent person (phronimos) would define it.”188 This 
passage is sometimes read as suggesting that the virtuous person’s 
judgments make an alternative correct. But this goes against the 
general thrust of Aristotle’s view that the right reason is determined 
by what contributes to eudaimonia. So it may be better read as a 
deliberative suggestion – looking up to a phronimos, preferably a 
concrete one, and trying to figure out how she would react to the 
situation may help to determine what virtue and reason really 
require in the situation.189 As in the case of Hume and Kant, this 
more reflective route to judgment – as well as the fact that the 
emotions themselves are not brute affective reactions but already 
incorporate responsiveness to reasons – makes sense of our investing 
the resulting judgments with authority and taking them to be 
justifiable, at least to anyone who has been brought up well enough. 
                                                 
186 NE 1109a, 29. 
187 NE 1109b, 29. 
188 NE 1107a. For a defense of the doctrine of the mean, see Hursthouse 
2006. 
189 Compare Epictetus: “When you are going to meet with any person, 
and particularly one of those who are considered to be in a superior 
condition, place before yourself what Socrates or Zeno would have done in 
such circumstances, and you will have no difficulty in making a proper use 
of the occasion.” (Manual, XXXIII) 
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Since Aristotle does not require conscious reasoning to play a 
central role in arriving at moral judgment, his view is relatively easy 
to fit with the empirical data. First, if judgment issues from moral 
perception or educated emotions, the reasons that support the 
judgment will not be immediately or infallibly available to the agent. 
There may be no principle to refer to; perhaps the only thing to say if 
asked to justify the judgment is “Don’t you see?”.190 On this reading, 
it may be a mistake to demand verbal explanations, and no surprise 
if people’s access to their actual reasons is limited. Even if we could 
engage in, say, explicit dialectical reasoning about the good life and 
deliberation about the best means to it, it would be a waste of 
expensive resources – not to mention time – to do so, whenever we 
can delegate the job to emotions and perception. Second, that 
emotions affect judgments is part of the theory, and as we have seen, 
Aristotle has resources to distinguish when this serves judgment 
well and when badly. His theory does not fare particularly well, it 
must said, on the psychopath issue, since what they are lacking is 
social emotions in particular, and Aristotle has little to say about 
them. It is not hard to see, however, how the theory should be 
amended to handle these cases, since the general point that one must 
have the right sort of emotional reactions to make moral judgments 
(particularly in thick terms) is at the heart of the theory. Third, 
Aristotle does distinguish between conventional and non-
conventional norms in his discussion of justice191, but does not 
address the issue of how we come to make such a distinction. Again, 
it is not hard to see how the theory could be amended, either in 
terms of different natural tendencies or different sort of feedback 
from caretakers (that is, different sort of normative education), or 
both. Finally, since Aristotle acknowledges, particularly in the 
Politics, that the good life can take different forms depending on 
social, historical, and natural circumstances, and correspondingly 
require different virtues, his view predicts that there will be 
widespread cultural differences, mitigated by universal features of 
human nature. 
                                                 
190 See McDowell 1979/1998, 63. 
191 NE Bk V, sec 7. 
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This introduction is not a place to argue for any particular view 
about moral judgment in the process sense. But I do hope to have 
shown that in contrast to inflated claims made by psychologists and 
empirically minded philosophers, the various metaethical traditions 
provide philosophical explanations of the phenomena that remain 
serious contenders both as descriptive and normative accounts of 
moral thinking. 
 
 
Essay 2: ‘Moral Judgment and Volitional Incapacity’ 
 
In ‘Moral Judgment and Volitional Incapacity’, I develop a new 
criticism of expressivist theories of moral judgment in the product 
sense and outline a cognitivist and rationalist theory that makes 
sense of both success and failure of moral motivation. Expressivism 
is the contemporary heir of emotivism and non-cognitivism. It is, in 
the first instance, a thesis about what it is to think moral thoughts. 
The distinctive mark of expressivism is that according to it, thinking 
that something is wrong or someone is admirable does not involve 
ascribing moral properties, but rather amounts to an attitude toward 
an object on the basis of its natural properties. Moral utterances – 
sometimes also confusingly called ‘moral judgments’ – get their 
sense from the psychological states they express, and are thus not in 
the business of describing the world. They can be true only in a 
deflationary sense, in which calling something true is just endorsing 
it. If that is the case, to say that it is true that murder is wrong is to 
say nothing over and above saying that murder is wrong. 
Why should we believe in expressivism? There are two basic 
motivations for it. One is that it gives a legitimate role for moral 
thought and discourse – expressing and coordinating attitudes and 
actions – that does not involve a commitment to moral facts, which 
would be ‘queer’ additions to a naturalistic worldview. The other 
benefit of expressivism is that it is thought to explain the special 
motivational role of moral judgments. The metaethical thesis known 
as moral judgment internalism says that thinking that something is my 
duty (roughly speaking) necessarily motivates me to do it. It comes 
in many varieties, from very strong (we always do what we think is 
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morally required) to very weak (if we never have any motivation to 
do what we think is morally required, we are not really thinking 
moral thoughts). In any case, internalism presents a challenge to 
cognitivist theories of moral judgment: why would a mere belief 
have such an intimate, non-contingent connection to motivation? 
Expressivists, by contrast, have an easy answer: since moral 
judgment itself consists in an attitude, such as a complex higher-
order desire, emotion, or a planning state, it is not surprising that it 
gives rise to motivation. While cognitivists may have the edge when 
it comes to accounting for the fact-like surface features of ethical 
discourse, expressivists have an advantage when it comes to 
explaining moral motivation. 
This is the picture that I challenge in Essay 2. I start with the 
observation that not only success but also failures of moral 
motivation must be made intelligible by an account of moral 
judgment. To be sure, sophisticated expressivists like Allan Gibbard 
(1990, 2003), my main target, can account for some failures of 
motivation, such as ordinary weakness of will. But there seem to be 
other cases, uncovered by recent philosophy of action, that force us 
to reject any view that identifies moral judgment with will or 
decision or planning state, as Gibbard explicitly does. A central class 
of these cases have been labelled those of volitional incapacity by Gary 
Watson (2003). Volitionally incapacitated agents do not suffer from 
weakness of will, which entails that there are competing 
motivational forces, such as the intention to act (the will) and a 
competing desire, within the agent. Rather, they are unable to take 
the first step from a first-personal ought-judgment to forming the 
corresponding intention. They do not, thus, suffer from inner 
motivational conflict, but a conflict between their judgment and the 
will (or motivational states in general). If that is the case, their 
judgment cannot be identified with any volitional or conative state. 
That means that ought-judgments must be some kind of cognitive 
states. 
Does this mean that we must also reject moral judgment 
internalism, which is, after all, an independently plausible thesis? 
Not necessarily. As Michael Smith (1994) has argued, one can be 
both cognitivist and internalist, provided that it can be shown that 
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there is a necessary connection between moral belief and motivation 
in rational agents, by virtue of the content of the moral belief. I 
develop an alternative to Smith’s own story of the content of moral 
beliefs on the basis of Robert Brandom’s (1994, 2000) inferentialist 
conceptual role semantics. According to inferentialism, the content of 
a concept is given by the circumstances and consequences of its 
application. More precisely, the question to ask is under what 
circumstances is one committed and entitled to apply the concept, 
and what consequences applying the concept has to one’s score of 
commitments and entitlements. Following and modifying 
Brandom’s account, I argue that ought-talk makes explicit inferential 
commitments. Crudely put, if I say that I ought to milk the cow, I am 
anyone in my situation would be entitled to milk the cow (which 
explains the rationality of setting out to milk the cow) and that I am 
not entitled not to milk the cow, which amounts to saying that 
anyone is entitled to negatively sanction me for failing to milk the 
cow (which explains the bindingness of the ought-judgment). Since 
the inferential commitment constituting the ought-judgment consists 
is rationally binding, a rational agent – understood simply as an 
agent who is capable of responding to acknowledged commitments 
to which one takes oneself to be entitled – will form the will 
(intention or plan) corresponding to the judgment, and act 
accordingly, unless suffering from weakness of will. Volitional 
incapacity and weakness of will, on this picture, are disruptions of 
two different rational-causal mechanisms. 
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3 The Psychology of Moral Responsibility 
 
Moving from narrowly metaethical questions to broadly metaethical 
ones, the focus of the inquiry shifts from the person as the subject of 
moral evaluation to the person as the object of moral evaluation. 
What does it take for someone to be a fit target of reactive attitudes 
like praise, blame, gratitude, and resentment? This question brings 
us to the debates about free will and autonomy, since the practical 
and philosophical interest in them derives largely from their role in 
making it fair to praise and blame people – it does not make much 
sense to criticize or reward people for something that was not up to 
them, if they were not in some significant sense in control of what 
they did. As it turns out, there are many kinds of control that may be 
relevant. There are also at least three senses of responsibility that 
must be distinguished.192 One is causal responsibility, which is clearly 
distinct from any moral notions – a worn-out timing belt may be 
causally responsible for the engine stalling, for example. Another 
sense is closely related to self-disclosure. Actions that we are 
responsible for in this sense are deeply attributable to us. They reveal 
our character or who we really are. A third sense of responsibility is 
often called accountability. We can be held to account, praised or 
blamed, for actions and attitudes for which we are responsible in this 
sense. 
 
                                                 
192 See especially Watson 1996, but also Scanlon 1998 and Wolf 1990. 
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3.1 The Metaphysics of Free Will 
 
The first questions in this area are metaphysical. The traditional 
divide is between compatibilists and incompatibilists. Compatibilists 
believe that free will and moral responsibility are compatible with 
being determined by the past and the laws of nature, provided that 
this determination is of the right kind. Incompatibilists deny this. In 
recent decades, this crude division between metaphysical options 
has been considerably refined. On the compatibilist side, the core 
thesis of classical compatibilism is that determinism is compatible with 
the ability to have done otherwise, which is taken to be essential to 
free will and moral responsibility. The simplest version of the 
argument goes something like this: If the causal chain that leads to 
action runs through the agent’s own beliefs and desires, then had 
those beliefs and desires been different, the agent would have acted 
otherwise, and this is all we mean by ‘free will’. More sophisticated 
arguments along this line are offered by Dennett (1984, 2003), Smith 
(1998), and Pettit (2001). The other main current of compatibilism is 
semi-compatibilism, which holds that moral responsibility does not 
require the power to do otherwise in the first place, so determinism 
does not threaten it. Semi-compatibilists typically appeal to so-called 
‘Frankfurt-style cases’ (originating in Frankfurt 1969), in which a 
‘counterfactual intervener’ would have made the agent to do what 
she did, had she not chosen to do so on her own; in such a case, it is 
not true that the agent could have done otherwise, but intuitively, 
she is still responsible. In John Martin Fischer’s terms, the agent lacks 
regulative control over which course of events comes about, but she 
can still have guidance control. What matters is the nature of the 
actual causal sequence that leads to action, not what might have 
happened. The most sophisticated defence of this kind of view is 
surely Fischer and Ravizza (1998) (see below).  
On the incompatibilist side, the shared starting point is the 
rejection of compatibilism. The simplest incompatibilist argument, 
directed against classical compatibilism, is that since determinism 
entails that there is at any point only one possible future, there are no 
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alternative possibilities among which we could choose from, so 
determinism is incompatible with freedom. A different argument 
that does not rely on alternative possibilities, and may thus work 
against semi-compatibilism which does not require them, starts from 
the idea that to have sufficient control of our actions, we must be 
their ultimate source.193 Relying on some version of what has come to 
be called ‘the principle of transfer of non-responsibility’, the 
argument claims that we cannot be sources of our actions if 
determinism is true: we are not responsible for the distant past or 
laws of nature, so if they determine our character, beliefs, and 
desires, we are not responsible for them either, and consequently not 
responsible for our actions, even if they result from our own beliefs 
and desires. Source incompatibilism thus sets the bar even higher 
than simple incompatibilism: even if we did have alternative 
possibilities, it would not suffice for free will, unless we were also 
the ultimate sources of our actions. 
Incompatibilists come in optimistic and pessimistic varieties, 
depending on whether they take us and the actual world to meet the 
demanding conditions they set on free will and responsibility. Those 
on the optimistic side of incompatibilism are called libertarians. The 
simplest and most baffling form of it is agent-causal libertarianism, 
according to which there is a special form of causation, agent-
causation, which is exempt from the laws of nature, and yet can 
make a difference to what happens. Though even the philosopher 
who introduced it to contemporary discussion, Roderick Chisholm, 
gave up on the idea as incoherent (see Chisholm 1995), it still has 
defenders. Event-causal libertarianism makes do with ordinary sort of 
causation, but argues that suitably situated random deviations from 
deterministic laws are necessary for free will. A major challenge for 
views of this kind has always been explaining why mere chance or 
luck (which is what a random deviation in fact is) would not rather 
undermine freedom and responsibility. Robert Kane’s views are 
perhaps the most sophisticated response to this problem (see below).  
                                                 
193 This kind of incompatibilism was labeled ‘source incompatibilism’ by 
Michael McKenna (2000). 
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Not all incompatibilists are optimistic about the existence of just 
the right kind of indeterminacy in the world. What are traditionally 
called hard determinists believe that both incompatibilism and 
determinism are true, so that we are not free or morally responsible. 
Lately, an even more pessimistic view has gained favour: 
philosophers like Galen Strawson (1994, 2002) and Derk Pereboom 
(2001) believe that we are not responsible whether determinism is 
true or not. For these hard incompatibilists, as they are sometimes 
called, the very notion of ultimate responsibility (which is the sort of 
responsibility they think we need) is incoherent. They draw on a 
regress argument, according to which to be responsible for our 
actions we must be responsible for our characters from which they 
issue, but to be responsible for our characters we must be 
responsible for creating them, and that either passes the buck back to 
responsibility for actions (as Aristotle thinks), leading to the same 
step again, or leads to infinite regress. No one can be causa sui, her 
own cause, since to cause anything, one must already exist. 
3.2 The A Priori Psychological Conditions of Moral 
Responsibility 
So much for a very brief overview of the metaphysical options on the 
table today. What is important for our purposes is that both 
compatibilists and incompatibilists are quickly led to questions in 
philosophical moral psychology. The sort of causation or chance that 
optimists on each side think is necessary and sufficient for 
responsibility takes place in the mind. For both sides, the key 
question is the following: what must the psychological process 
leading to action be like for the agent to be fully morally responsible 
for the action? An answer to this question will constitute at least part 
of the answer to another, related question: what does it take for an 
agent to be autonomous? These are paradigmatic a priori questions – 
it is hard to imagine that anyone would take answers to them to be 
found in the world. 
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On the compatibilist side, the best-known answers appeal to the 
notion of desire ownership. The basic idea is that a person is 
responsible for an action (and autonomous with respect to it) if the 
desire that leads to it is genuinely the agent’s own, part of her real self, 
not something that is in some sense alien to the agent. Different 
theories draw the line between alienated and non-alienated desires 
in different ways. Harry Frankfurt (1971) popularized structural 
views, according to which desire ownership is simply a matter of 
how the desire in question fits with the total structure of the agent’s 
psychological states. On Frankfurt’s own version, a desire is truly an 
agent’s own when the agent desires to have that desire and so in this 
sense reflectively endorses it. A desire that one wishes not to have, 
by contrast, is alien – the unwilling addict struggling in vain against 
his urge to inject drugs is a paradigmatic example of this sort of 
alienation, which is clearly a case of lacking freedom of the will. 
Frankfurt’s view is compatibilist, since for him the origin of the 
desires and second-order desires is simply irrelevant to whether they 
are the agent’s own. This has spawned several challenges. According 
to a different structuralist view, associated with Gary Watson, the 
problem with Frankfurt’s version of reflective endorsement is that 
higher-order desires as such lack authority – why should they get to 
delineate what really constitutes the agent’s own point of view?  
 
 
Valuing and Planning 
 
Drawing inspiration from Plato, Watson suggests that it is the 
agent’s evaluative system – her beliefs about what is good and worth 
pursuing – that has the necessary authority. On this view, it is 
evaluative beliefs that constitute the true self, and alienation is a 
matter of having desires that conflict with these beliefs. Again, the 
unwilling addict thinks it is bad for him to use drugs, but cannot help 
himself. This is why his responsibility is reduced. Thorny issues arise 
here, however, for we do want to blame those weak-willed agents 
who we think could have resisted the temptation that they fell for, 
such as the typical guilty adulterer, who thinks she should not cheat 
but goes on anyway. Compatibilists must find a way to distinguish 
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between compulsion and criticisable failure of self-control, which 
seems to require a making sense of ability to do otherwise in a 
deterministic world – the natural way to put the difference is that the 
unwilling addict could do no other, while the adulterer could. 
Perhaps the best effort to date is that of Michael Smith, and it may be 
worth taking a little time to take a closer look at it. He begins a 
cognitive analogy. Suppose a philosopher, John, fails to think of a 
clever response in a conversation. Now take two scenarios. In the 
first one, John goes home, reads some papers on the issue, and 
realizes what he should have said; in the second, the right answer 
comes to his mind as he is on the way home on the basis of what he 
already knew and had thought. It is very natural to say that while 
the first John could not have thought of the right answer on the spot 
(because he had to read up later), the second one could have 
(because he had all the necessary information; it was just a fluke that 
he blanked during the conversation). Yet, as Smith points out, if the 
world is deterministic and we take ‘could have’ to mean ‘could have 
even if the past and the laws of nature had been identical’, we lose 
the distinction: on this understanding of ability to do otherwise, it is 
equally impossible for Blanking John to have thought of the response 
as it is for Ignorant John.194 Clearly something is wrong, since our 
theory should capture the difference in their capacities.  
To make sense of this, we should think of ‘could have’ as David 
Lewis suggests: Blanking John could have thought of the right 
response, because he (or his counterpart195) would have thought of it 
in a possible world whose history and/or laws diverge minimally 
from ours, whereas Ignorant John could not, since the possible world 
                                                 
194 Smith 2004, 117–118. 
195 There is no need to go any deeper into the debate on the nature of 
possible worlds here, but on the Lewisian view, individuals are world-
bound – we inhabit exactly one possible world, namely the actual one. The 
truthmakers for our possible doings are the doings of our counterparts in 
other possible worlds. See Lewis 1971 and 1986. Those who take possible 
worlds talk less literally than Lewis are sometimes willing to talk about 
identity across possibilities; see for example Kripke 1980. For simplicity, I 
will ignore these distinctions here. 
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in which he would have thought of it is much more remote.196 To 
complicate matters, Smith notes that this does not yet suffice to rule 
out the case of a fluke – even if John was a very bad philosopher, it 
could have happened by chance that a fitting response occurred to 
him. Moreover, the possible world in which Fluky John thinks of the 
response could be equally close to ours as that in which Blanking 
John does. That’s why in order to get at a capacity we need to look at 
a pattern, a whole raft of counterfactuals: Blanking John’s 
counterparts come up with a response in a host of nearby possible 
worlds where similar questions are asked, while Fluky John’s 
counterparts do not.197 Smith argues persuasively that the same 
model applies to capacities relevant to self-control. Though both the 
addict and the adulterer act against their evaluative judgment in the 
actual world, different counterfactuals are true of them. In a host of 
nearby possible worlds, the adulterer refrains from cheating – we 
only need to tweak her incentives or imagination a little, and she 
resists the temptation. That is what the compatibilist of this type 
means when he or she says that the weak-willed agent has the 
capacity to control herself. The addict, in contrast, lacks the capacity 
and thereby full responsibility (leaving aside issues about 
responsibility for becoming an addict): the worlds in which he 
refrains from shooting up are very distant from ours, and her 
counterparts in those have very different beliefs and dispositions. In 
this way the compatibilist can make at least many of the crucial 
distinctions needed to make sense of our everyday attributions of 
responsibility. 
Even if evaluativist compatibilists clear this hurdle, they face 
further challenges. A rather obvious one is that there seem to be 
attitudes that we think it is wrong for us to have, but which are 
nonetheless intuitively our own, as Watson himself acknowledges.198 
We seem to be able to imagine a case in which a man falls in love 
                                                 
196 This is actually only the first pass for Smith due to complications 
arising from ‘finkish’ dispositions; see Smith 2004, 120–122, Johnston 1993, 
and Lewis 1997. 
197 Smith 2004, 123–125. 
198 Watson 1987, 150. 
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with a woman he is sure will betray him and reproaches himself, but 
will not give up the love, which has come to define who he is. 
Further, it seems possible that we can commit to one goal while 
regarding another as equally good or incommensurable with it, in 
which case our evaluative judgments do not suffice to determine 
where we stand.199 And third, at least some evaluative judgments 
involve an expectation of convergence among rational or reasonable 
agents (as discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.4), and one might well not 
have such an expectation concerning some of one’s commitments.200 
Searching for an alternative that both preserves the notion of 
agential authority missing in second-order desire accounts and the 
possibility of identifying with what one does not regard as best, 
Michael Bratman suggests that desires of one’s own are those that 
are endorsed by one’s ‘self-governing policies’ as reason-giving in 
practical deliberation. This needs some unpacking. Bratman has long 
emphasized the central role of planning in human agency: we do not 
just act moment by moment, but organize and structure our goals in 
advance.201 Much of our practical reasoning takes place against the 
background of one long-term plan or another, concretizing the goal 
or specifying the means. Some plans are policies: they concern what 
to do in a recurring type of situation, like whether to wear a seat belt 
while driving.202 Some policies concern practical reasoning: I might 
adopt a policy to give more weight to my mother’s needs in the 
future when making decisions, or a higher-order policy to ignore 
feelings of jealousy that arise when my girlfriend takes a tango class. 
Bratman labels policies to treat some considerations as “reason-
providing in motivationally effective deliberation” self-governing 
policies.203 Now, plans and policies introduce an element of cross-
temporal stability into an agent’s life, and Bratman sees this as the 
key to understanding the sort of psychological connections that 
constitute personal identity over time in a Lockean conception. We 
                                                 
199 Bratman 2005/2007, 205. 
200 See Bratman 2004/2007, 235–238. 
201 For the original statement, see Bratman 1987. 
202 Bratman 2000/2007, 27. 
203 Bratman 2007, passim. 
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are unified as persons because our beliefs, desires, intentions, and 
emotions at any given time refer to past and future psychological 
states and are shaped by a disposition to maintain a sort of coherence 
over time. The complex planning states that constitute self-governing 
policies thus play an important role in defining who the agent is. For 
Bratman, this is how they earn the right to decide which desires are 
really the agent’s own; as he puts it, “[t]hese attitudes have agential 
authority at a time in virtue of their roles in constituting and 
supporting the interwoven, interlocking structures of agency of that 
very person over time”204. 
 
History and Reason 
 
Evaluativist and planning views seem to help with the problem of 
agential authority, but they are subject to a further objection 
originally raised against hierarchical views: it seems that certain 
sorts of histories undermine responsibility, even if the action results 
from the preferred kind of structure. For example, it seems entirely 
conceivable that someone who drifts into a religious sect can acquire 
a new set of values or self-governing policies or higher-order desires 
as a result of external pressure, indoctrination, and manipulation. 
Often, we are inclined to think that such people are lacking in free 
will and responsibility, and certainly in authenticity. If there are any 
such cases, purely structural models of free will cannot be sufficient. 
There must be in addition some kind of restriction on the sorts of 
histories that are compatible with freedom and responsibility. One 
popular answer is that the values or attitudes must result from 
reasons-responsive mechanisms. In this vein, Alfred Mele argues that 
agents lose autonomy when their values are changed by mechanisms 
that bypass their capacities for controlling their mental lives, centrally 
capacities to make and revise evaluative judgments on the basis of 
standards one endorses and modify desires and emotions 
                                                 
204 Bratman 2004/2007, 245. 
accordingly.205 This is building on the sort of evaluativist model 
Watson outlines.  
Fischer and Ravizza, in turn, build their model on the basis of 
consideration of Frankfurt-style cases. In Frankfurt’s original 
example, the counterfactual intervener Black stands by to interfere 
with Jones’s brain processes in case he chooses B rather than Black’s 
preferred alternative A; alas, Jones chooses A anyway, so Black 
never does anything. Identifying making a choice with adopting an 
intention as a result of deliberation, the situation can be represented 
with the following simplified diagram: 
 
Actual 
sequence 
Deliberation Intention to 
A 
Intention to 
B B-
ing 
A-
ing 
Counterfactual 
intervener 
Perception 
of r as a 
reason for 
A-ing 
 
In this case, Frankfurt argues, Jones “will bear precisely the same 
responsibility for what he does as he would have borne if Black had 
not been ready to take steps to ensure that he do it”206. Suppose the 
action is shooting the president. Jones, deeply unhappy about the 
warmongering of the administration and aware of the likely 
consequences, has decided it is time to trim the executive branch. 
Black, a clever scientist frustrated with the president’s anti-scientific 
                                                 
205 Mele 1995, 166–167. Mele allows that one can autonomously arrange 
for oneself to be compelled in this sense.  
206 Frankfurt 1969, 836. 
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religiosity, has covertly installed a remote-controlled monitoring and 
controlling device in Jones’s brain. Were Jones to give a sign that he 
is about to form the intention to refrain from shooting, Black would 
press a button and cause Jones to from the intention to shoot 
anyway.207 But as it is, Jones does not waver and pulls the trigger. 
Jones could not have done otherwise, but he is nonetheless 
intuitively responsible. 
Fischer and Ravizza point out that in the actual sequence – the 
one in which Jones responsibly chooses A – Jones’s choice results 
from a process of practical reasoning, while in the counterfactual 
sequence, it results from direct stimulation of the brain. The relevant 
difference, he argues, is that were Jones presented with sufficient 
reason r’ to choose B rather than A, the actual, responsibility-
entailing mechanism of practical reasoning would in a range of 
different scenarios lead him to choose B, while the counterfactual 
mechanism would be entirely insensitive to reasons.208 Fischer and 
Ravizza distinguish between two aspects of reasons-responsiveness: 
reasons-recognition (being able to recognize the reasons there are) 
and reasons-reactivity (being able to make choices in accordance 
with reasons that are recognized to be sufficiently good). Since we 
can be responsible when we fail to make the best available choices, 
they believe that moderate reasons-responsiveness (being able to 
respond to a significant range of, but not all, reasons) suffices for 
guidance control and moral responsibility.209 However, they add a 
further requirement that the agent also own a reasons-responsive 
                                                 
207 The need for a prior indication creates problems if the world is 
indeterministic, since in that case there is no reliable sign of the choice to be 
made until it is actually made – whatever the conclusion of the deliberation, 
the agent might still choose B. By then, it will be too late for the controller to 
intervene, but if the controller intervenes before the choice, he is no longer 
merely counterfactual, and the agent is no longer intuitively responsible 
(since the choice resulted from external intervention). See Widerker 1995 for 
this type of argument against Frankfurt and Mele and Robb 1998 for a 
sophisticated response. 
208 Fischer 2006, 18.  
209 Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 41–46. 
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mechanism – they believe that one cannot be manipulated into 
reasons-responsiveness without losing responsibility.210 
Not all views that take reason-responsiveness to be central focus 
on history and the right sort of actual sequence. Susan Wolf’s 
‘Reason View’ builds on the intuition that responsibility for choices 
requires having a grasp of their value. Wolf refers to the so-called 
M’Naghten rules in criminal law, still widely referred to in common 
law jurisdictions.211 In 1843, Daniel McNaughton, a Scottish 
woodturner, shot a civil servant while suffering from serious 
paranoid delusion. The case required the House of Lords to set a 
standard for insanity defence. According to it, a defence on this 
ground requires that it is clearly established that  
at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was 
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, 
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if 
he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong 
(M’Naghten’s Case [1843] UKHL J16212) 
 
This is not quite precise enough for philosophical purposes. 
Intuitively, someone who is incapable of telling right from wrong 
cannot fairly be blamed for doing something wrong. A negligent 
person might also fail to know that what he is doing is wrong, but as 
long as he is not incapable, he is still culpable – he should know. 
Moreover, one may know that what one is about to do is wrong but 
be unable to refrain from doing it nonetheless.213 Consequently, not 
only evaluative but also motivational capacities to act according to 
reasons are needed for full responsibility. Wolf argues that these 
considerations favour an asymmetrical view about the need for 
alternative possibilities. If one does the right thing for the right 
reasons, “in accordance with the True and the Good”214, one need 
                                                 
210 Fischer and Ravizza 1998, ch. 8. 
211 Wolf 1987, 381. See also Wallace 1994. 
212 http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1843/J16.html  
213 In law, this is known as ‘irresistible impulse’. 
214 Wolf 1990, 79. 
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not be able to have done otherwise to be fully morally responsible. 
Someone who cannot help jumping in the water to save a drowning 
child because she sees it as the only thing to do in the situation (that 
is, her psychological makeup makes it impossible for her to do 
otherwise) deserves no less praise. As Wolf points out, phrases like 
“I cannot tell a lie” and “he couldn’t hurt a fly” are “not exemptions 
from praiseworthiness but testimonies to it.”215 However, if one does 
something wrong, then it must be true that one could have done the 
right thing for one to be responsible in the accountability sense. In 
her example, JoJo, the son of a dictator, born and bred for brutality, 
becomes a cruel dictator himself. As a result of his twisted and 
unusual upbringing, he is literally incapable of realizing that his 
actions are wrong. Even if JoJo wholeheartedly endorses his first-
order desires, even if they are in line with his values, even if they fit 
with his self-governing policies, it does not seem that he is 
responsible for his actions, Wolf claims.216  
One thing the Reason View has been criticized for is its neglect of 
history. Mele brings up a case in which a person who is capable of 
recognizing the True and the Good deliberately hardens himself and 
eventually becomes a cold-hearted killer unable to orient himself by 
the Good. It follows from the Reason View that he is no longer 
responsible. But for Mele, this is implausible: since being guided by 
reasons “is a capacity that he voluntarily and successfully sought to 
eliminate, it is difficult to see why its absence should absolve him of 
moral responsibility for his behaviour”217. From the other direction, 
Fischer argues that it is implausible that one could be morally 
responsible if one was manipulated into having the right sort of 
                                                 
215 Wolf 1990, 80. 
216 Given the thin understanding of reasons-responsiveness that Mele 
and Fischer and Ravizza use, JoJo might be responsible on their accounts, 
too. I cannot discuss this further here. The plausibility of Wolf’s example is a 
different issue – just what kind of upbringing can make a physiologically 
normal person blind to basic moral distinctions? For worries on this account, 
see Vogel 1993. 
217 Mele 1995, 163. 
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connection to the Good.218 Should Wolf be worried about these 
cases? Perhaps not. Mele’s killer may be responsible for hardening 
his character (which he did while still able to do otherwise), and 
thereby indirectly responsible for his later actions. As to becoming 
tuned to reasons, Fischer’s criticism may reflect a kind of prejudice. 
As McDowell’s reading of Aristotle emphasized, it may well be a 
matter of luck and non-rational processes of moral upbringing that 
one comes to be aware of the reasons that there really are.219 Once 
one has the reasons in view, it does not really matter how one got 
there. Suppose Wolf’s JoJo were given a virtue pill that gave him the 
ability to see the world aright. Surely if he continued beating up 
cartoonists and whatever, he would now be fully responsible for it. 
 
Libertarian Moral Psychology 
 
I have spent most of this section discussing various compatibilist 
theories of the psychological conditions of moral responsibility. 
There do exist, however, also incompatibilist (libertarian) versions. I 
will finish with a quick look at Robert Kane’s theory. 
For Kane, the most important condition for free will is Ultimate 
Responsibility (UR); insofar as alternative possibilities matter, it is 
because they matter to UR. To be ultimately responsible for an 
action, an agent “must be responsible for anything that is a sufficient 
reason, cause, or motive for the action’s occurring.”220 If a choice 
results from an agent’s character and motives, for example, she must 
be responsible for them to be responsible for the choice. If 
responsibility for character requires having made choices in the past 
that have formed the character, the agent must be responsible for 
those choices in turn. This quickly threatens to lead to the sort of 
regress that pessimistic source incompatibilists like Galen Strawson 
(2001) delight in. Kane agrees with Strawson to the extent that if 
                                                 
218 Fischer 2006, 34n53. 
219 McDowell 1995/1998. See above, section 2.2.3. 
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determinism is true, there will be sufficient conditions for whatever 
we do in the long-gone past, so that ultimate responsibility is 
impossible. But what if determinism is false? Then it could be, in 
principle, that at some points in our lives we are able to make choices 
for which there are not sufficient conditions in the past. The big 
question for libertarians is just what kinds of effect of indeterminacy 
count as our choices rather than random swerves of atoms. 
Kane begins his positive answer by limiting the scope of 
undetermined choice needed for UR. As compatibilists like to point 
out, the fact that Luther “could do no other” when he stood 
condemned does not mean he was not responsible for standing up. 
Kane acknowledges that having one’s will set in one way is 
compatible with UR, but claims that in that case the agent must be 
responsible for his will being set that way. This means that the real 
debate concerns relatively few “will-setting” or “self-forming” 
actions. At some point in the past, the ultimately responsible agent 
must have been able to act in more than one way, and do so 
“voluntarily, intentionally, and rationally”221, not just by accident or 
mistake. This is the connection between UR and alternative 
possibilities. But what kind of indeterminism makes possible 
voluntary and rational self-forming actions? Kane appeals to two 
physical theories, quantum indeterminacy, which makes it plausible 
that the exact timing of the firing of individual neurons in the brain 
might be indeterminate, and chaos theory, according to which small 
changes can have large effects in suitable conditions.222 His 
hypothesis is that moments of personal conflict create just the sort of 
conditions in which this sort of indeterminacies might occur and 
their effects be magnified. As he puts it, “[t]he uncertainty and inner 
tension that we feel at such soul-searching moments would thereby 
be reflected in the indeterminacy of our neural processes 
themselves.”223 
Kane’s central example is a businesswoman faced with a choice 
of making it in time to a very important meeting or stopping to help 
                                                 
221 Kane 2005, 128. 
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a stranger. This is a potentially formative choice between selfishness 
and morality. Kane imagines that in this kind of situation there are 
two competing neural networks in the agent’s brain, one constituting 
her desire to make it to the meeting and the other her desire to 
help.224 Supposing this competition brings about chaotic 
indeterminacy, there is no way in advance to tell which way the 
agent goes (which neural pathway “wins”). Whichever choice she 
will make, it is not determined by the past and the laws of nature. At 
the same time, Kane argues, whichever choice she will make, it will 
be voluntary rather than accidental (since it will be what she tries to 
do) and it will come about for the agent’s own reasons. After all, it is 
the neural processes that constitute the agent’s trying to decide that 
create the indeterminacy in the first place. They are her own pretty 
much in the same sense as compatibilists understand ownership: 
“what makes these efforts, deliberations, reasons, and intentions hers 
… is that they are embedded in a larger motivational system realized 
in her brain in terms of which she defines herself as a practical 
reasoner capable of responding to and acting on such reasons.”225 
Though the choice is not directly controlled by the agent’s reasons 
and motives, it is not a matter of brute luck either. The agent’s own 
character and motives explain why there is conflict and effort to 
solve it without explaining the outcome.226 An indeterminacy of this 
sort during self-forming actions, Kane believes, suffices to stop the 
regress of ultimate responsibility and so ground full moral 
responsibility.  
I will not here discuss the philosophical challenges to this view. 
Even if Kane’s suggestion works philosophically, it is an empirical 
question whether the brain works the way it must for us to be free 
and responsible. 
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225 Kane 2002, 423–424.  
226 Kane 1996, 127. 
 
 
 
 
121 
3.3 Empirical Questions about Moral Responsibility 
 
As I noted, questions about the nature of psychological processes 
needed for moral responsibility are paradigmatically a priori, and 
until recently there has not been much empirically informed work 
done in the area. Recent years have, however, seen an explosion of 
interest in the issue. Part of this is because the research programme 
of experimental philosophy promises a scientific method for 
answering questions about folk concepts and intuitions, in this case 
concerning freedom and responsibility. Eddy Nahmias, Thomas 
Nadelhoffer, and their colleagues have run surveys that call into 
question the alleged intuitiveness of incompatibilism, at least when it 
comes to concrete cases.227 As I argue in Essay 1, I do not believe that 
philosophical claims about concepts are empirically testable in this 
way, so I will leave these studies aside here. However, even if we can 
answer the conceptual and metaphysical questions a priori, there is a 
further question that is of much interest to us: whatever it takes to be 
free and morally responsible, do (any or most) human beings have the 
required capacities? What does it take for human beings to come to 
have such capacities? These are undeniably a posteriori empirical 
questions. They arise for both incompatibilists and compatibilists. As 
far as I know, there are no empirical studies either confirming or 
disconfirming the empirical assumptions that Kane, the most 
sophisticated event-causal libertarian, makes, nor is obtaining such 
results within the means of contemporary science, so I will not 
discuss the challenge to incompatibilism here. But there do exist data 
that allegedly call into question whether human beings are morally 
responsible in the compatibilist sense. This gives rise to a position 
                                                 
227 See Nahmias et al. 2005. Woolfolk, Doris, and Darley (2006) found 
support for the view that agents who identify with their actions are held 
responsible even if their actions are completely determined. In an interesting 
study, Josh Knobe and Shaun Nichols (forthcoming) found that when the 
theses were formulated abstractly, people tended to be incompatibilists, but 
when they had to allocate responsibility for particular cases in a 
deterministic world, they tended to be compatibilists! 
 
 
 
 
122 
Eddy Nahmias has labelled ‘neurotic compatibilism’228. Neurotic 
compatibilists are convinced that determinism and moral 
responsibility are compatible, provided that the causal chain that 
leads to action is of the right kind, but worry that human beings 
might lack the necessary psychological mechanisms to produce such 
causal chains.  
Two kinds of empirically-based worries have been particularly 
prominent recently. First, neuroscientists have come up with results 
that suggest to some that our decisions are already made by the time 
we become conscious of them. Second, and along the same lines, 
social psychological studies on automaticity suggest that potentially 
large behavioural differences arise from minor, non-rational, 
subconscious and uncontrollable environmental cues. What is the 
philosophical relevance of these results? 
 
The Neurophysiological Challenge 
 
Early brain research in the 1960s (such as Kornhuber and Deecke 
1965) showed that a measurable peak of electric activity in the brain 
occurs reliably up to 800 ms before intentional motor activity, such 
as moving one’s fingers at will. This peak was termed ‘readiness 
potential’ (RP). Since the late 1970s, the neuroscientist Benjamin 
Libet has conducted a series of experiments to measure the exact 
timing of RP in relation to conscious intention to act. In the most 
famous study (Libet et al. 1983), the participants were equipped with 
devices to record electric activity in the brain, told to lean back in a 
chair, and flex their fingers or wrist at any time they felt like doing so 
(but at least forty times during the experiment), and some moreover 
to “let the urge to act appear on its own at any time without any 
preplanning or concentration on when to act”229. All they had to do 
in addition was to observe the position of a fast-moving dot on a 
clock face in a computer screen at the time when they first 
                                                 
228 Nahmias (forthcoming). 
229 Libet et al. 1983, 625. 
experienced the urge or intention to act or the time the experienced 
the actual movement. Though there were minor differences 
depending on the methods of reporting and measuring, the results 
were clear: “[N]euronal processes that precede self-initiated 
voluntary action, as reflected in the readiness potential, generally 
begin substantially before the reported appearance of conscious 
intention to perform that specific act.”230 The following figure shows 
the average times recorded (modified from Wegner 2002, 53): 
 
RP onset  
(-535 ms) 
Reported 
intention 
Reported 
movement 
(-86 ms) (-204 ms) 
 
Moving the 
finger 
Libet interprets these results as showing that “the brain evidently 
‘decides’ to initiate, or, at the least, prepare to initiate the act at a 
time before there is any reportable subjective awareness that such a 
decision has taken place”231. In later work, he suggests that we can, 
however, consciously ‘veto’ an action before the “actual motor 
outflow” – after all, the awareness does occur some time prior to the 
action itself, even if readiness potential precedes it.232 In subjects 
instructed to intend to flex at a pre-set time and cancel that intention 
just before then, an early RP is followed by “flattening or reversing” 
of the potential around 150–250 ms prior to the pre-set time.233 
Nevertheless, when action does occur, it is initiated by the brain 
before conscious awareness. 
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Why, then, do we experience our conscious thoughts as causing 
our actions, if they could not possibly do so? That is, why do we 
have the illusion of conscious will? Perhaps the most comprehensive 
answer to this is Daniel Wegner’s (2002) theory of apparent mental 
causation. Wegner surveys an impressive array of phenomena in 
which people either think that their conscious thoughts are causing 
their actions or other events when that cannot be the case (such as 
phantom limbs234, direct brain stimulation235, stopping a mouse 
pointer on the screen when another person is in fact in control236) or 
that their thoughts are not causing their actions or other events when 
that it is fact the case (such as automatic writing, dowsing (well-
spotting)237, ideomotor action238). For Wegner, such phenomena and 
experiments, including Libet’s results, show that conscious willing 
                                                 
234 People who have amputated limbs often experience willingly moving 
them when there is in fact no action (see Wegner 2002, 40–45. 
235 In José Delgado’s studies, electric stimulation of part of a brain 
caused the subject’s head to move to one side or another; when asked, 
however, the subjects confabulated reasons for turning their head (such “I 
am looking for my slippers”). See Wegner 2002, 46–47. 
236 Wegner and Wheatley (1999, 487–489) told subjects move a pointer 
around randomly on a screen with pictures of household objects on it, and 
stop whenever they felt like it. A confederate was moving the same mouse, 
and unbeknownst to the subject given instructions to stop at specific times. 
During the experiment, the subject heard on intervals names of objects on 
the screen to prime him or her to think about a specific object at a specific 
time. When the subject had been primed to think about an object (such as a 
swan) and the confederate forced the pointer to stop on it, the subjects 
reported that they had stopped the pointer themselves. This was not the case 
if they did not think of the object beforehand. (More precisely, the subjects 
reported, on average, a high degree of intentionality for forced stops if they 
were primed just beforehand; if the thought occurred 30 seconds before the 
stop, they did not experience consciously stopping the pointer at the 
mentioned object.) 
237 It turns out that dowsers are in fact responding to observable cues 
about the presence of water (differences in vegetation and so on) and do no 
better than chance without them (Wegner 2002, 116–120). 
238 See Wegner 2002, 120–230 and the discussion of automaticity below. 
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does not cause actions. Instead, unconscious brain processes cause 
both actions and causally unrelated conscious intentions. Appearance 
of causality, as in other cases, results from the perceived priority, 
consistency, and exclusivity of thought with respect to action.239 As 
Wegner summarizes it, “[f]or the perception of apparent mental 
causation, the thought should occur before the action, be consistent 
with the action, and not be accompanied by other potential 
causes.”240 Since this often happens, we tend to think we have 
conscious control, even when we do not. 
 
The Automaticity Challenge 
 
Social psychologists have long argued that social perception involves 
automatic, non-conscious processes that give rise to evaluatively 
laden categorizations. Studies on stereotyping and trait attributions 
have amply shown that we tend to be unaware of environmental 
cues that lead us to form beliefs about racial minorities and attractive 
people, for example. John A. Bargh and his colleagues have extended 
the study of this sort of automaticity to the effects of unconscious 
perceptions on behaviour. To take just one example, Bargh, Chen, 
and Burrows (1996) primed subjects in three randomly assigned 
groups with a sentence-scrambling test which was said to measure 
linguistic ability. One group had to unscramble sentences to do with 
politeness (like “they her respect see usually”), another rudeness, 
and third neutral. Their next task was to go down a hallway to report 
to the experimenter for the second part of the study. They found the 
experimenter having an interminable conversation with another 
‘participant’ (who was in fact a confederate, another experimenter) 
and in no way acknowledging the presence of the participant. The 
object of the study was simply to see whether the participant would 
interrupt the conversation within ten minutes. 37% of the subjects 
who had unscrambled neutral words interrupted the conversation, 
                                                 
239 Wegner and Wheatley 1999, 482–487. Compare Hume’s Treatise 1.3.2. 
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but the figure rose to 63% for those primed with rude words and 
reduced to 17% for those primed with polite ones.241 When asked 
later, “no participant showed any awareness or suspicion as to the 
scrambled-sentence test’s possible influence on their interruption 
behaviour”242. Similar lack of awareness of actual causes of 
behaviour has been found in a large number of other social-
psychological studies.243  
What explains this? According to Bargh’s ‘auto-motive model’, 
automatic perceptions can directly give rise to pursuit of goals in the 
same way as conscious decisions – there is a “direct and automatic 
route … from the external environment to action tendencies, via 
perception”244. Quite simply, just as environmental stimuli can non-
consciously activate a stereotype, they can non-consciously activate a 
goal representation, and this can be experimentally shown.245 If this 
                                                 
241 Bargh, Chen, and Burrows 1996, 235. In another experiment in the 
same study, people primed with stereotypically elderly-related words like 
“Florida”, “sentimental”, “conservative”, and “wrinkle” were measured 
walking more slowly afterwards than those in the control group! 
242 Bargh, Chen, and Burrows 1996, 234. 
243 In one classic study, Nisbett and Schachter (1966, cited in Nisbett and 
Wilson 1977, 237) gave subjects placebo pills that were said to produce 
symptoms that were in fact those caused by electric shocks. The hypothesis 
was that they would tolerate stronger shocks if they attributed the 
symptoms to the pill. When shocks were subsequently given to the subjects, 
the placebo group tolerated on average four times more amperage than 
control subjects without placebo pills. But when they were asked afterwards 
whether taking the pill had had any effect on them, they denied it, 
explaining their greater tolerance to shocks with answers like “Well, I used 
to built radios and stuff when I was 13 or 14, and maybe I got used to electric 
shock”! 
244 Bargh and Chartrand 1999, 465. 
245 The idea is this: it has been shown before that our consciously held 
goals make a difference to what we perceive, remember, how much of an 
effort we make, and so on. If non-conscious priming has similar effects, we 
can conclude that it gives rise to non-consciously held goals. In one 
experiment (Bargh et al. 2001), Bargh and his colleagues first primed subjects 
with an unscrambling task involving achievement-related words, and then 
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happens, conscious decision-making becomes merely 
epiphenomenal. As Bargh and Chartrand put it, “it may be, 
especially for evaluations and judgments of novel people and 
objects, that what we think we are doing while consciously 
deliberating in actuality has no effect on the outcome of the 
judgment, as it has already been made through relatively immediate, 
automatic means.”246 Some research suggests that this may be the 
case not only for the sort of relatively trivial judgments tested in 
laboratory conditions. For example, John Doris brings up research 
based on public records that suggests that the so-called ‘name-letter 
effect’ (people prefer letters that appear in their own names) can 
influence major life decisions, like where to live and which 
profession to choose: women named Virginia or Georgia were 36% 
more likely than others to move to states sharing the same name, and 
men named Geoffrey or George were 42% more likely than others to 
be geoscientists!247 
Here, as in the case of affect-driven moral judgments, 
confabulation rears its ugly head. People do seem to have a need to 
come up with a story to make their choice look rational, whether or 
not they had any reasons. In a classic study, Nisbett and Wilson 
(1977) had subjects choose from four identical pairs of nylon 
stockings and indicate which was of best quality.248 It turned out that 
there was a considerable positional effect: subjects were four times 
more likely to choose stockings placed on the right. However, the 
reasons subjects gave for their choice made no reference to position, 
                                                                                                       
had them perform a task of building as many words as possible from 
Scrabble letters. These subjects came up with 8 more words in five minutes 
than a non-primed control group – a similar result to studies in which 
people are consciously construing a task in terms of achievement. As Bargh 
and Ferguson put it, in this and similar experiments “the achievement-
primed participants consistently showed classic properties of being in a 
motivational state, despite not having consciously chosen or guided their 
behavior towards this goal.” (Bargh and Ferguson 2000, 936) 
246 Bargh and Chartrand 1999, 475. 
247 Doris (forthcoming). The research that he cites is Pelham et al. (2002). 
248 Nisbett and Wilson 1977, 243–244. 
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talking instead about differences in knit, sheerness, and weave. 
When the experimenters explicitly asked about the effect of position, 
they denied that it made any difference! They hypothesize that when 
asked for an explanation, people consult cultural and personal “a 
priori causal theories” – basically, assumptions about what stimuli 
cause what response – that appear to make sense of their (or others’) 
reactions, whether or not these schemas pick out the actual causes.249 
 
Implications for Freedom and Responsibility 
 
On the face of it, at least, the scientific and psychological data 
outlined above pose a challenge to philosophical conceptions of 
freedom and responsibility. If our conscious decisions and plans are 
epiphenomenal, or if it is irrelevant to what we in fact do which 
considerations we take to be reasons, and we are instead driven by 
uncontrollable brain processes and subconscious environmental 
cues, our practices of holding each other responsible rest on a 
massive error. It is therefore imperative for philosophers working in 
this area to examine what the data in fact show. 
To begin with the neurophysiological studies, Al Mele draws 
attention to the carelessness with which Libet and many of his 
followers identify the onset of RP with intention or willing, while 
also talking interchangeably about ‘urges’ or ‘wants’.250 Clearly, 
from the perspective of philosophy of action, urges and intentions 
play a very different role in the generation of action. Urges, wants, 
and desires may serve as inputs or stimulants for practical reasoning, 
whereas intentions are on its output side and subject to very 
different rational constraints – for example, it is irrational if not 
inconceivable to both intend to do something and intend not to do it, 
while it is not unusual to both want to do something (like eat a piece 
of chocolate) and want to not do it (because we are all getting too fat 
                                                 
249 Nisbett and Wilson 1977, 248–249. 
250 Mele (forthcoming); Mele 2006, ch. 2. 
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anyway).251 There is a difference among intentions, too. Some 
concern future actions (I will play football next Sunday), some 
standing policies (I will prepare my job applications in time), and 
some what to do right now (I will press this button now). In Mele’s 
terms, the first two are varieties of prior intentions, while the latter 
are called proximal intentions, since they are the proximal causes of 
intentional action. 
Given these standard distinctions in the philosophy of action, 
how should we interpret Libet’s results? It seems reasonable that the 
subjects had formed the prior intention to flex their wrists at least 40 
times during the experiment whenever it occurred to them. So, they 
were consciously on the lookout for any sort of urge to flex during 
that specified time. Mele suggests, very plausibly, that the onset of 
RP at -550 ms represents just such an urge; it is, after all, a sort of 
bodily readiness to take action, just what one would be looking for in 
order to complete the specified task. (It is not an ‘urge’ in the sense of 
a sudden desire for something pleasurable, for example.) In that 
case, the reported awareness at -200 or so ms could well precede the 
proximal intention to flex now, and the subject would form (or not 
form, in the case of the veto studies) the proximal intention as a 
result of consciously experiencing the urge. On the basis of Libet’s 
data and independent reaction time studies, Mele places the 
proximal intention itself at -90 to -50 ms prior to the bodily 
movement.252 On this interpretation, then, there is no unconscious 
willing or deciding going on. The only real decision involved is to 
follow the instructions given, and consequently to form a proximal 
intention (a kind of ‘conscious will’) to act whenever one feels like it, 
or, in the veto studies, just record the time of the urge and refrain 
from forming the proximal intention. To be sure, the urge or 
readiness to act itself is still initiated unconsciously on this picture, 
but nobody ever claimed that we directly consciously control the 
                                                 
251 Consequently, Libet’s (1985) instruction for veto-subjects to both 
intend to flex at a pre-set time and intend not to flex at that time is 
incoherent. They can intend to prepare to flex and stop short of it, which is 
what they indeed seem to be doing. 
252 Mele (forthcoming), sections III and V. 
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emergence of such things, so that is no challenge to our 
commonsense picture of the will.253 
As to Wegner’s data, there is no need to deny that the 
extraordinary phenomena that he discusses exist. All that defenders 
of free will need to show is that they are indeed extraordinary. Eddy 
Nahmias draws a parallel with visual illusions: they are predictable 
products of a generally reliable system faced with unusual input.254 
He also emphasizes how odd it would be to think in the first place 
that we form conscious intentions before each and every movement 
– most of the time there is at best conscious monitoring going on (for 
example, I correct my balance if I slip while walking, but I do not 
rehearse each step in my mind before taking it). Certainly Wegner’s 
results are not sufficient to support the conclusion that “the real 
causal mechanisms underlying behaviour are never present to 
consciousness”255. 
What about automaticity? Are we just happily rationalizing 
decisions made in response to to subconscious situational cues that 
have nothing to do with what we take to be our reasons? Consider 
what happens if I am cooking Thai red curry and it comes to a boil 
soon after I have put the coconut milk in. If I am at the same time 
having a conversation with a friend, I may turn down the heat not, 
merely without deliberating, but also without even noticing that I 
did so. If the food turns out well, I am no less to praise for such 
automatic responses to situational cues than I am for more deliberate 
choices like how much coconut milk to use. They are no less 
sensitive to reasons and no less manifestations of my skill. 
                                                 
253 There is still an indirect control of the emergence of urges going on – 
most of us do not regularly feel the urge to flex our wrists! 
254 Nahmias (forthcoming).  
255 Wegner and Wheatley 1999, 490. The claim would, of course, be 
trivially true if by ‘real causal mechanisms’ was meant the 
neurophysiological states and their relationships that realize or constitute 
our psychological states and their relationships. But that is not what Wegner 
and Wheatley try to say; rather, they mean that my belief that a car is 
approaching (or, presumably, the neurophysiological state that realizes or 
constitutes it) cannot be the cause of my jumping off the road. 
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Automaticity as such seems thus not to threaten any element of our 
commonsense picture of agency. But what if automatic processes are 
not in harmony with our more or less consciously held values? The 
first thing to note is that even if they are beyond our direct control, 
they may be indirectly controllable. Pizarro and Bloom (2003) point 
to the effects of consciously framing an issue in a certain way, 
selective exposure to right sort of environments (for example, 
implicit racism is reduced through exposure to positive black 
exemplars256), and redirecting attention. 
Indirect control, naturally, presupposes some awareness of the 
automatic processes, so it cannot be the answer to all challenges from 
automaticity. What should we make of the sort of priming effects 
that Bargh and colleagues highlight? Not only are the subjects 
unaware of them, but they also deny that they made any difference 
to their behaviour when asked. Looking more carefully at the studies 
and their results, it does not seem that they are cases of people being 
driven by forces beyond their control. Rather, the test scenarios are 
carefully constructed so that the subjects have roughly equal reasons 
to do one thing or another, for example either interrupt the irritating 
conversation or remain patient. Moreover, what is at stake is nothing 
very dramatic, so there is no particular need for the subjects to 
reason carefully about their choice. Under these conditions, it is not 
so very shocking that associations activated by priming tip the 
balance one way or the other. They seem to be on par with the effect 
of a bad or good cup of coffee, or listening to an aggressive talk radio 
or NPR on the way to work.257  
                                                 
256 Dasgupta and Greenwald 2001. They conclude that “the present 
research provides new evidence suggesting that automatic preference and 
prejudice may indeed be malleable” (Dasgupta and Greenwald 2001, 806). 
257 What about the study by Pelham et al. (2002) on the effect of one’s 
name on choice of profession or place to live? Surely these are dramatic 
effects? Indeed they are. But one’s name is not exactly a situational factor. It 
is surely plausible that someone named Georgia would have a conscious 
interest and perhaps a fondness for the state of Georgia – surely it would 
catch one’s attention more than others, at least. Would it be surprising if 
when one deliberated between two roughly equal choices, say Georgia and 
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There exists, in fact, some experimental data supporting the 
tiebreaker interpretation. Macrae and Johnston (1998) primed people 
with helping-related stimuli and conducted the actual experiment in 
an elevator on the way out, when the subjects thought the whole 
thing was already over. In the first scenario, a confederate dropped a 
number of ordinary pens on the floor; in the second, the pens were 
leaking and messy-looking. As other automaticity studies would 
lead one to expect, helping-primed subjects were more likely than 
the control group to help in the first scenario. But in the second 
scenario, when there was a stronger reason not to help (getting one’s 
clothes dirty), the difference vanished. Moreover, when participants 
had a competing conscious goal, this had the same result. These data 
suggest that the motivational effects of non-conscious priming are 
much less dramatic than automaticity enthusiasts think. 
In short, existing empirical data do not seem to threaten the 
existence of free will and moral responsibility, since they do not 
undermine the existence and influence of the sort of rational and 
volitional capacities that are necessary for compatibilist freedom, 
even if the scope of these capacities may be narrower than some 
philosophers have thought. We can therefore turn the question 
around: what kind of empirical circumstances are conducive to the 
acquisition and use of rational and other capacities required by 
freedom and responsibility? This leads to different empirical and 
conceptual questions, which I address in some detail in ‘The Social 
Dimension of Autonomy’. 
 
 
Essay 3: ‘The Social Dimension of Autonomy’ 
 
I begin ‘The Social Dimension of Autonomy’ with a brief overview of 
some traditional conceptions of autonomy. They are closely related 
to views about free will and moral responsibility, and this is no 
                                                                                                       
South Carolina, this would tip the balance? It would be considerably more 
dramatic if people named Georgia had little other reason to move there but 
did so anyway, but this seems unlikely, and is certainly not shown by the 
sort of archival study that Pelham and colleagues did. 
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accident: as I take it, autonomy is a theoretical concept we use for the 
sort of self-governance that grounds ascriptions of full moral 
responsibility. Autonomy, for short, is authentic self-determination. 
To be autonomous, one must both have the sort of capacities 
required for authentic self-determination and exercise them – 
without the exercise, one is at best potentially autonomous. This gives 
rise to three questions: 
 
1) What are the psychological capacities needed for autonomy? 
2) What does it take to acquire the autonomy-relevant capacities? 
3) What does it take to exercise the autonomy-relevant capacities? 
 
In the spirit of reasons-responsiveness views about moral 
responsibility, I argue that autonomy requires the sort of normative 
competence that allows one to recognize what reasons one has and 
the capacity to be motivated by one’s perception of reasons. I assume 
that Wolf and Fischer and Ravizza are correct that having such 
capacities is compatible with determinism. The real focus of the 
paper, however, is on two other questions, particularly the last one. 
On the issue of acquisition, I qualifiedly endorse the communitarian 
view that one must belong to a community to acquire the ability to 
stand back from one’s desires and assess one’s options in the 
language of qualitative distinctions. Communitarians like Sandel go 
too far, however, when they suggest that one’s ‘constitutive ends’ 
must permanently remain outside assessment; I see no reason why 
they should not be subject to Neurathian scrutiny (see section 2.2). 
This aspect of the social dimension of autonomy is by now familiar 
and, with the sort of qualifications I make, relatively uncontroversial.  
The question of what it takes to exercise the autonomy-relevant 
capacities – what it is to live an autonomous life – is less familiar, 
and often unasked. Since my interest is in the social conditions of 
autonomy, I in effect divide it in two subquestions: 
 
3.1) What are the social conditions for having the psychological 
capacities and attitudes required for exercising autonomy? 
3.2) What are the social conditions for leading an autonomous 
life? 
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Axel Honneth’s attempt to naturalize Hegel’s theory of recognition, I 
argue, aims to answer the first of these questions. There are two 
stages to the argument: identifying the psychological capacities or 
attitudes conceptually necessary for exercising autonomy, and then 
identifying the social psychological mechanisms and relationships 
that are nomologically necessary for the development and 
maintenance of those capacities and attitudes. Thus, Honneth argues 
that if we lacked basic self-confidence, we would be hindered from 
exercising our autonomy-relevant capacities, since we would not 
give our desires and needs the weight they deserve in deliberation. 
Drawing on developmental psychology, he claims that love and 
caring are the forms of recognition by others that are needed for the 
development of basic self-confidence. (I criticize the paucity of 
Honneth’s empirical evidence here and elsewhere, but accept the 
basic thrust of the argument.) If we lacked self-respect, understood as 
a positive attitude toward one’s ability to make rational decisions, 
our autonomy would be again undermined – we would defer to 
others, debase ourselves. Honneth ties self-respect to having the sort 
of sense of entitlement that comes with having rights, a different 
form of recognition by others, not just by individuals but also by 
institutions. Finally, if we lacked self-esteem, understood as valuing 
ourselves under particular role-descriptions and identities, we 
would be hindered from undertaking particular projects involving 
those identities. Honneth claims, without much in the way of hard 
evidence, but still plausibly, that self-esteem in this sense results 
from social esteem manifested in the distribution of both symbolic and 
material rewards. 
Honneth’s work is a valuable contribution to the literature on 
autonomy and responsibility, and I offer a friendly amendment to it 
by reformulating some of its theses in the language of normative 
competence views. However, I argue that Honneth fails to see that 
there is a further social dimension of autonomy consisting of the 
social conditions for exercising autonomy-capacities in the real 
world, that is, for living an autonomous life. Self-confidence or no 
self-confidence, one cannot act on reasons deriving from one’s 
emotional needs if one is shut out of personal relationships by 
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cultural patterns of value. No matter how much self-respect one has, 
one cannot shape one’s life on the basis of independent judgments 
unless one’s social status includes a guarantee against arbitrary 
intervention by others. Even a self-respecting slave is still a slave, 
and as such not responsible for choices with respect to which she 
cannot exercise her autonomy-capacities. And finally, self-esteem 
does not suffice for exercising one’s autonomy with respect to 
particular projects; one must also have genuine access to practices 
within which these projects and the identities they involve acquire 
significance. In short, the subjective experience of intersubjective 
recognition must be met with the objective fact of intersubjective 
recognition for an agent to be able to exercise her autonomy, and so 
for her to be fully morally responsible. There are non-psychological 
necessary conditions for exercising autonomy. 
These arguments have consequences for any view in political 
philosophy that takes autonomy to be an important value. Liberal 
theories, in particular, take respecting and promoting autonomy to 
be central for justifying and constraining policies. The interesting 
question is whether acknowledging the internally complex social 
dimension of autonomy forces us to reconsider the basic liberal 
tenets of individual rights, state neutrality, and equality of 
opportunity. I finish the paper by sketching some areas where the 
social conception of autonomy exerts pressure on the liberal views.258 
                                                 
258 The volume in which the paper will be published will include 
Honneth’s response, but as of this writing, I have not seen it. 
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4 Normative Ethics and What We Are Like 
 
In the previous sections, I have examined the role of moral 
psychology in second-order questions about our ethical practices. 
When it comes to first-order, normative ethical questions, the role of 
psychological facts is different. As I suggested in section 1, the 
distinction between the philosophical and the non-philosophical 
seems to coincide with that between the normative and the 
descriptive.259 However, what is normatively required of us depends 
on descriptive psychological facts in two ways. First, insofar as 
ought implies can, the demands of morality on us are constrained by 
our cognitive and motivational limitations – tying in with the issue 
of moral responsibility, we cannot fairly be blamed for not doing 
something that it is impossible for us to do.260 More controversially, 
                                                 
259 This is not universally agreed upon. Appiah (forthcoming) explicitly 
argues that empirical research has a bearing on normative questions not 
only by way of helping derive concrete recommendations, but also directly 
informing us of what well-being consists in, for example. Prinz 
(forthcoming) argues that if naturalism is true, all meaningful questions, 
normative questions included, are amenable to empirical study. I do not 
have the space to examine these arguments and their flaws here. 
260 There is a sense in which we can never do other than we actually do 
if determinism is true. That is why various compatibilists about moral 
responsibility have rejected that ought implies can. Fischer’s (2006, 24–25) 
example is a woman, Sally, who has an arrangement with a lifeguard that 
she will raise her hand to alert him if a child is in trouble. She sees a child 
drowning, but does not raise her hand, and the child drowns. Unbeknownst 
to her, she is temporarily paralyzed in such a way that she would have been 
unable to raise her hand in any case. Fischer argues that Sally is 
blameworthy nevertheless, and that she acted wrongly, and thus that she 
ought to have raised her hand. If this is the case, ought does not imply can. 
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some have argued that even if something is not strictly impossible 
for us, morality should not demand us all to be saints, who are, after 
all, individuals of exceptional moral capacities.261  
Second, depending on the normative theory in question, various 
sorts of psychological facts must be taken into account in deriving 
concrete rules or recommendations from abstract principles. In the 
simplest case, what the right rules or actions are according to 
hedonistic utilitarianism depends on which alternative results in the 
greatest amount of pleasure for sentient beings. This obviously 
requires knowing what kind of things give pleasure and pain to 
people and animals. Philosophical interest of this sort of facts, 
however, is not limited to hedonistic theories of value. Since 
virtually every normative theory, even Kantian deontology, gives 
some place to happiness, the recently burgeoning field of ‘positive 
psychology’, empirical study of the causes and measurement of felt 
well-being, holds much interest for ethicists.262 On the non-
consequentialist side, the key value is respecting and promoting 
personal freedom and autonomy. I have already discussed its 
empirical and conceptual conditions in Essay 3, and draw out further 
implications to the structure of normative arguments in Essay 4. 
4.1. Psychological Realism in Normative Ethics 
 
In Varieties of Moral Personality, Owen Flanagan articulates a thesis he 
calls the Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism: 
                                                                                                       
Arpaly (2007, ch. 2) argues by parity with norms for belief, which is 
commonly not taken to be under volitional control. 
261 The classic discussion is Wolf 1982, who argues that moral perfection 
“does not constitute a model of personal well-being which it would be 
particularly rational or good or desirable for a human being to strive” (Wolf 
1982, 419). 
262 For an overview from a philosophical perspective, see Tiberius 2006. 
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Make sure when constructing a moral theory or projecting a moral 
ideal that the character, decision processing, and behaviour 
prescribed are possible, or are perceived to be possible, for creatures 
like us. (Flanagan 1991, 32) 
 
Theories that fail to meet the constraint articulated by the principle 
arguably fail at a central task of ethical theory, namely giving us 
some guidance in decision-making and evaluating. Certainly, many 
moral philosophers believe that moral theory is not just an attempt 
to describe and explain how things are in the way that biology or 
physics is. It also has a practical import. Aristotle saw this clearly: 
The purpose of this inquiry is not, as it is in other inquiries, the 
attainment of theoretical knowledge: we are not conducting this 
inquiry in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become 
good, else there would be no advantage in studying it. (NE 1103b) 
 
From a more theoretical perspective, minimal psychological realism 
is supported by the connection between the ability to follow the 
demands of morality and fairness of holding one responsible for 
failures, as noted above. There are thus both practical and theoretical 
reasons for normative ethicists to ensure that they do not set up 
ideals that would be either cognitively or motivationally too taxing 
for us.  
On the cognitive side, the constraint of psychological realism is 
widely accepted – just about any act-consequentialist acknowledges 
that as a decision procedure, it would require “an impossible 
amount of attention to one’s action options”263. We simply cannot 
calculate and compare the outcomes of all possible actions. The 
standard response is to defend act consequentialism as a criterion of 
rightness instead, and allow for one heuristic or another to do the job 
of guiding decision.264 Motivational constraints are more 
controversial. One reason for this is that it is not so clear what we can 
                                                 
263 Flanagan 1991, 34. 
264 See for example Hare 1981 on the levels of moral thinking and 
Railton 1984. 
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and cannot do in this respect. Flanagan distinguishes between 
natural and social limits on psychological traits.265 Sexual desire, for 
example, is natural, but its expressions in action are heavily 
influenced by culture. Consequently, the sort of things that are not 
too demanding for members of one culture may be such for those 
who have deeply internalized the practices of another. They may not 
be strictly speaking impossible, but too costly to be worth it. This is, 
of course, controversial, since it involves modifying “ought implies 
can” into something like “ought implies can without excessive cost 
to personal well-being or self-deception”. Many are tempted to 
rather conclude with Kant that if we are too weak to meet the 
demands of morality, so much worse for us: what is wrong is still 
wrong.  
I need not take a position on the motivational demandingness 
issue here. Instead, I want to discuss empirical evidence for two 
psychological claims that would relatively uncontroversially require 
us to modify our normative theories if they were true: psychological 
egoism and the thesis that there are no such traits as virtues. 
 
The Reality of Altruism 
 
I have already discussed the issue of the motivational effectiveness 
of moral reasoning and moral sentiments above, so I will limit 
myself here to the more general question of the possibility – and 
actuality – of altruism, which provides a good illustration of the 
different roles of a priori reflection and experimental study. The 
form of altruism at issue is psychological altruism, which is a matter of 
having non-instrumental motives to benefit others – that is, motives 
that do not derive from some concern for one’s own good.266 It must 
be distinguished from behavioural altruism, which is the rather trivial 
                                                 
265 Flanagan 1991, 41–46. 
266 For a definition of psychological altruism that clearly distinguishes it 
from other things (sometimes misleadingly) called altruism, see Joyce 2005, 
13–16. 
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claim that we sometimes act in ways that benefit others at a cost to 
ourselves267, and from evolutionary altruism, the thesis that sometimes 
genes that dispose their vehicles (individuals) to sacrifice their 
reproductive fitness for others get selected for. Opposed to 
psychological altruism is psychological egoism, the thesis that all our 
motives are ultimately self-regarding.268 The truth or falsity of 
altruism is naturally of significance for minimally psychologically 
realist moral theories, since if it is the case that we are incapable of 
genuinely other-regarding motives, morality cannot demand them 
from us, supposing that ought implies can. This would require a 
radical revision of at least Kantian and virtue theories, as well as 
some consequentialist theories of agent-evaluation.269 
Since psychological egoism and altruism are hypotheses about 
actual human motivations, they are straightforwardly an empirical 
matter.270 Testing them empirically is nevertheless challenging, since 
there is always potentially a gap between external behaviour and 
ultimate motives, as well as between our introspective view of our 
motives and our real motives. Getting around this requires 
considerable ingenuity, and is not easily accomplished. Perhaps the 
                                                 
267 There are forms of behavioural altruism, however, whose existence is 
contentious. Ernst Fehr and his colleagues in the field of experimental 
microeconomics have conducted a series of experiments to study altruistic 
punishment, which is a form of behavioural altruism that seems to play a 
particularly important role in social coordination. See Fehr and Fischbacher 
(2003) for an overview of this research, which corrects some simplistic 
behavioural assumptions that rational choice theorists are sometimes liable 
to make. 
268 As Stich, Doris, and Roedder (MS) remind us, it is not simple to 
decide which desires are self-regarding and which are not. This is clearly a 
conceptual question that must be settled before any empirical investigation. 
269 Insofar as consequentialists assess actions only in light of their 
consequences, the possible falsity of altruism does not affect them. 
270 Philosophers have, to be sure, not always thought so. Mill 1863, for 
example, tries to prove a priori that altruism is “physically and 
metaphysically” impossible because of the connection between pleasure and 
desire. Blackburn 1998 gently corrects him with Butler’s point about the 
dependence of many pleasures on pre-existing desires. 
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cleverest experiments to date have been conducted by Daniel Batson 
and colleagues. Batson notes correctly that altruistic motivation for 
helping is compatible with receiving psychological and non-
psychological rewards (such as pleasure, fame, and money) for it, as 
long as the rewards are a by-product (a perhaps anticipated but 
unintended consequence) rather than the ultimate goal of helping 
behaviour.271 When motivation is egoistic, helping the other is only a 
means to some benefit for the self. To settle the question about 
psychological egoism we must thus be able to distinguish between 
goals, means, and unintended consequences of actions on the basis 
of observable behaviour.  
How, in general, do we do this? Well, goal-seeking behaviour 
presumably terminates when the goal is reached or believed to be 
unachievable, assuming the agent is minimally rational. In contrast, 
if something is a by-product, bringing it about or believing it 
impossible makes no difference to the behaviour in question. 
Suppose Joan’s boss is a big classical music aficionado who goes to 
all concerts of the local symphony orchestra. One day she announces 
she is going to go to see a Brahms violin concerto. Joan knows that if 
the boss sees her there, he will be pleased and think favourably of 
her in the next round of promotions. How can we discover whether 
Joan is going to the concert for the music (in which case pleasing the 
boss is a by-product of her action) or to please the boss (in which 
case going to the concert is a means to pleasing the boss)? It is hard 
to be certain, but if finding out that the boss will not be there after all 
leads Joan to drop her plan, or if finding an easier way to gain 
promotion has the same result, we can reasonably infer that going to 
the concert was for her at least in part a means for gaining the boss’s 
favour, rather than something she wanted to do for its own sake. If 
she does go anyway, that does not, however, yet show that her 
ultimate goal in going is listening to music – there could be some 
further end to which going to the concert is a means. But if no 
plausible candidate is on offer, we have grounds to conclude that she 
wants to listen to Brahms for its own sake.  
                                                 
271 See Batson 1991, 64–67; Sober and Wilson 1998, 217–222.  
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In general, if both A and B are known consequences of x’s action, 
we can reasonably infer that bringing about A is not a means to B for 
x if x brings A about while believing it cannot lead to B or while 
believing there is an easier or more efficient way C to gain B.272 This 
schema is important for testing psychological egoism, since the 
egoist’s claim is that benefiting others (paradigmatically relieving the 
suffering of others) is never the ultimate goal, but always the means 
to some benefit to oneself. Thus we can test various egoist 
hypotheses by removing the postulated benefits to self or adding an 
easier way to get them, and then observing whether the subject goes 
on nonetheless to provide benefit to others. This method is 
necessarily inconclusive, since there could, in principle, always be 
some other benefit to self that the action gives rise to. But given 
general assumptions about human psychology, the number of 
plausible egoistic hypotheses is very limited. Batson and his 
colleagues have focused on three most common ones. The 
alternatives can be diagrammed as follows (simplified and modified 
from Batson 1991, 76): 
                                                 
272 More precisely, we can infer that bringing about A is not mere means 
to B. As Aristotle already noted, it is possible to want something for its own 
sake and for the sake of something else; this is the relationship of virtues to 
eudaimonia. 
Perception of 
need to avoid 
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Perception of 
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for reward
Goal: 
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Sympathy 
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Perception of 
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Each story begins with the perception of someone else in need – they 
are, after all, alternative psychological hypotheses about the 
motivation to benefit others. The three first alternatives are egoistic, 
since in each case, helping another is only a means to some benefit to 
self. If rewards and punishments are understood as external, the first 
two hypotheses are very implausible – people certainly seem to 
benefit others without expecting an external reward for doing so or 
any kind of punishment for failing to do so. But there are also 
internal rewards and punishments, like empathic joy, guilt, and 
shame. These either cannot be had, or are most likely to be had, 
when we empathize with another person. Empathy, as such, can 
thus be a source of egoistic motivation. 
Batson labels the hypothesis that empathy leads to helping 
another as a way of getting an internal reward the empathy-specific 
rewards hypothesis, and the view that empathy leads to helping 
another as a means to avoid an internal punishment like guilt the 
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empathy-specific punishments hypothesis.273 The third hypothesis 
differs from the second in that what is avoided by helping is simply 
the unpleasant feeling caused by observing or thinking another’s 
suffering, not the unpleasant feeling resulting from one’s own failure 
to respond to it. This is known as aversive-arousal reduction 
hypothesis. For these egoistic hypotheses, empathy must be 
understood broadly to cover feelings aroused either by the feelings 
of others or the objective situation of others when it is such as to give 
rise to feelings in them. The first disjunct covers sharing the feelings 
that the other has (like feeling sad that John lost his job because John 
feels sad that he lost his job), while the second, which Sober and 
Wilson call ‘sympathy’, involves a feeling for the other that she does 
not necessarily have herself (like feeling sad for Elisa because her 
brother has died, even though she does not even know it yet).274 The 
fourth alternative Batson labels the empathy-altruism hypothesis (EA). 
According to it, empathy (which is here narrowly understood as 
“feeling sympathetic, compassionate, warm, softhearted, tender, and 
the like”275) can motivate us to have benefiting another as our 
ultimate goal. In empirical testing, it functions as the baseline against 
which egoistic alternatives are tested. I will next briefly summarize 
some of the experimental results that suggest EA fares better than its 
egoistic competitors. 
According to the aversive-arousal reduction hypothesis (AAR), 
we are motivated to help another in need, because we feel bad when 
witnessing someone else in need, and helping is a means to get rid of 
this bad feeling. The bad feeling is a kind of empathic arousal, since 
it results from the perception of another’s need. AAR gives rise to a 
testable prediction. If the real reason for helping is getting rid of 
empathic aversive arousal, one will take an alternative means to that 
end (for short, escape) if one is available. More precisely, one can be 
expected to help at a high rate in an experimental situation if there is 
no escape, particularly if empathetic arousal is high. However, if 
there is an easy way to escape, one can be expected to take it whether 
                                                 
273 For Batson’s terms, see Batson 1991, chapter 7. 
274 Sober and Wilson 1998, 232–235. 
275 Batson 1991, 86. 
 
 
 
 
145 
empathetic arousal is high or low. By contrast, if EA is true, the ease 
of escape should make little difference to helping behaviour, since 
helping is not a means to reduce one’s own arousal. 
To test these predictions, one needs to be able to manipulate both 
the subjects’ level of empathy and ease of escape. Batson and 
colleagues came up with the following sort of experimental setup to 
do this.276 Participants are told that the object of the study is task 
performance in aversive conditions and its effects on the attitudes of 
others. Aversion is to be created by giving electric shocks to the 
‘worker’. At the beginning of the experiment, participants draw lots 
for the roles of worker (in fact, a confederate) and observer; the draw 
is rigged so that the subject always receives the role of the observer, 
watching the worker, Elaine, perform ten two-minute number-
recalling tasks via television (in fact a pre-recorded videotape). After 
the first few trials, Elaine begins to look very distressed, and an 
assistant, Martha, goes to ask her what is wrong. Elaine explains that 
as a child she was thrown off a horse onto an electric fence, and was 
told that she might react strongly even to mild shocks in the future. 
Martha offers her a chance to quit, but she says she knows the 
experiment is important and wants to finish what she started. Then 
Martha hits upon an idea: maybe she could ask the observer to trade 
places with Elaine, and Elaine reluctantly agrees. A moment later, 
the experimenter comes to the observation room and tells the subject 
that Elaine is “finding the aversive conditions pretty uncomfortable” 
and that Martha was wondering whether the observer would like to 
trade places with Elaine, emphasizing that she has no obligation to 
do so, having drawn the observer lot. 
The participants are in four different conditions: easy or difficult 
escape and high or low empathy. In easy escape, they are told before 
the experiment that they need to observe only two out of the ten 
trials, and after Elaine’s distress that if they decide not to trade 
places, all they need to do is answer a few questions about their 
impression of Elaine and they may go. In difficult escape, they are told 
in advance that they have to watch all ten trials, and are reminded 
                                                 
276 Batson 1991, 113–117. 
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again of this commitment when they decide whether to trade places. 
Thus, they can either go and forget about Elaine (easy escape) or 
watch her suffer (difficult escape). To create the empathy conditions, 
Batson and colleagues make use of previous studies indicating that 
people are likely to empathize with people who they think are 
similar to them.277 To manipulate this, the subjects, who have several 
weeks earlier filled in a personality and values questionnaire, are 
handed before the experiment a copy of the same questionnaire 
allegedly filled in by Elaine. In high empathy condition, Elaine’s 
answers are very similar to the subjects’ own answers, in low 
empathy, very dissimilar. 
 The results can be summed up in the following 
table278 indicating how many percent of the subjects in each 
condition agreed to trade places and take shocks for Elaine: 
 
 Low empathy 
(dissimilar victim) 
High empathy (similar 
victim) 
Easy escape (told to 
leave) 
18% 91% 
Difficult escape (must 
stay and watch) 
64% 82% 
 
Recall that it follows from AAR that people would prefer an easy 
escape to costly helping (here receiving electric shocks), since 
helping is only a means to reducing one’s own aversive arousal. So 
the proportion of helpers should be smallest in the easy escape/high 
empathy condition. But the results are the opposite: people with 
high empathy are most likely to help when they have an easy 
                                                 
277 In another similar experiment, empathy was manipulated by placebo 
pills. In studies that were based on the subjects hearing a fake radio 
broadcast and being offered a chance to help the person in talked about, 
empathy was manipulated by asking participants in advance either to give 
an objective description of the elements of the story (low empathy) or think 
about what it is like to be the person talked about (high empathy). 
278 Based on Batson 1991, 116. 
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alternative means of reducing their own discomfort. This fits with 
EA, which thus receives corroboration from the experiment. 
Of course, this does not suffice to reject psychological egoism or 
even AAR – perhaps the manipulations fail in some way (for 
example, escape does not reduce aversive arousal or similarity does 
not increase empathy). Batson and his colleagues have therefore, first 
of all, varied the AAR experiments in several ways, such as 
manipulating empathy by placebo pills or perspective-taking instead 
of similarity, but the results have been the same – if people 
empathize with others, they choose to help rather take the easy 
escape.279 One frequent criticism has been that perhaps the escape is 
not so easy: after all, one might reasonably feel guilty for walking 
out on someone receiving electric shocks. This criticism is in effect 
the empathy-specific punishments hypothesis (ESP). It predicts that 
people are more likely to help others when they would feel guilty 
otherwise. To test it, one must therefore create conditions that are 
otherwise similar but differ in the likelihood that guilt is aroused. 
This is far from trivial. One way Batson and colleagues tried to do 
this is varying the availability of justification for not helping – after 
all, it is easy to rationalize guilt away if there is some plausible 
justification for inaction: “Even those who reflexively slap 
themselves with guilt and self-recrimination whenever they do 
wrong are likely to be sensitive to situational cues in determining 
when they have done wrong”280. They reasoned that people will be 
more likely to think it is all right not to help if they believe that 
others are not helping either, and more likely to think helping is the 
thing to do if they think that most others are doing it. As it turned 
out, providing a rationale for avoiding guilt did not significantly 
reduce helping behaviour (only 10% fewer participants offered help 
in the high justification/low-guilt condition); again, subjects 
behaved in accordance with EA rather than the egoist competitor 
ESP. Other manipulations of guilt included offering the opportunity 
to attribute refusal to help to features of the helping task itself – if 
                                                 
279 See Batson 1991, 118–127. 
280 Batson 1991, 135. 
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what one must do to help is difficult, one should be less likely to feel 
guilt for failing to do it.  
A different approach is to make use of the so-called emotional 
Stroop task.281 It is based on the observation that people are slower 
to name the colours of words that are related to their emotional state 
or preoccupation than those of neutral words – for example, an 
alcoholic is slower to name the colour of the word “whiskey” than 
the colour of the word “window”. A broadly accepted explanation is 
that this is a result of an attentional bias that interferes with the task, 
even though one is meant to ignore the semantic content of the 
words. Making use of this paradigm, Batson and colleagues had 
subjects in a helping task name the colours of both punishment-
relevant words (“guilt”, “duty”, “should”, “shame”) and victim-
relevant words (“hope”, “child”, “needy”, “friend”).282 EA would 
predict that empathic helpers would be at some level thinking about 
guilt rather than the needs and state of the person to be helped, so 
they should be slower at the colour-naming task for punishment-
relevant words than for neutral or victim-relevant ones. Once again, 
this turned out not to be the case, indicating that people did not have 
avoiding punishment in mind while helping. 
I lack the space to discuss all the studies testing egoistic 
hypotheses and their variants here. Suffice it to say that they have 
not fared well in psychological testing. This does not yet, of course, 
show that egoism is false. For one thing, the experimental setups are 
far from perfect.283 But bearing in mind the uneven argumentative 
burden – the egoist must show there is no altruistic motivation, 
while the altruist does not deny that there is egoistic motivation – we 
would need a very strong a priori reason to believe in egoism to 
embrace it. Some egoists have thought that they would find it in 
                                                 
281 See Williams, Mathews, and MacLeod (1996). The original “Stroop 
effect” was that people are slower to name the colours of words if the words 
have an incongruent meaning (like the word “green” written in blue ink). 
282 Batson et al. 1988. 
283 For example, Stich, Doris, and Roedder (MS) offer a number of 
criticisms of Batson’s work from a philosophical perspective. The problems 
they raise do not seem particularly serious, however. 
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evolutionary theory. After all, how could altruism survive in nature 
red in tooth and claw? But this line of argument turns out to rest on a 
confusion of levels. It is genes, not individuals, that get selected for, 
and it is not at all unusual in nature that the ‘interests’ of the two fail 
to coincide. Most obviously, genes that dispose a parent to sacrifice 
itself for its offspring may well spread in a population when the 
offspring of non-sacrificers gets eaten. There can be no doubt that 
costly helping or behavioural altruism exists in spades in nature.284 
Since the proximal mechanisms that govern intelligent behaviour in 
human beings are psychological states like beliefs and desires, there 
is good reason to believe that natural selection would favour 
dispositions to be non-instrumentally concerned for at least those 
who share one’s genes.285 This, of course, would be a very limited 
sort of altruism, but there are good reasons to believe that other sorts 
of prosocial behaviour (and so the motivational structures that 
promote it) also serve the interest in survival and reproduction.286 
                                                 
284 The existence of ‘evolutionary altruism’ is open to question, but also, 
fortunately, irrelevant to the philosophical and psychological questions. 
285 Sober and Wilson point out that in principle, two kinds of 
mechanisms for taking care of offspring might have evolved: parents could 
have an ultimate desire for the well-being of their offspring, or they could 
get a lot of pleasure from the prospering of their offspring and be hedonists 
(Sober and Wilson 1998, 312–313). The latter mechanism would be egoistic 
(since the well-being of the children would be a means to the parents’ 
pleasure). Sober and Wilson argue that the egoistic mechanism would be 
more unreliable than direct concern for children (because direct concern 
requires only a belief that children are in risk of being harmed to lead to 
action, while the egoistic mechanism requires also an additional belief that 
harm to children would be unpleasant), so the latter, psychologically 
altruistic alternative is likely to have been selected for (Sober and Wilson 
1998, 316–319). 
286 As Richard Joyce puts it, “If kin selection gave our distant ancestors 
the psychological and physiological structures needed for regulating helpful 
behavior toward family members, then those structures became available for 
use in new tasks – most obviously, helpful behavior toward individuals 
outside one’s family – if the pressures of natural selection pushed in that 
direction.” (Joyce 2006, 22) Joyce goes on to list a number of sources of such 
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We can, then, be fairly confident that psychological egoism is false, 
since nobody has come up with the sort of strong evidence that 
would be required for us to reject the appearance (an Aristotelian 
endoxon, surely) that at least some people sometimes have non-
derivative concerns for the good of others. Normative ethical 
theories that require some degree of altruistic motivation have not 
been shown to be psychologically unrealistic. 
 
 
Is Virtue Possible? 
 
The distinctive feature of virtue ethics, as opposed to its main 
competitors, deontology and consequentialism, is its focus on agents 
rather than individual actions. This is not to say that deontologists 
and consequentialists do not have anything to say about character or 
that virtue ethics does not have anything to say about individual 
actions, just that there is a particular emphasis on developing 
character traits and becoming a good person in virtue theorists. 
Within normative ethics, there has long been a healthy debate about 
the need for a specific virtue theory and the best form for it. In recent 
years, however, virtue ethicists have had to face a somewhat 
surprising external challenge: do the sort of character traits they 
think we should have exist at all? To answer this question, we need 
to first understand what character traits are meant to be. 
If everybody behaved the same (similar) way in same (similar) 
situations, we would have no use for concepts of character and 
personality.287 We could still predict and explain their behaviour and 
                                                                                                       
pressures, such as the benefits of joint action, direct and indirect reciprocity, 
and group selection. 
287 ‘Sameness’ is a bit tricky here. Obviously, no two situations are the 
same in the sense of being numerically identical, nor are they perfectly 
similar in the sense of being qualitatively identical. Nonetheless, it seems 
perfectly unproblematic to classify situations into repeatable types on the 
basis of contextually salient features. Thus, in one context, you and I can be 
in the same situation if we both discover at the office that we’ve left the keys 
home; in another context, such discovery could mean that our situations are 
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even patterns of behaviour, but only on the basis of situations 
themselves and patterns in them. If everybody behaved in a 
completely random way, we would have no more use for character 
concepts; nothing except particular circumstances would predict or 
explain people’s behaviour. However, neither of the antecedents is 
true: people do behave differently in relevantly similar situations, 
and not in a random way either. The mind of an adult (or even a 
child) is not a blank slate when it comes to dispositions to perceive 
and respond to practically relevant changes in the environment. The 
set of such dispositions constitutes what we call the personality of a 
person. Character traits are plausibly a subset of personality traits, 
perhaps distinguished by their prima facie evaluative significance.288 
Both personality and character traits are, at a familiar level of 
abstraction, shareable with others – you and I can both be fidgety 
Bible-thumpers (sharing personality traits) or stingy cowards 
(sharing character traits). Personalities and characters are (as a 
matter of fact) unique on two dimensions, as it were: horizontally 
(they have a different combination of in principle shareable traits) and 
vertically (they possess the same traits in different ways – your 
honesty may be different from my honesty). It is conceivable, though 
empirically unlikely, that two people would have identical 
personalities. They would still behave differently, however, as long 
as they faced different situations. 
What kind of dispositions are character traits? The recent 
literature on the empirical adequacy of virtue ethics highlights a 
number of distinctive features that character traits are traditionally 
taken to have.289 They are meant to be robust, that is, resistant to 
situational pressures to the contrary. Ceteris paribus, an honest person 
will not lie even when she could do so with impunity and to a great 
personal advantage. They are cross-situationally consistent, that is, 
they manifest themselves in a variety of trait-relevant situations 
across different contexts (home, workplace, and so on). An honest 
                                                                                                       
very different – your husband is waiting for you anyway, while nobody has 
a spare key to the reinforced concrete door to my cozy bunker. 
288 This is how Goldie (2004) draws the distinction. 
289 For the following, see especially Doris 1999. 
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person will tell the truth in a host of different situations that call for 
telling the truth and, conversely, refrain from lying or misleading in 
all (or most) of those situations. Nor will she steal or cheat. Character 
traits are also stable over time, not changing day by day. And finally, 
as talk of situations that ‘call for’ a particular kind of response 
suggests, they are responsive to reasons. An honest person will 
recognize when there is reason to tell the truth and act for that 
reason (as well as taking it into account in deliberation, if that is 
needed). If she finds that being silent would mislead her 
conversational partner, she sees this as a strong non-instrumental 
reason to speak up. Typically, this does not involve thinking in 
virtue terms (“That would be the honest thing to do, so I will do it”), 
but rather simply seeing the relevant features as favoring or 
disfavoring certain courses of action (“It would be good for me if he 
believed that, but it just isn’t true, so forget about it”).  
Recently, John Doris (1999, 2002), Gilbert Harman (1999b) and 
others have argued that there are no robust, cross-situationally 
consistent, stable, and reasons-responsive dispositions that would 
play a role in the explanation of behavior, and thus no character 
traits in the ‘global’ sense that virtue ethicists need.290 At most, there 
are very local dispositions of this sort, like being “dime-finding, 
dropper-paper compassionate”291. The basic thesis of this situationist 
alternative is that “[b]ehavioral variation across a population owes 
more to situational differences than dispositional differences among 
persons.”292 Thus, situationists do not deny that some people tell the 
truth more often than others, for example. The claim is simply that 
what explains this is that these people are placed in certain kinds of 
                                                 
290 I am leaving out of discussion one of the features of character traits 
that Doris discusses, namely evaluative consistency, the thesis that if a 
person has one positive or negative character trait (like generosity), she is 
also likely to have others of same valence (like compassion) (Doris 1999, 
506). This is obviously related to the unity of virtue thesis, which not all 
virtue ethicists endorse. 
291 Doris 1999, 514. For context, see the discussion of Isen and Levin 1972 
below. 
292 Doris 2002, 24. 
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situations (in which truth-telling is easy or advantageous or 
whatever) more often than others, and not something about their 
character. Doris’s basic argument for this is a modus tollens on the 
basis of a hypothesis about the nature of character traits and the 
empirical data (Doris and Stich 2006):  
 
1. If behaviour is typically ordered by robust traits, 
systematic observation will reveal pervasive behavioural 
consistency. 
2. Systematic observation does not reveal pervasive 
behavioural consistency. 
3. Therefore, behaviour is not typically ordered by robust 
traits. 
 
The first premise is a little too simple, insofar as character traits 
manifest themselves first in perceptions of reasons rather than 
behaviour, but if the demands of particular situations are consistent 
and if agents are moved to act by their perceptions of reasons – two 
major qualifications – we can still expect behavioural consistency.293 
As to the second premise, social psychologists have produced a large 
number of studies purporting to show ‘the power of the situation’. I 
will next briefly describe three well-known studies in this vein and 
then take a closer look at whether they support Doris and Harman’s 
contention. 
One class of studies concerns the effects of situations on helping. 
In Isen and Levin’s (1972) study, the experimenters left a dime in a 
public telephone in a shopping mall, so that the next person using 
the phone (the unwitting experimental subject), would have the nice 
surprise of a free call.294 The control group were people using the 
same telephone without finding a dime. When the subject left the 
                                                 
293 Kamtekar (2004, 474) is therefore not charitable enough to 
situationists when she claims that they “treat all the traits on the model of 
aggression: people who possess a given trait are expected, to the extent that 
they possess the trait, to behave spontaneously and unreflectively in ways 
that manifest it on every occasion.” 
294 For the following, see Isen and Levin 1972, 386–387. 
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phone booth, a female confederate walking ahead dropped a manila 
folder full of papers, apparently accidentally. The dependent 
measure was whether the subject would help the confederate pick 
up the papers or not. 14 out of 16 people who found a dime did stop 
to help, but only 1 out of 25 who did not find a dime stopped. As 
Isen and Levin interpret the results, what explains the subjects’ 
behaviour is good mood occasioned by the unexpected and 
convenient find.  
Latané and Rodin (1969), in turn, were interested in the effect of 
the presence of other people (the ‘bystander effect’) on helping 
behaviour. In their experiment, college students were asked to fill in 
a questionnaire on games by a female ‘marketing researcher’. While 
they were working on it, the ‘marketing researcher’ went to her 
office in the next room, and after a few minutes was heard to first 
climb on a chair to reach for a stack of papers and then fall with loud 
crash, saying “Oh my God, my foot… I… I… I can’t move it […] I… 
can’t get this… thing… off me”, and moaning loudly.295 (This was in 
fact a tape recording, which most of the subjects did not realize.) The 
variable here was whether subjects would go and help. Subjects were 
tested in four conditions: filling the questionnaire alone, with a 
passive confederate (who did not go and help), with another test 
subject, and together with a friend. Afterwards, they were asked 
why they acted as they did. Again, the results were striking: 70% of 
the subjects who were alone helped, while only 7% of those with a 
passive confederate did anything.296 Yet when asked, most subjects 
tested with a confederate reported that the presence of another 
person had “very little” influence on their behaviour. Latané and 
Rodin offer two possible explanations for these results. First, the 
‘social influence’ explanation is that faced with an ambiguous 
situation (What are those noises? Am I meant to do something?), 
people look to other people’s reactions for guidance. When the other 
                                                 
295 The experiment is described in Latané and Rodin 1969, 191–192.  
296 Latané and Rodin 1969, 193. When two subjects unknown to each 
other were paired, at least one helped in 40% of the cases, and at least one of 
two friends helped in 70% of the cases (suggesting that the presence of a 
friend neither hindered nor increased helping) (ibid., 195–196). 
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person (the confederate) is unconcerned, they conclude that the 
situation is not so bad.297 This does not exclude a second 
explanation, which is simply that when more than one person is 
present, responsibility for inaction gets diffused – there is less of a 
pressure for me to do something about the situation.298 
                                                
The final series of studies I want to look at is Stanley Milgram’s 
justly famous obedience experiments. In the original experiment 
(Milgram 1963), forty men of various socioeconomic groups were 
paid to participate in an experiment on ‘punishment and learning’.299 
Each subject was paired with another ‘volunteer’ (in fact a 
confederate), and assigned the role of a ‘teacher’ by a rigged drawing 
of lots. The teacher’s ostensible task was to give multiple choice tasks 
involving memorizing word pairs to the learner, and punish the 
learner with an electric shock every time he made a mistake (or 
failed to respond), crucially increasing the level of the shock with 
each mistake. He was shown how the learner was strapped to a chair 
and electrodes applied to his wrist. The teacher also received a 
sample shock of 45 volts to convince him of the authenticity of the 
device he was to operate. The device itself had 30 lever switches 
marked from 15 to 450 volts, with additional verbal designations 
from ‘Slight Shock’ to ‘Danger: Severe Shock’. The teacher was told 
that none of the shocks result in permanent tissue damage, though 
they may be painful. 
During the run of the experiment, the ‘learner’, situated out of 
sight in a separate room and responding by way of a signal box, 
gave wrong answers about 3/4ths of the time. In the original 
experiment, the learner did not communicate otherwise, except by 
banging the wall at the 300 volt level and ceasing to give any sign 
after 315 volts. In later experiments, the learner made other noises 
and comments.300 For example, at the Strong Shock level (135-180 
 
297 Latané and Rodin 1969, 198–199. They also hypothesize that since 
Americans like to appear poised and unconcerned in public, people are 
mutually led astray by the apparent lack of concern of each other. 
298 Latané and Rodin 1969, 199. 
299 For a description of the setup, see Milgram 1963, 373–374. 
300 See Doris 2002, 41–42. 
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volts), he said “Ugh!!! Experimenter! That’s all. Get me out of here. I 
told you I had heart trouble.”. At Intense Shock (255-300 volts), the 
reactions included agonized screaming and “I absolutely refuse to 
answer any more”. Extreme Intensity Shock (315-360 volts) resulted 
in an “intense and prolonged agonized scream”, “My heart’s 
bothering me”, and hysterical repetition of “Let me out of here”, 
followed by silence at 345 volts. In these studies, if the teacher did 
not shock the learner after a wrong response, the experimenter, who 
was with the teacher, prodded him along in a firm but not impolite 
tone according to a predetermined series from “Please continue” to 
“You have no choice, you must go on”. 
The results of the first study came as a surprise to everyone 
involved. Here are some of them: 
 
- no subject stopped before 300 volts, labeled “Intense Shock” 
(“At this level … the victim kicks on the wall and no longer 
provides answers to the teacher’s multiple-choice 
questions.”) 
- 14 subjects stopped between 300 and 375 volts (the latter 
labeled “Danger: Severe Shock”) 
- 26 subjects went on to the end of the scale (450 volts, labeled 
“XXX”) 
 
These results have been replicated in a number of follow-up studies. 
On average, two thirds of subjects go to the end of the scale.301 And 
the results cannot be explained away by the subjects’ seeing through 
the experimental setup. Quite the contrary; when asked after the 
experiment to rate the strength of the last shocks they gave on a 14-
point scale from “not at all painful” to “extremely painful”, the 
subjects mean estimate was 13.42 (mode 14). Their manner of 
behaviour during the experiment matched this belief: “Subjects were 
observed to sweat, tremble, stutter, bite their lips, groan, and dig 
their fingernails into their flesh.”302 
                                                 
301 Doris 2002, 45. 
302 Milgram 1963, 375. 
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These kinds of results, Doris and Harman claim, call into 
question the existence of character traits in the sense that virtue 
theories must assume. For this to be so, virtue theory must predict 
that people would not act in the observed ways in the situations. 
This requires that the following two assumptions hold in each case: 
 
a) Virtue demands behaviour x, not the observed 
behaviour y 
b) The number of participants who would be considered 
virtuous is significantly higher than the number of 
participants who actually behave in the way x 
 
Assumption b is required, since, as Doris acknowledges, if virtue is 
very rare, the results of the studies are precisely what virtue theory 
would predict – only a few people do the kind thing when 
conditions are not conducive to it. Let us assume, then, for the time 
being that b is true in each of the cases. What about a? To begin with, 
it is not obvious that kindness demands one to stop and pick up the 
papers of clumsy people while you are busy shopping or going 
home yourself. It would be kind, to be sure, and there is some reason 
to do it, as well as some reason not to. Failing to help does not mean 
you are callous or selfish. In fact, the case looks like many of 
automaticity studies: there is a near balance of reasons for action, 
and it is tipped in one way or another by a situational factor, in this 
case a lucky mood triggered by the discovery of a coin. Just minding 
your own business and walking past seems here compatible with 
possessing an ordinary degree of kindness. A really kind or helpful 
person – the sort of person we make a point of calling kind or helpful 
– might give more weight to this sort of considerations, and we 
would expect her to be more likely to help in the experimental 
situation. But that is consistent with the data. Virtue is a matter of 
degree, and for most virtues, possessing them to a high degree is 
indeed rare and something to aspire to for most of us.303  
                                                 
303 Cf. Sreenivasan 2002, 57. 
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At the other extreme with regard to the demands of virtue are 
Milgram’s studies. Here there is no equivocation: however we 
understand virtue, it demands one to stop participating in the 
experiment way before XXX. And it seems that the subjects recognize 
that, too. Here is how Milgram himself describes them: 
It is clear from the remarks and outward behavior of many 
participants that in punishing the victim they are often acting 
against their own values. Subjects often expressed deep disapproval 
of shocking a man in the face of his objections, and others 
denounced it as stupid and senseless. Yet the majority complied 
with experimental commands. (Milgram 1963, 376) 
 
There is thus little doubt that the participants perceived the suffering 
of the learner as calling for them to stop. These people are not 
sadists, but ordinary, decent citizens. Yet they go on, giving in to 
fairly mild pressure exerted by the experimenter. They have some 
excuses available – up to a point the learner does give answers in 
spite of the shocks, indicating a willingness to go on with the 
experiment, and of course there is some level of trust in the 
institution involved; surely a university researcher would not ask 
them to do something really dangerous to another person. But these 
really are excuses: the evidence available to them strongly points to 
serious pain and fatal risk. So what is going on? The best explanation 
seems to be that the situational pressures inhibit the move from 
perception of reasons and ought-judgments based on them to action. 
As Allan Gibbard notes, this is a kind of weakness of will. He 
suggests that the participants are in the grip of norms of politeness 
and cooperation with the experimenter, and thus give in against 
their best judgment.304 From a virtue theory perspective, the 
participants – and, we may infer from the studies, most of us – are 
lacking in executive virtues. The moral failure at play is not in the 
first instance lack of compassion but lack of courage. 
What the Milgram studies, as well as, to an extent, the Latané 
and Rodin study (which is not such a clear case, since the presence of 
                                                 
304 Gibbard 1990, 59. 
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others and observation of their reactions both reduces helping and 
the strength of reasons to help) and many others like Zimbardo’s 
Stanford Prison Experiment, point to is that virtue is a lot more 
fragile than we might have thought. Even when we recognize 
reasons, we do not always act on them if there are social pressures to 
the contrary. This inaction, in turn, may well lead us to rationalize 
away our original perception. This is an important lesson, and one 
that is relevant to both private planning and public policy-making.305 
Does it mean that there are no character traits or virtues? Hardly so. 
The experimental results show at best that the virtues of many of us 
are less robust, broad, and reasons-responsive than an optimist 
about human nature might have thought. It does not tell against 
somewhat the more localized and fragile dispositions whose 
existence is attested to by the lifetime of better-than-chance 
predictive success that most of us have enjoyed, particularly with 
people we have observed and interacted with in many different 
contexts.306 The ideal articulated by virtue ethics, particularly as an 
ideal to aspire to, has not been shown to fall foul of the constraint of 
minimal psychological realism. 
                                                 
305 Zimbardo (2007), for example, argues that studies like his predict the 
sort of abuse that occurred (and occurs) in Abu Ghraib and other American 
military prisons, and that the scandals could and should thus have been 
avoided by putting the social psychological knowledge to use. 
306 Sreenivasan emphasizes that our tendency to rush into character 
judgments on the basis of meager evidence (such as a few observations of an 
individual’s behaviour in a particular context) and ignore the effect of the 
situation in which the person is (the ‘fundamental attribution error’ in the 
language of social psychology) does not as such count against the existence 
of character traits: “If we suppose that a trait has been attributed without 
warrant, it will come as no surprise to learn that the predictions it licenses 
are frequently confounded” (Sreenivasan 2002, 54). Poorly grounded 
predictions will indeed fail: if I think Jack is honest just on the basis of 
having seen him give a dropped ten-dollar note back to its owner, it is my 
own stupidity if he walks away with a million-dollar loan I gave him. Virtue 
theory predicts predictive success only on the basis of thorough 
acquaintance and, post-Milgram, under normal background conditions (cf. 
Sreenivasan 2002, 66). 
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Essay 4: ‘Reason, Recognition, and Internal Critique’ 
 
The question at the heart of ‘Reason, Recognition, and Internal 
Critique’ is a very old one: how do you rationally persuade someone 
to accept a moral norm she does not at present accept? One answer 
comes from a minority philosophical tradition going back at least to 
Socrates and Aristotle and resurfacing with Hegel and Marx: by 
showing that the person or group in question is in fact already 
committed to accepting it. This, in brief, is what internal critique 
amounts to. In the final (and oldest) paper of my dissertation, I 
examine the advantages and different varieties of internal critique, as 
well as the role that psychological facts having to do with the 
importance of recognition can play in it. 
I begin with a look at the logical space of possible sources of 
standards of normative criticism. (In the paper, I present the issue at 
the social level, but mutatis mutandis, the same points apply to 
individuals.) One could criticize another society’s practices on that 
basis of one’s own norms as such, objective norms like natural law, 
or the society’s own norms. The first two are forms of external 
criticism. Appeal to the mere fact that we find, for example, universal 
healthcare to be a necessary component of a decent society is highly 
unlikely to persuade someone who disagrees, nor should it. In 
contrast, if there are objective reasons (and I am less sceptical about 
them now than I was when I wrote the paper), they do, obviously, 
carry normative weight with everyone. But the other party to the 
debate will probably have a different view about objective reasons, 
and it is not easy to show that one is in an epistemically superior 
situation. If it is possible to show that the target society’s own 
fundamental normative commitments already require, say, 
providing taxpayer-funded healthcare to everyone, concerns about 
the status and accessibility of objective normative truths are 
bypassed. In addition, the criticism is more likely to be effective in 
practice, since some kind of motivation to comply with the norms 
already exists. Internal critique is therefore preferable to external 
criticism both in justificatory and pragmatic terms. 
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Internal critique, too, can take several forms. I distinguish 
between simple internal critique, which draws on the explicit 
commitments of a society or group and aims to show that they 
contradict some policy or practice, and reconstructive internal 
critique, which begins by making explicit commitments that are 
implicit in a society or group’s practice, and then aims to show that 
they are not consistent with a particular policy or practice. Implicit 
norms manifest themselves in unarticulated emotions and informal 
sanctions, for example, and may form an unstated basis for customs 
and norms. Within reconstructive internal critique, I further 
distinguish weak and strong forms. Weak reconstructive critique 
draws on contingent implicit norms of a society, whereas strong 
reconstructive critique articulates normative commitments that are 
unavoidable, that any social group must undertake to some degree 
to function and reproduce. The critical theories of Habermas and 
Honneth are both forms of strong reconstructive internal critique, 
and as such more ambitious that simple critique of ideology. 
As already discussed in ‘The Social Dimension of Autonomy’, 
Honneth argues that social psychological research supports the 
quasi-Hegelian view that taking up the sort of attitudes toward 
ourselves that enable autonomous agency and forming a personal 
identity requires, as a matter of empirical fact, that others express 
corresponding attitudes toward us. (The Hegelian twist is that for 
these attitudes of others to matter to us, we must, in turn, recognize 
them – respect from someone I do not respect does not help my self-
respect.) For him, this is an anthropological fact about becoming and 
being a person. This need for recognition gives rise to a normative 
demand for recognition. Pre-philosophically, to be sure, we are not 
aware that it is recognition we are looking for, but that goal and its 
normative status for us can be read in our emotional reactions to 
failures of recognition. These negative moral emotions manifest the 
expectation we have to be treated as persons, and, when systematic, 
motivate action for social change. (There are presumably positive 
emotions in response to achieving recognition.) I find Honneth’s 
basic idea here plausible, even exciting, but point out that we must 
be more careful when looking at moral emotions as indicators of lack 
of recognition: sometimes people have them because of false beliefs 
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when there is no failure of recognition, and sometimes lack them 
because of ideology even though there is misrecognition. 
If Honneth and the Hegelian tradition in general are right, every 
society must by ‘anthropological necessity’ already be implicitly 
committed to some norms of mutual recognition that we can 
reconstruct from their practices and emotional reactions. Internal 
critique can then proceed on the basis of pointing out the 
contradiction between a particular practice or explicit norm in force 
in the society and the norms of recognition. But, I argue in the paper, 
there are two challenges even if we accept all this. First, there is the 
question of why norms of recognition should be given priority when 
they conflict with other norms of the society (I call this the Priority 
Challenge). Second, there is a further question about what reason the 
society or group in question (or those in power within it) has to 
extend the application of recognition to those from whom they do 
not need it (the Application Challenge). On Honneth’s behalf, I 
suggest that a critic can appeal to the functional importance of 
recognition to show that the norms related to it are more 
fundamental than most other norms. As to the Application 
Challenge, I argue that the best response to it will appeal to further 
moral considerations. Honneth himself appeals to the value of ‘self-
realization’, which, however, threatens to limit the scope of internal 
critique to those for whom self-realization is a fundamental value. I 
favour coherentist arguments instead. Armed with knowledge about 
the empirical importance of recognition, we can try to convince the 
members of the criticized society that were they to reach wide 
reflective equilibrium, they would find that they have no normative 
basis for withholding recognition from outsiders and outcasts. This 
kind of internal critique can lead to a new normative self-
understanding by locating and amplifying forces of change within 
the criticized society. 
Though the argument of ‘Reason, Recognition, and Internal 
Critique’ is formulated in terms of dialectical argumentation – from 
one perspective, it is an attempt to show how to defeat relativism 
without assuming superior epistemic access to moral values – the 
same psychological facts can be employed in more straightforward 
normative theorizing. Just like utilitarians must know what as a 
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matter of fact promotes happiness to derive concrete moral 
principles and judgments from the abstract goal of maximizing 
general welfare, Kantians and other liberals must know what as a 
matter of fact promotes and respects the autonomy of persons to 
derive concrete principles and judgments from the abstract goal of 
promoting everyone’s autonomy to the extent that it does not 
conflict with the autonomy of others. The normative remarks at the 
end of ‘The Social Dimension of Autonomy’ adopt this simpler 
strategy.307 
 
 
 
                                                 
307 In his response to my paper (published in the same issue of Inquiry), 
Honneth seems to adopt a similar strategy, and so making what he calls self-
realization the value on which the interest in recognition depends. 
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Conclusion 
At the beginning of this introduction, I laid out what I consider to be 
the three main questions of philosophical moral psychology: 
 
1. What are the necessary psychological conditions for making 
moral judgments – that is, what is the nature of moral 
thinking? 
2. What are the necessary psychological conditions for being 
morally responsible and thus fit to be praised and blamed? 
3. What are the implications of facts about human psychology 
for normative ethical theory? 
 
The distinctively philosophical approach to the first two questions 
has been to begin with an a priori investigation of the concepts and 
conditions of possibility involved. Recently, experimental 
philosophers have challenged this, and conducted empirical studies 
to discover a posteriori what ordinary people take to be necessary for 
moral judgment or moral responsibility. One response to this would 
be to reject the importance of folk concepts, but I agree with the 
experimentalists that this is a costly move. Philosophers need to stick 
closely to what ordinary people mean by moral thinking or 
responsibility if their work is to have any relevance. In ‘The Rise and 
Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that survey studies cannot, 
for reasons of principle, achieve their goal, and traditional methods 
of reflection and dialogue can. This deflects a major challenge to 
philosophical moral psychology. 
When we move to substantial issues, however, further challenges 
to philosophical reflection arise. There is a constant theme to much 
recent work in empirical moral psychology, whether it concerns the 
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process of moral judgment, the kind of control required for moral 
responsibility, or the existence of moral virtues. Study after study 
claims to show that the true causes of our judgments and actions are 
hidden from us, that our self-understanding as rational, responsible 
agents is an illusion. Since much of philosophical moral psychology 
consists in articulating that self-understanding, these results threaten 
to reduce it to irrelevance. However, a careful survey of these studies 
shows that their claims are inflated for two different reasons. First, 
neither our commonsense self-understanding nor philosophical 
views are nearly as naïve as the psychologists like to paint them. As I 
have tried to show in this introduction, major philosophical 
traditions acknowledge the importance of emotional and automatic 
processes in moral judging and other decision-making alongside 
conscious reasoning. Second, the conclusions that can be legitimately 
drawn from the experimental data are far less dramatic than 
empirical researchers themselves suggest. As far as the studies show, 
non-rational situational cues and unacknowledged emotions play 
the biggest role at the margins and when nothing very important is 
at stake. To put it from a different perspective, the empirical 
accounts that purport to undermine our self-understanding fail to 
explain the felt authority of morality and the fact that our choices in 
general are intelligible in light of consciously held values and goals. 
It may be appropriate to finish this introduction by highlighting 
the answers that I give to the basic question of philosophical moral 
psychology in the papers that comprise the substantial part of this 
dissertation: 
 
1. What are the necessary psychological conditions for 
making moral judgments – that is, what is the nature of 
moral thinking? 
 
To think that one morally ought to do something is to locate 
oneself in the space of reasons, understood as a web of 
commitments and entitlements. It is to take anyone in a 
relevantly similar situation to be entitled to do the same 
(unless pre-empted by prior commitments) and to take 
anyone to be entitled to sanction oneself negatively unless 
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one acts in the way in question. The first-personal moral 
judgment is true if one’s deontic status really is as described. 
It motivates an agent to act accordingly insofar as she is 
rational in the sense of responding to the acknowledgment 
of commitments and entitlements in the appropriate way. 
 
2. What are the necessary psychological conditions for 
being morally responsible and thus fit to be praised and 
blamed? 
 
Autonomous, fully morally responsible agents must be at 
least moderately capable of recognizing desire-independent 
reasons for action, giving them appropriate weight in 
deliberation, and being motivated accordingly. To exercise 
these capacities, they must have self-confidence, self-respect, 
and self-esteem, which appears as a matter of empirical fact 
to require standing in relationships of recognition with other 
agents. 
 
3. What are the implications of facts about human 
psychology for normative ethical theory? 
 
Especially in dialectical moral argumentation, psychological 
facts can serve as a lever to coax the opponent into 
modifying her position. For example, since human beings 
can as a matter of fact become autonomous and morally 
responsible agents only through standing in relations of 
mutual recognition to other agents and institutions, any 
society or normative theory for which autonomy is a central 
value must also grant the importance of love, rights, and 
social esteem, and treat measures that promote them as 
increasing rather than compromising autonomy. 
 
None of these answers pretends to be a comprehensive response to 
the question. A single article can contribute only so much to a 
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collaborative project that philosophers have been engaged in for 
several thousand years. I only hope to have nudged these debates 
forward a little. 
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